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ABSTRACT 
 
Sport management scholars have increasingly examined institutional change in sport. 
This line of work tends to focus on isomorphism in the adoption of new organizational practices 
or structures (Cunningham, 2009; Kikulis, 2000; Slack & Hinings, 1994), and often depicts sport 
organizations as passive recipients of broader field-level institutional demands. We lack 
understanding of institutional factors affecting variation in sport policy adoption across 
geographic boundaries and the role of agency in the change process. This dissertation aims to 
extend our understanding of institutional change around sport policy, corresponding variations in 
organizational responses, and the role of agency in institutional processes by investigating 1) the 
local community-level institutional factors on the varied rate of sport policy adoption across 
geographic boundaries (Study 1), and 2) the activities and tactics by which institutional 
entrepreneurs create and promote the passage of new sport policies (Study 2). Empirically, I 
study these institutional dynamics in the context of the passage of youth sport concussion 
legislation across U.S. states. First, I provide background and historical overview of my context 
around concussion in sports in Chapter 2. Then, in Study 1 of this dissertation (Chapter 3), I 
conducted an event history analysis to investigate the effects of institutional triggers, and 
cultural, political, and social factors, within and between states, on the speed of concussion 
legislation adoption. My quantitative analysis shows that a series of intrastate factors—state 
norms, disruptive events, and state advocacy—have a significant influence on state policy 
adoption. Supporting qualitative data provide additional insight around the role of disruptive 
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events and local advocacy in the adoption of concussion legislation. This study contributes to a 
better understanding of cross-state diffusion of institutional change in sport, and heterogeneity in 
the process. In Study 2 of this dissertation (Chapter 4), I conducted multi-case study to explore 
the activities and tactics by which coalitions of individuals and organizations create and promote 
the passage of state-level concussion legislation. My findings show that institutional 
entrepreneurs engaged in diverse types of activities and tactics to advance the passage of 
concussion legislation. First, they were tasked with political activity, namely coalition building, 
in which they employed tactics including prioritizing recruitment for knowledge and legitimacy, 
diversified membership, involving skeptics, and developing a shared vision to build a broad-
based coalition. Next, coalition actors moved to technical activity that concentrated on building a 
concussion legislation template. Important tactics included leveraging expertise, strategic 
compromise, and using neutral and inclusive language. These institutional entrepreneurs also 
became involved in cultural activity that focused on framing and justifying the adoption of 
concussion legislation. Relevant tactics included episodic framing (i.e., highlighting a particular 
individual’s story) and embedding the issue in a broader value context. This study sheds light on 
the multifaceted nature and temporal dynamics underlying institutional change in sport. 
Collectively, Study 1 and Study 2 contribute to prior sport management studies focused on the 
constraining effects of institutional forces on organizational processes (Berrett & Slack, 1999; 
Silk & Amis, 2000), by shedding light on how institutional entrepreneurs can re-evaluate and 
capitalize on local institutional factors to initiate institutional change in sport.
1 
CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
 
Sport management scholars have increasingly examined institutional change in sport 
(Cousens & Slack, 2005; Heinze & Lu, 2017; O'Brien & Slack, 2003; Washington, 2004; 
Washington & Ventresca, 2004, 2008). This line of research tends to focus on isomorphism in 
the adoption of new organizational practices or structures (Cunningham, 2009; Danisman, 
Hinings, & Slack, 2006; Kikulis, 2000; Slack & Hinings, 1992, 1994; Stevens & Slack, 1998; 
Washington & Patterson,  2011), and often depicts sport organizations as passive recipients of 
broader field-level institutional demands—either coerced into similar forms (Danylchuk & 
Chelladurai, 1999; Vos, Breesch, Késenne, Hoecke, Vanreusel, & Scheerder, 2011), or 
mimicking others for legitimacy (Babiak & Trendafilova, 2011; Silk, Slack, & Amis, 2000).  
Less is known about institutional change around sport policy and corresponding 
variations in organizational responses. New policies or legislation, including in sport, represent 
formal arrangements and regulations that provide guidelines for accepted norms within 
organizational fields and are thus important carriers of institutional change (Hoffman & 
Ventresca, 2002; Gilardi, 2004; Sine & David, 2003). Several recent studies have suggested that 
institutional pressures at the local geographic community level help account for variations in 
organizational practice or policy adoption across communities (Marquis & Battilana, 2009; 
Marquis, Glynn, & Davis, 2007; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis, Lounsbury, & 
Greenwood, 2011; Pe’Er & Gottschalg, 2011). Hence, organizations, including state legislatures,
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may respond differently to sport policy changes in the field, depending on the local, community-
level institutional context. In the first study of the dissertation (Chapter 3), I examine the effects 
of institutional factors within a local and immediate institutional environment (Marquis & 
Battilana, 2009; Marquis et al., 2007), on the rate of sport policy adoption across geographic 
boundaries. This investigation extends beyond the isomorphism hypothesis in prior institutional 
studies in sport management (Cunningham & Ashley, 2001; Pentifallo & VanWynsberghe, 2012; 
Slack & Hinings, 1992, 1994) to shed light on heterogeneity within the broader process of 
institutional change in sport.  
Institutional change, including via sport policy innovation, generates opportunities for 
entrepreneurial action (Child, Lu, & Tsai, 2007; Wijen, & Ansari, 2007). The adoption of new 
policies or legislation is often driven by collective action among individual and organizational 
leaders (Gilligan, 1997; Schlager, 1995; Wijen, & Ansari, 2007). These collaborators act as 
institutional entrepreneurs by mobilizing resources and skills to create, justify, and legitimize 
new institutions and social arrangements (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006; Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004). However, we lack knowledge of how 
institutional entrepreneurs create and promote the adoption of new sport policies. In the second 
study of the dissertation (Chapter 4), I explore the activities and tactics of institutional 
entrepreneurs in passing new sport policy. This examination adds to the expanding literature 
around institutional analysis in sport management (Calvin, Abiodun, & Marvin, 2018; Heinze & 
Lu, 2017; Patterson, Arthur, & Washington, 2016; Washington & Patterson, 2011) to underscore 
the importance of agency in institutional processes in sport. 
I conduct such institutional analysis in the context of adoption of youth sport concussion 
legislation across states in the United States (U.S.). Sport-induced concussions represent an 
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important public health issue because of the large number that occur each year and the potential 
negative long-term health effects of brain injury (Guskiewicz et al., 2005; Moser & Schatz, 
2002). Developments in recent decades have indicated institutional change in the U.S., namely 
through the involvement of new actors and organizations; new knowledge, practices, and 
policies; increased media attention, and government involvement around concussion in sports 
(Heinze & Lu, 2017). One of the most noteworthy aspects of this trend is a nationwide 
concussion regulatory change, specifically the passage of youth sport concussion legislation 
across all 50 states (Ellenbogen, 2014). In 2009, Washington1 (the state) and Oregon respectively 
passed the first two concussion legislation in the country: the Zackery Lystedt Law and the Max 
Conradt Law, named after two young athletes who were permanently disabled after sustaining 
concussions in football and returning to the game too soon. By 2014, all 50 states and the District 
of Columbia had passed similar youth sport concussion legislation, designed to improve 
education and prevention of concussion in young people.  
The adoption of concussion legislation across states provides a valuable context to 
examine local community-level institutional factors around, and approaches to, sport policy 
change. Following Marquis and colleagues (Marquis & Battilana, 2009; Marquis et al., 2007; 
Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007), in this dissertation, each U.S. state is conceptualized as a 
community. Change is happening at the field level, yet factors in the more immediate, 
community-level institutional environment (e.g., state norms and local advocacy) may play roles 
in determining which states enact policies sooner (Soule & King, 2006; Soule & Zylan, 1997; 
Vogus & Davis, 2005). Further, early evidence has pointed to the roles of institutional 
entrepreneurs— coalitions of individuals and organizations—in the creation and passage of 
                                               
1 For the remainder of the paper, Washington refers to the state.  
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concussion legislation in Washington and Oregon. Thus, empirically, this dissertation focuses on 
unpacking 1) community-level institutional factors (e.g., cultural, political, and social pressure 
and triggering events) associated with variation in states’ adoption of concussion legislation 
(Chapter 3); and 2) specific activities and tactics institutional entrepreneurs have employed in the 
passage of concussion legislation (Chapter 4). Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the 
dissertation.  
 
 
Figure 1. Structure of the Dissertation 
 
Different methodologies are employed in this dissertation to examine these questions. In 
the first study of the dissertation, I conduct a quantitative, event history analysis to examine the 
effects of institutional factors within the local community-level context on the timing of sport 
5 
policy adoption across states (Chapter 3). In the second study, I use qualitative multi-case study 
approach to unpack the sport policy creation process and explore how institutional entrepreneurs 
create and promote the passage of concussion legislation (Chapter 4). The theoretical foundation 
of this dissertation is discussed below, followed by the overarching contributions of this work 
and a summary of each chapter.  
 
Theoretical Foundation 
Institutional theory posits that organizations operate in, and are influenced by, 
institutional environments composed of peer organizations, regulatory agencies, constituents, and 
others (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). These environments structure and 
guide organizational behavior as a result of processes associated with three institutional pillars: 
the regulatory, referring to the legal aspects of institutional controls of organizations, such as 
policy, legislation, and mandates (e.g., Lounsbury, 2001; Skille, 2009; Slack & Hinings, 1994); 
the normative, which influences organizational behavior via occupational and professional 
standards (e.g., Babiak & Wolfe, 2009; Trendafilova, Babiak, & Heinze, 2013); and the 
cognitive, which focuses on taken-for-granted conceptions and conventions (e.g., Beckert, 2010; 
Davis & Greve, 1997). Change occurs when there are shifts in what is deemed legitimate or 
appropriate in an institutional environment; then, corresponding practices and policies emerge 
among organizations and across states (Ruef & Scott, 1998; Schneiberg & Soule, 2005; Sine & 
Lee, 2009). For example, a series of legislative actions, such as the enactment of disability and 
Medicare programs, gradually contributed to institutional change around Social Security 
(Béland, 2007). In the policy context, the enactment of workmen’s compensation legislation 
across states followed from changing beliefs about labor and social protection (Fishback & 
6 
Kantor, 2007).  
Organizations, including state legislatures, seeking to establish or maintain legitimacy 
often adopt new practices and policies in response to different institutional factors. Sport 
management scholars have traditionally focused on homogeneity and the role of broader field-
level coercive forces (i.e., dependence on other organizations), mimetic forces (i.e., imitation of 
other organizations), and normative forces (i.e. professions and socialization) in promoting 
organizational isomorphism (Babiak & Trendafilova, 2011; Kikulis, 2000; Slack & Hinings, 
1994; Stevens & Slack, 1998). For instance, Babiak and Trendafilova (2011) found that the 
organization-wide adoption of environmental management initiatives in professional sport was 
driven, in part, by teams and leagues communicating with and mimicking one another. The 
isomorphism concept has also been used to explain isomorphic tendencies in American and 
Canadian collegiate athletic programs (Cunningham & Ashley, 2001; Danylchuk & Chelladurai, 
1999), the low representation of black coaches in collegiate athletics (Cunningham, Sagas, & 
Ashley, 2001), and increasing formalization within a Canadian amateur ice hockey organization 
(Stevens & Slack, 1998). 
This research stream possesses three major limitations. First, regarding the locus of 
change, sport management studies assuming an institutional theory perspective have fallen short 
in illuminating sport policy adoption across geographic boundaries. Second, with respect to 
change outcomes, research has overemphasized homogeneity (e.g., Cunningham & Ashley, 
2001; Stevens & Slack, 1998) while neglecting to examine variations in the adoption of new 
sport approaches (Kostova & Roth, 2002; Lounsbury, 2008; Westphal, Gulati, & Shortell, 1997). 
Third, fewer sport management studies have expanded on the role of agency in the change 
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process to explore in depth how individual and/or collective actors influence organizational 
behavior (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Hardy & Maguire, 2008). 
Investigations into organizational variation and change have focused recently on a local, 
community-level institutional context and its influence on organizational practice or policy 
adoption (Marquis & Battilana, 2009; Marquis, Davis, & Glynn, 2013; Marquis et al., 2007; 
Marquis et al., 2011); however, sport management scholars have yet to explore this community-
based nature of practice or policy adoption. In the first study of this dissertation, I examine the 
effects of community-level institutional factors on the rate of sport policy adoption across states 
(Chapter 3). In assessing state variation in sport policy adoption, several local institutional 
factors appear relevant. Intra- and inter-state factors both play roles in determining which states 
enact policies sooner. Intra-state factors include aspects of state norms or culture, such as a 
history of policy-making (Boehmke & Skinner, 2012; Walker, 1969) and key events (Hoffman, 
1999; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010), and political factors, such as local advocacy (Mintrom & 
Vergari, 1996). At the inter-state level, states may be influenced by peer states in their 
geographic region (Berry & Berry, 1990; Walker, 1969). Thus, in the first study of this 
dissertation (Chapter 3), I apply event history analysis, a quantitative data procedure, to identify 
the influences of triggering events and social, cultural, and political factors within and between 
states on concussion legislation adoption. Further, I draw on qualitative data and analyses to 
provide additional insight into the role of factors revealed in the first stage. 
To better account for the role of agency in the change process, institutional scholars have 
developed the concept of institutional entrepreneurship, whereby purposeful actors utilize 
different resources and skills to spearhead change (Garud, Hardy, & Maguire, 2007; Leca, 
Battilana, & Boxenbaum, 2008; Maguire et al., 2004). Despite its prominence in the broader 
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management discipline, institutional entrepreneurship has been less examined in sport 
management research. Studies of institutional entrepreneurship in management have investigated 
a range of institutional types that can be broadly categorized as fields (Dorado, 2013; Hwang & 
Powell, 2005; Lawrence & Phillips, 2004), practices (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Greenwood, 
Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002; Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007), technologies (Garud, Jain, & 
Kumaraswamy, 2002; Munir & Phillips, 2005; Wang & Swanson, 2007), and forms/structures 
(Perkmann, 2002; Perkmann & Spicer, 2007; Tracey, Phillips, & Jarvis, 2011). Less attention 
has been paid to the emergence of new government policies in sport, a type of regulatory change 
that constitutes key facet of institutional space (Pacheco, York, Dean, & Sarasvathy, 2010). In 
particular, an understanding of specific activities and tactics surrounding the innovation of new 
sport policies remains elusive.  
 In addition, many regulatory changes represent complex social processes that often 
require collaboration among numerous individuals and/or organizations (Hargrave, & Van de 
Ven, 2006; Schlager, 1995; Wijen & Ansari, 2007). This wide group of individuals and 
organizations can be termed as institutional entrepreneurs (Battilana et al., 2009; Garud et al., 
2007; Möllering, 2007). In the second study of the dissertation, I investigate how institutional 
entrepreneurs create and promote the passage of new sport policies (Chapter 4): using qualitative 
multi-case study design, I explore how institutional entrepreneurs promote concussion legislation 
change with a focus on involved parties’ activities and tactics. 
 
Contributions of the Dissertation 
This dissertation advances sport management scholarship in several ways. First, this 
dissertation contributes to the literature on institutional change in sport, focused on new 
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organizational practices and structures (Babiak & Trendafilova, 2011; Danisman et al., 2006; 
Slack & Hinings, 1992, 1994; Stevens & Slack, 1998; Trendafilova et al., 2013), by shedding 
light on the roles of institutional forces in sport policy adoption. Second, this dissertation 
advances institutional studies in sport management, centered on how broader field-level 
institutional pressures influence or constrain organizational behavior (Babiak & Trendafilova, 
2011; Heinze & Lu, 2017; Kikulis, 2000; Washington & Ventresca, 2004, 2008), by elucidating 
the effects of local community-level institutional factors (Marquis et al., 2013; Marquis et al., 
2007; Marquis et al., 2011) on variations in sport policy adoption across geographic boundaries. 
Third, my investigation on intra- and inter-state factors (e.g., cultural, social, and political 
pressures and triggering events) in the adoption of sport policies addresses the appeal to “deeply 
examine a sport field landscape” (Washington & Patterson, 2011, p.10). Fourth, this dissertation 
draws on the concept of institutional entrepreneurship (Battilana et al., 2009; Garud et al., 2007; 
Tracey et al., 2011), which has been less applied in sport management scholarship (Washington 
& Patterson, 2011), to expand on the role of agency in institutional change in sport. Fifth, this 
dissertation contributes to providing a micro-level understanding of the specific activities and 
tactics in promoting sport policy change. Further, by demonstrating that the various activities and 
tactics institutional entrepreneurs engaged in shifted in a temporal order, this dissertation sheds 
light on the multifaceted nature and temporal dynamics associated with the process of 
institutional entrepreneurship in sport.  
This dissertation also has important empirical implications. By focusing on the enactment 
of youth sport concussion legislation, this work augments the larger body of scholarship on 
concussion in sports focusing on the physical effects, diagnosis, prevention, and treatment of 
concussions (Maroon, Mathyssek, & Bost, 2014; McCrea et al., 2003; McCrea, Hammeke, 
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Olsen, Leo, & Guskiewicz, 2004), by adding knowledge on relevant sport policy and 
institutional developments. This research also sheds light on how sport organizations interface 
with policy issues in addressing a public health challenge (Santo & Mildner, 2010). More 
broadly, this research provides actionable strategies and tactics on how to construct a broad-
based, effective coalition, build a policy template, aggregate divergent interests, justify the 
adoption of new sport policies, and make it appealing and compelling to wider audiences. 
Practitioners and policy makers can use these tactics to fulfill their political or legislative 
agendas, and initiate broader social change. 
 
Summary of the Dissertation 
In Chapter 2, I provide background on the organizational field around concussion in 
sports. I begin by reviewing fundamental scientific knowledge regarding sport-related 
concussions (SRC). Then, I chronicle institutional change around concussion in sports over time 
(between 1880 and 2014) with a focus on how the field has evolved alongside the involvement of 
new organizations and actors, changing responses from key organizations and stakeholders, and 
normative and regulatory changes. Next, I elaborate on the background of substantial regulatory 
change in the organizational field around nationwide youth sport concussion legislation to 
contextualize Study 1 (Chapter 3) and Study 2 (Chapter 4) in this dissertation. 
In Chapter 3, I examine the effects of local community-level institutional factors, within 
and between states, on the rate of youth sport concussion legislation adoption. Using an event 
history analysis, results indicate that a variety of intrastate factors—state norms, disruptive 
events, and local advocacy—exerted significant influences on the timing of sport policy 
adoption, but interstate social networks did not. Supporting qualitative data provide additional 
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insight into the relationship between disruptive events and local advocacy in the adoption of 
concussion legislation. This study contributes to a better understanding of community-level 
institutional factors in the diffusion of sport policy across geographic boundaries and offers an 
approach for future research investigating variations in sport policy or practice adoption. 
In Chapter 4, I delve deeper into how institutional entrepreneurs promote sport regulatory 
change. Specifically, I explore the activities and tactics by which coalitions of individuals and 
organizations create and promote the passage of state-level concussion legislation. My findings 
show that institutional entrepreneurs engaged in three main types of activities. First, they were 
tasked with political activity, namely coalition building, in which they employed tactics 
including prioritizing recruitment for knowledge and legitimacy, diversified membership, 
involving skeptics, and developing a shared vision to build a broad-based coalition. Next, 
coalition actors moved to technical activity that concentrated on building a concussion legislation 
template. Important tactics included leveraging expertise, strategic compromise, and using 
neutral and inclusive language. These institutional entrepreneurs also became involved in 
cultural activity that focused on framing and justifying the adoption of concussion legislation. 
Relevant tactics included episodic framing (i.e., highlighting a particular individual’s story) and 
embedding the issue in a broader value context. This study sheds light on the agentic dimension 
underlying institutional change in sport by exploring how institutional entrepreneurs create and 
propagate new sport policies. In Chapter 5, I provide a summary of the dissertation, and address 
the limitation, practical implications, and future directions. 
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CHAPTER II 
Empirical Context: Concussion in Sports 
 
In this chapter, I provide background on the organizational field around concussion in 
sports. The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. I start by reviewing basic scientific 
knowledge and concepts relevant to SRC. Then, I chronicle the institutional change around 
concussion in sports over time (between 1880 and 2014)); major changes and events are 
summarized in Figure 2 and Table 1. I delineate how the field evolved through the involvement 
of new organizations and individuals, key organizational and stakeholders’ changing responses, 
and normative and regulatory changes. Next, I examine a prominent regulatory change in the 
field, nationwide youth sport concussion legislation, on which this dissertation focuses. I identify 
major field conditions as potential precursors to this substantial institutional change along with 
key individuals and organizations involved in the passage of concussion legislation.     
 
Sport-Related Concussions (SRC) 
In this section, I provide an overview of basic scientific knowledge of SRC, including the 
term’s definition, symptoms and diagnosis, effects, and recovery.  
Definition of SRC 
The definition of SRC has evolved over time. An early definition was based on a loss of 
consciousness following a direct hit to the head (Cantu, 1986; Kontos, Deitrick, Collins, & 
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Mucha, 2017); however, the definition was considered limited in accounting for the symptoms 
and causes of concussions (Aubry et al., 2002; McCrory et al., 2005). First, early criteria 
required a loss of consciousness (i.e., a player getting knocked out or blacked out), but research 
has shown that concussions can occur with or without loss of consciousness (Budinger, 2016; 
Kelly et al., 1991). In fact, statistics have revealed that fewer than 10% of SRC are accompanied 
by unconsciousness (CDC, 2010; Lau, Kontos, Collins, Mucha, & Lovell, 2011). Second, this 
early definition only emphasized the occurrence of SRC as a result of a direct hit to the head. 
Subsequent studies have found that concussions can also be caused by a blow or fall involving 
other parts of the body, leading to rapid acceleration and deceleration of the brain (McCrory et 
al., 2005). 
Considering the simplicity of this early definition, more recent definitions of SRC have 
focused on altered mental or neurological functioning that may or may not involve a loss of 
consciousness and may result from a direct hit to the head or a blow to another part of the body, 
resulting in force that causes the brain to slide back and forth within the skull (Broglio et al., 
2014; Giza et al., 2013). In sports concussion research, the International Conference on 
Concussion in Sport proposed a widely used definition; per the most updated 2016 consensus 
statement on concussion in sport, SRC is defined as “a traumatic brain injury induced by 
biomechanical forces” that may result in “a range of clinical signs and symptoms that may or 
may not involve loss of consciousness” and may be “caused either by a direct blow to the head, 
face, neck or elsewhere on the body with an impulsive force transmitted to the head” (McCrory 
et al., 2017, p. 2). 
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Symptoms and Diagnosis of SRC 
Symptoms of SRC can fall into four categories: 1) cognitive, such as difficulty in 
recalling recent events, vision disturbance, or sensitivity to light or noise; 2) physical, such as 
headaches, dizziness, vomiting, nausea, or fatigue; 3) emotional, such as sadness, irritability, 
anxiety, or depression; and 4) sleep-related, such as drowsiness, difficulty in falling asleep, or 
sleeping more or less than usual (CDC, 2010; Clark & Guskiewicz, 2016; Halstead & Walter, 
2010).  
Diagnosis of SRC often relies on measurement tools developed to evaluate cognitive 
functioning and motor control in athletes suspected of sustaining a concussion (Clark & 
Guskiewicz, 2016). For instance, the Standard Assessment of Concussion (SAC) is commonly 
used to detect athletes’ cognitive functioning when they are susceptible to the acute effects of 
SRC (Broglio et al., 2014; Clark & Guskiewicz, 2016). The SAC can be administered with 
minimal training and cost and is thus considered a convenient and practical sideline assessment 
tool (Notebaert & Guskiewicz, 2005). Because concussive injuries may also lead to deficits in 
motor control, assessment of motor control systems can facilitate SRC diagnosis (Broglio, 
Eckner, Paulson, & Kutcher, 2012; Sosnoff, Broglio, & Ferrara, 2008). For instance, the Balance 
Error Scoring System, which measures athletes’ abilities to hold different static stances, is often 
employed to assess balance on the sideline (Bell, Guskiewicz, Clark, & Padua, 2011). Although 
numerous concussion assessment tools and tests have been developed for concussion diagnosis, a 
single, uniformly accepted assessment tool capable of identifying all patients with SRC does not 
yet exist (Broglio et al., 2014). 
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Effects of SRC 
SRC can cause a variety of short- and long-term health effects that influence a person’s 
thinking or cognitive (e.g., memory and reasoning), physical condition (e.g., headaches, 
vomiting), language (e.g., speaking, communication), and emotional behavior (e.g., anxiety, 
anger, and other mood changes) (Moser & Schatz, 2002). Short-term effects of SRC include 
headaches, delayed cognitive responses, impaired memory, trouble learning, and irritability 
(Macciocchi, Barth, & Littlefield, 1998).  
The effects of an individual’s first concussion may not be that serious; an immediate 
second concussion often carries more severe consequences. Second Impact Syndrome (SIS) is 
defined as “rapid cerebral edema and herniation after a second head injury” (Bowen, 2003, 
p.288). SIS often occurs when a player who has suffered a concussion sustains another before the 
symptoms of the initial injury have subsided (Bowen, 2003). SIS can result in brain swelling and 
bleeding that can cause permanent disability or even death (Bowen 2003; Cantu, 1998; Wetjen, 
Pichelmann, & Atkinson, 2010).  
Repeated concussions may have long-term cognitive and neurobiological effects, such as 
cognitive impairment (Guskiewicz et al., 2005), depression (Guskiewicz et al., 2007), and 
dementia (McKee et al., 2009). Chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE) may develop in more 
severe cases (Stein, Alvarez, & McKee, 2015; Stern et al., 2011). CTE is a degenerative 
condition associated with a history of repetitive brain injuries (Stein et al., 2015; Stern et al., 
2011). Athletes with this condition have been found to experience progressive neurologic 
declines in memory, mood, and movements (Stern et al., 2011). Some may develop more serious 
depression or dementia (McCrory, Meeuwisse, Kutcher, Jordan, & Gardner, 2013; Omalu, 
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Hamilton, Kamboh, DeKosky, & Bailes, 2010). Research has revealed evidence of CTE in 
contact sports, such as boxing, football, and ice hockey (Omalu et al., 2010; Stern et al., 2011).  
Recovery of SRC 
Studies have identified several factors that may influence concussion recovery, such as a 
person’s age, concussion history, or pre-existing mental and physical conditions (CDC, 2010; 
Field, Collins, Lovell, & Maroon, 2003; Mooney, Speed, & Sheppard, 2005). For instance, 
extensive research has found that high school athletes demonstrate slower recovery from SRC 
compared to collegiate and professional athletes (CDC, 2010; Field et al., 2003; Pellman, Lovell, 
Viano, & Casson, 2006). Some studies have also suggested that concussed players who sustained 
a concussion in the past may take longer to recover than those without any concussion history 
(Colvin et al., 2009; Covassin, Stearne, & Elbin, 2008). 
 
Historical Overview: Institutional Change Around Concussion in Sports  
The issue of SRC is not new (Harrison, 2014), but more substantial institutional change 
began in the 2000s (Heinze & Lu, 2017). In this section, I provide an historical overview of the 
extent of changes that have taken place in the organizational field around concussion in sports 
since the late 19th century. 
Following Hoffman (1999) and Kostova and Roth (2002), I define the organizational 
field as forming around a central issue for a collective of organizations and actors: concussion in 
sports (Heinze & Lu, 2017). This issue includes the diagnosis, treatment, prevention, and 
management of concussions for players in all sports and at all age levels. In accordance with 
Hoffman’s conceptualization of a field, over time, the issue of concussion in sports became 
salient to the interests and objectives of various individuals and organizations: active and retired 
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athletes at all levels (youth, collegiate, and professional), team physicians, and coaches; schools, 
colleges, and universities; all levels of sport organizations, including sports governing bodies 
(SGBs); scientific communities of concussion researchers and experts as well as academic and 
research institutions; athletic trainers and athletic trainer associations; physicians specializing in 
brain injury and healthcare systems; state and national government entities, such as state 
legislatures, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH), and the Congress; the media; concussion and brain injury advocacy groups and/or 
organizations; and corporations involved with concussions, such as companies that produce 
products intended to potentially decrease head injuries. 
The proceeding historical review covers four periods as shown in Figure 2. In the first 
stage (1880-1906), although the organizational field around concussion in sports had not yet 
emerged, early records of concussion-related fatalities began to be noticed on the football field. 
In the second stage (1907-1970), the organizational field around concussion in sports began to 
grow; some coaches, sports medicine scientists, and SGBs joined the field and developed new 
helmets and safety rules targeted at protecting athletes from brain injuries. In the third stage 
(1971-1999), the organizational field around concussion in sports continued to expand, with 
more scientists and SGBs at different levels becoming involved in SRC research and 
management. In the fourth stage (2000-2014), the field around concussion in sports experienced 
a more substantial and significant change accompanied by a proliferation in scientific research 
and media reports on SRC revealing discoveries about the long-term risks of concussions. New 
constituencies and actors, such as government entities, corporations, and retired athletes, also 
joined the field. Increasing normative pressures expressed through new knowledge, media 
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attention, and key stakeholders’ changing opinions promoted significant regulatory action in the 
form of nationwide concussion legislation change. Table 1 presents a chronology of events.  
 
 
Figure 2. Institutional History of Concussions in Sports 
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Table 1. Chronology of Events 
Year Event 
1880- 
1906 
Football was played violently in American colleges. The brutality of the game often 
resulted in serious injuries and fatalities. For instance, the 1905 football season 
resulted in 19 player deaths and 137 serious injuries. Concussion was noted as one of 
the causes of fatalities.  
1895 In response to the excessive violence, Harvard University led the charge of abolishing 
football on campus, and more schools followed.  
1906 The IAAUS (the NCAA) was founded and approved around 30 safety rule changes to 
reduce brutal injuries in football.  
1910 Among the 14 fatalities on the football field, 7 died of concussion-related injuries. 
1931 Soccer player John Thompson died of a concussion-related injury.  
1939 The NCAA required football players to wear helmets to play in college football. 
1943 The NFL made it mandatory to wear helmets in the game.  
1955 The AFCA placed much of the blame of football injuries on the inadequate 
construction of helmets. The Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory developed a new 
helmet to dissipate the impacts of football tackles.  
1964 The NCAA required that no player may deliberately use helmet or head to hit an 
opponent.  
1983 Dr. Bennett argued years of concussions may leave serious consequences for the 
brain.  
1986 Researchers Mueller and Schindler questioned the effectiveness of helmets to prevent 
SRC.  
1988 Mike Harden of the Broncos was fined $5,000 for a vicious hit on the Seahawk Steve 
Largent who ended up with a concussion.  
1990s Multiple and repeated concussions led to the premature retirement of four high-profile 
NFL players: Mike Webster (1991), Al Toon (1992), Merril Hoge (1994), and Steve 
Young (1999).  
1994 The NFL founded the MTBI Committee to study the impacts of concussions in NFL 
players. 
1995 Early concussion activist Leigh Steinberg organized a concussion seminar and 
advocated the NFL to adopt more stringent safety rules and develop new concussion 
practices. 
20 
1997 The NFL and NHL Players Association established the NFL-NHL Players 
Association Concussion Program. 
1999 The NCAA funded a long-term concussion study with sports medicine scientists Dr. 
Kevin Guskiewicz and Dr. Michael McCrea. 
2000s High-profile former NFL (e.g., Mike Webster, Justin Strzelczyk) and collegiate 
players (e.g., Owen Thomas) died and were subsequently diagnosed with CTE. 
Several youth players (e.g., Zackery Lystedt, Evan Coubal) suffered SIS that resulted 
in death or permanent disability. 
2002 Dr. Bennet Omalu discover the first case of CTE in a former NFL player’s brain.  
2003- 
2007 
More researchers, such as Dr. Guskiewicz and Dr. McCrea, found evidence that 
repetitive head injuries may cause negative long-term effects on individuals’ health.  
2009 The House Judiciary Committee held congressional hearings on the legal issues 
related to head injuries sustained by NFL players. 
2009 Washington passed the first youth sport concussion law in the country. 
2010 The NFL founded a new concussion committee, the Head, Neck and Spine 
Committee. 
2014 All 50 states including the District of Columbia adopted youth sport concussion 
legislation. 
 
Stage 1: 1880-1906  
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the norms of American football projected 
violence and brutality (Guilianotti, 2013). Although the organizational field around concussion 
in sports did not yet exist, SRC incidents were noticed in brutal injuries and fatalities on the 
football field. The increasing violence in football also compelled some universities to close their 
football programs. To preserve the game of football, the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA) was founded to reform the safety rules of collegiate football.  
 In the late 19th century, American football, a hybrid of English rugby and soccer, began 
to develop in several elite U.S. universities (Harrison, 2014). Initially, football was a highly risky 
pastime that was often played violently as exemplified in the tactic of the flying wedge, 
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introduced in 1892 in a collegiate football game between Harvard and Yale (McQuilkin & 
Smith, 1993). In performing the flying wedge, 11 offensive players all collided at full speed and 
threw their entire weight against one opponent who bore the brunt of the attack (McQuilkin & 
Smith, 1993). Because of the inherent brutality of this move, the flying wedge often resulted in 
serious and fatal accidents on the field (Harrison, 2014; Moore, 1984). A news report more than 
a century ago remarked, “Every time a youth steps on the football field, he assumes nearly the 
same risk that a soldier does on a battlefield. … Everyday (sic) one can hear of broken heads 
and necks, fractured skulls, wrenched legs, and dislocated shoulders” (“Change the Football 
Rules,” 1893, p.2).    
Key events  
SRC incidents began to be noted in early reports of brutal and even fatal injuries on the 
football field. For instance, the 1905 football season resulted in 19 player deaths and 137 
extreme injuries; several students died of serious concussions. For example, in a game against 
New York University in 1905, 19-year-old Harold Moore of Union College was struck in the 
head by an opponent and died soon following a severe concussion (Watterson, 1995). William 
Harvey, a former Penn Football player, reflected the concussion he sustained in a football game 
in 1883: “The only serious injury I received was in the game with Harvard in 1883, when in a 
scrimmage behind the goal I was knocked insensible. … During the summer following, I was sick 
with blood gathering in the head and threatened with congestion of the brain. My illness was 
attributed by the Doctors (sic) to the above incident” (Harrison, 2014, p.822).   
Organizational responses 
In response to increasing violence and brutality on the football field, many colleges 
strove to suppress football by disbanding football teams at their institutions (Watterson, 2002). 
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For instance, Charles W. Eliot, then-president of Harvard University led the charge of abolishing 
football; he noted, “The game of football grows worse and worse as regards foul and violent 
play and the number and gravity of the injuries that the players suffer. It has become perfectly 
clear that the game as now played is unfit for college use” (“President Eliot on Athletics,” 1895, 
p.4). 
To save the game of football from abolition, under the help of President Roosevelt, the 
Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States (IAAUS), later renamed as the NCAA, 
was founded in 1906 to modify football safety standards and rules. IAAUS approved more than 
30 playing rule changes, including outlawing the flying wedge and other dangerous mass plays 
(Harrison, 2014). However, these safety rules were not targeted at reducing SRC but rather at 
decreasing brutal athletic injuries in general.  
Stage 2: 1907-1970  
Even after the founding of the NCAA and the passage of football safety rules in 1906, 
concussion injuries were far from eliminated. The next 60 years witnessed the emergence of an 
organizational field around concussion in sports. Severe and fatal concussion incidents occurred 
in football and other sports (e.g., soccer, boxing, ice hockey). In an effort to decrease head 
injuries, some SGBs approved rule changes aimed at protecting athletes from brain injuries. 
Some coaches and sports medicine scientists also shifted their attention to new technology and 
developed new helmets to protect athletes’ heads from serious injuries.  
Key events 
In the second stage, serious and fatal concussion incidents plagued football and other 
sports. The incidence of concussions in football continued to grow. For instance, during the 1910 
football season, seven of 14 fatal incidents were attributable to concussion-related injuries 
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(“Football Dead 14,” 1910). The number of athletes who sustained severe concussions also 
increased, constituting a much higher proportion of injuries than in previous years (“Football 
Dead 14,” 1910). Although football resulted in the most concussion casualties, SRC also 
occurred in other sports, such as boxing, horse racing, soccer, and ice hockey. For instance, in 
1931, a leading soccer goalie John Thompson was kicked in the head and died of a serious 
concussion and fractured skull (“40 Players Killed,” 1931). In 1968, professional ice hockey 
player Bill Masterton, of the Minnesota North Stars, died of massive brain injuries. Serious 
concussion injuries also occurred in boxing, amounting to a couple per year (Eskenazi, 1968).  
Organizational responses 
During this stage, some SGBs implemented more explicit rule changes to protect athletes 
from brain injuries. In 1939, the NCAA mandated that all football players wear helmets when 
playing college football (Daneshvar et al., 2011). ). In 1943, football helmets were required in 
the National Football League (NFL). In 1964, the NCAA stated that no football player could 
deliberately use his helmet or head to hit an opponent (Williamson, 1964). 
New technology 
In an effort to decrease head injuries, some coaches and sports medicine scientists in the 
1950s and 1960s turned their attention to innovative technologies by upgrading helmets to 
protect athletes. In 1955, in its annual report on football deaths, the American Football Coaches 
Association (AFCA) blamed many football injuries on inadequate helmet construction. 
According to Jack Curtice, President of the AFCA, “The rising toll in football fatalities is 
disturbing. Maybe we need a real fine study of football equipment of the helmets, the shoulder 
pads, and all the rest” (Johnston, 1955, p.317). In the same year, the Cornell Aeronautical 
Laboratory, a center for research in football equipment, developed a more efficient helmet to 
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reduce impact in football (Johnston, 1955). The success of Cornell’s helmet research expanded 
into other sports, including polo, boxing, hockey, and auto races; several sports medicine 
scientists also focused on upgrading helmets to protect athletes in the following years. In 1961, 
Dr. Floyd Eastwood of Los Angeles State College said: “There was a steady increase year by 
year in fatalities from blows on the head, and future improvements in the helmet seem to be 
necessary” (“Coaches Propose Safety,” 1961, p.46). In 1968, at the University of Florida, Dr. 
Robert Cade invented a new hydraulic football helmet, which dissipated the force of energy upon 
impact and protected the head from serious injury (Amdur, 1968).  
Stage 3: 1971-1999 
 In the last three decades of the 20th century, the organizational field around concussion in 
sports continued to grow. Several high-profile concussion injury events in professional sports 
called more attention to the seriousness of SRC. In response to this increasing interest, some 
SGBs founded concussion committees and began to support concussion research. Some 
professional SGBs enacted stricter regulations around vicious plays that could cause 
concussions. In the research sector, more scientists became involved in research on SRC and 
started to investigate the long-term effects of concussions. Early concussion activists also joined 
the field to advocate for change in SGBs. Despite the seemingly considerable attention to SRC, 
players still tended to take concussions lightly. 
Key events 
Severe concussion incidents in professional sports garnered increasing attention during 
this stage. Professional football continued to be played violently. Quarterbacks, running backs, 
and wide receivers often became targets of attack, and players in these positions frequently 
sustained one or multiple concussions. For instance, after the first quarter of a game between the 
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Jets and the Steelers in 1989, several players were taken out with concussions: the Jets’ receiver 
Al Toon and quarterback Pat Ryan and the Steelers’ quarterback Bubby Brister (Wallace, 1989). 
Serious concussions also occurred in professional ice hockey and baseball; in a baseball game in 
1987, Ray Knight of the Baltimore Orioles was struck in the head during a collision and suffered 
a severe concussion (“Knight Has Concussion,” 1987). 
The 1990s also saw several high-profile concussion injuries in the NFL. Four prominent 
players chose to retire after suffering multiple concussions throughout their professional careers, 
including the Kansas City Chiefs’ center Mike Webster (1991), New York Jets’ star receiver Al 
Toon (1992), Chicago Bears’ running back Merril Hoge (1994), and San Francisco 49ers’ 
quarterback Steve Young (1999). These prominent concussion injuries and subsequent exits 
called further attention to the issue of concussion in sports (Heinze & Lu, 2017). As noted by Dr. 
Jeffrey Barth, a neuropsychologist at the University of Virginia, “Concussions are a hot topic 
because of these high-profile cases[.] … if Aikman had a knee injury before the Super Bowl, we'd 
be talking knees like crazy” (Farber, 1994, p. 39).  
Organizational responses  
During this stage, some SGBs, such as the NFL, National Hockey League (NHL), and 
NCAA, began to fund research on SRC. In 1994, the NFL founded the Mild Traumatic Brain 
Injury (MTBI) Committee to investigate the impacts of concussions in NFL players. In 1997, the 
NFL and NHL Players Association established the NFL-NHL Players Association Concussion 
Program to manage concussions using a scientific approach. In 1999, the NCAA funded a long-
term concussion study with Dr. Kevin Guskiewicz of the University of North Carolina (UNC), 
director of UNC’s Sport-Related Traumatic Brain Injury Research Center, and Dr. Michael 
McCrea, director of brain injury research at the Medical College of Wisconsin.  
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Further, some professional SGBs became stricter on plays that could result in 
concussions. For instance, in a game between the Seattle Seahawk and the Denver Broncos, the 
Seahawk receiver Steve Largent was knocked out of the game with a concussion; his opponent 
Mike Harden was fined $5,000 for “unnecessary viciousness” (“Bronco Is Fined,” 1988). The 
National Basketball Association (NBA) also strengthened rules around violent plays. For 
instance, Rick Mahorn from the Pistons was fined $5,000 for elbowing Mark Price of the 
Cavaliers, who sustained a concussion (“NBA Fines Mahorn,”1989). 
New knowledge  
In the research sector, SRC received greater attention from sports medicine scientists and 
neurologists, whose findings elicited new knowledge around SRC. Some researchers questioned 
the effectiveness of helmets in preventing concussions. Dr. Frederick Mueller, a sports injury 
expert from UNC, and Richard Schindler, assistant director of the National Federation of State 
High School Associations (NFHS), argued that helmets may not help reduce the number of 
concussion injuries because “Helmets may give rise to a sentiment that the head was so well 
protected that it was invulnerable, which in turn encouraged hit’em in the numbers” (Rogers, 
1986, p.A00026).  
Scientists also began to consider the potential long-term effects of SRC and the 
seriousness of SIS. Dr. Donald Bennett, a neurologist at the University of Nebraska contended 
that years of concussions may have serious consequences on the brain (Bennett, Fuenning, 
Sullivan, & Weber, 1980). In the early 1980s, the death of professional boxer Willie Classen led 
Dr. Bennet Derby of New York University to host seminars on neurological assessment of 
concussions inside a boxing ring. According to Dr. Derby, “When a fighter receives a concussion 
and the opponent continues to beat on him, the opponent could damage the fighter” (Neumann, 
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1989, p.87). Dr. Derby pointed out that a secondary hit to the head in a short period of time may 
result in more serious and longer-lasting consequences. He recommended that once a fighter 
sustained a concussion, the boxer should not be allowed to continue to play.  
Advocacy  
Some early concussion activists joined in the field during this stage, advocating for 
change in SGBs. A leading activist was Leigh Steinberg, an agent for numerous NFL players, 
many of whom had suffered multiple concussions. Beginning in 1994, Steinberg publicly 
criticized the way the NFL managed SRC. As Steinberg noted, “It is a horrendous thought, but it 
might take someone to die on the field before the league takes this issue seriously” (Freeman, 
1997, p.10). In 1995, Steinberg organized a concussion seminar and invited medical experts from 
around the country. With these experts’ support, Steinberg argued the NFL should adopt more 
stringent rules to outlaw helmet-to-helmet tackling and develop new concussion practices, such 
as mandatory medical counseling, a better concussion grading system, and sideline concussion 
evaluation by healthcare professionals (Heinze & Lu, 2017; Smith, 1995).    
Athletes’ responses 
Despite growing attention to SRC, key stakeholders and active players continued to 
underestimate the seriousness of concussions. Several professional football players recalled 
having played in the 1980s and 1990s, a period when players were rarely concerned with 
concussions. Upon sustaining a concussion, athletes explained, “You got your bell rung. And 
unless you liked being called frilly names, you got back on the field as soon as you could locate 
it” (Cook, 2012, p.A31). For some players, even after suffering concussions, they chose to return 
to the game in which they had been hurt. New York Giants’ quarterback Dave Brown, “I would 
28 
have gone back in the next play. I would have known what the risk was, but it wouldn't have 
mattered. I wanted to go back in” (Freeman, 1994, p.B00029).  
Stage 4: 2000-2014 
Since the 2000s, the field around concussion in sports has undergone substantial 
institutional change. A series of concussion-related fatalities among former professional and 
collegiate players provided scientific evidence of CTE associated with repeated head injuries. 
Academic research on SRC has expanded in kind, revealing new knowledge of the long-term 
risks of concussions. Media reports around concussion in sports have proliferated as well. With 
these normative changes, the boundaries of the field extended to include government entities, 
business corporations, concussion advocacy organizations, and retired athletes. Greater 
awareness of the long-term effects of SRC has led to sweeping changes: Congressional hearings; 
individual lawsuits at the professional, collegiate, and high school levels; development of new 
concussion practices; and significant regulatory evolution in the form of nationwide youth sport 
concussion legislation change, which is the topic of this dissertation.  
Key events  
Serious and fatal high-profile concussion incidents continued to occur at all age levels 
during this stage. On the professional level, between 2001 and 2015, 14 high-profile former NFL 
players, such as Mike Webster (2002), Justin Strzelczyk (2004), and Terry Long (2005), died and 
were subsequently diagnosed with CTE, a progressive and incurable brain disease caused by 
repeated head trauma or concussions. CTE was identified in the deceased collegiate athletes as 
well. For instance, in April 2010, 21-year-old Owen Thomas from the University of 
Pennsylvania football team committed suicide. Researchers from Boston University discovered 
evidence of early CTE in his brain (Schwarz, 2010b). During this same period, several youth 
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players (e.g., Zackery Lystedt and Max Conradt) suffered SIS that resulted in death or permanent 
disability. For instance, in a September 2010 football game, 11-year-old Evan Coubal sustained a 
second concussion before the symptoms of the first one were cleared, and died two days later 
(Schwarz, 2010c). These disruptive concussion incidents at all age levels spurred more research 
on the long-term effects of SRC and drove sport organizations to implement new policies, 
practices, and rules to manage concussions. 
Normative changes  
During this stage, new scientific knowledge and increasing media coverage ushered in 
normative changes. Throughout the past two decades, a group of sports medicine researchers and 
neurologists have uncovered evidence of the long-term effects of SRC. In 2002, Dr. Bennet 
Omalu, a forensic pathologist and neuropathologist at the Allegheny County coroner’s office, 
performed an autopsy of Mike Webster (legendary Pittsburgh Steelers’ center for 15 seasons) 
and discovered the first case of CTE in a former professional football player’s brain (Omalu et 
al., 2005). In subsequent years, Dr. Omalu found evidence of CTE in the brains of athletes 
including Terry Long, Andre Waters, Justin Strzelczyk, and Tom McHale. Mounting 
pathological evidence of CTE has suggested a possible link between prior participation in 
football and the severe brain disease. As noted by Dr. Omalu, “This is irreversible brain damage. 
It’s most likely caused by concussions sustained on the football field” (Schwarz, 2007). 
Following Dr. Omalu, other researchers, such as Dr. Guskiewicz, Dr. McCrea, and Dr. Ann 
McKee (neuropathologist at Boston University), found evidence that repetitive head injuries may 
exert accumulative, negative long-term effects on individuals’ health, including cognitive 
impairment, mood changes, depression, and dementia (Guskiewicz et al., 2005; Guskiewicz et 
al., 2007; McCrea et al., 2003).  
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The issue of concussion in sports also received enormous media attention and was 
profiled on leading national news outlets, such as the New York Times (NYT), the Los Angeles 
Times (LAT), and Sports Illustrated (SI). As shown in Figure 3, compared with 218 articles on 
concussion in sports published in the NYT in the prior stage, 2088 articles were identified in this 
period. Sports media also began to express greater sensitivity toward brain injuries. Since 2007, 
NYT sports reporter Alan Schwarz has written more than 120 articles to expose the seriousness of 
SRC, which earned him a Pulitzer Prize nomination. Extensive scientific research and media 
reports on sport concussions has amplified normative pressure for sport organizations to develop 
new concussion practices and rules.  
 
 
Figure 3. Media Reports on Concussions in Sports 
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Organizational responses 
Evidence of enduring effects of repeated concussions prompted SGBs at all levels to 
devote greater efforts to managing brain injuries. In 2010, the NFL abolished the old MTBI 
committee, which had raised many questions around conflict of interest among its employees, 
and founded a new concussion committee, the Head, Neck and Spine Committee, composed of 
independent brain injury doctors and experts unaffiliated with the league to make decisions on 
SRC issues (Schwarz, 2010a). On the youth sport level, in the same year, USA Football amended 
rules for illegal hits to prevent the shoulder or forearm from being used to target players’ heads. 
SGBs also interacted in other ways; in 2014, the NFL partnered with the Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and several other international SGBs to conduct 
research examining when athletes can safely return to play after having potentially sustained a 
concussion (Belson, 2014). 
During this stage, the boundaries of the field widened to involve more organizations, 
such as government entities and business corporations. On the government sector, in 2009, the 
House Judiciary Committee held Congressional hearings on legal issues related to head injuries 
sustained by NFL players and questioned the NFL’s handling of active and retired players with 
SRC (Schwarz, 2009a). The involvement of government entities also introduced more funding 
opportunities for concussion-related research. In 2008, the NIH provided a $100,000 grant to 
Boston University’s Concussion Research Center to examine the effects of repetitive head 
trauma on former football players. Leading business corporations also partnered with SGBs in 
pursuit of new technologies, equipment, and/or products to better protect the brain. For instance, 
in 2013, General Electric established a partnership with the NFL on a 4-year, $50 million 
initiative focused on developing a new imaging technology to detect concussions (Battista, 
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2013).  
Advocacy  
During this stage, more concussion advocacy organizations joined the field, such as Brain 
Injury Association of each state, Concussion Legacy Foundation, and BrainLine. These 
organizations dedicated themselves to solving the concussion crisis and increasing awareness of 
brain injury through medical research, education, and policy development. For instance, the 
Concussion Legacy Foundation, founded by Dr. Chris Nowinski and Dr. Robert Cantu in 2007, 
dedicated itself to enhancing public awareness on how concussions should be understood, 
handled, and prevented in sports.  
Athletes’ responses 
During this stage, as the serious nature of head injuries became better understood, players 
began to express greater concern over the risks of concussions and were more willing to such 
injuries. Eagles running back, Brian Westbrook, shared, “I’m more concerned about how things 
will happen for me in the future, how having concussions now will affect me 20, 30 years from 
now” (Schwarz, 2009b, p.A1). Giants defensive end Justin Tuck said, “Guys have to change 
their mentality. We’ve got to really start taking care of each other. There’s got to be something 
in your mind that says, ‘I shouldn't be hitting this guy in his head and leading with my head” 
(Rhoden, 2009, p.SP7). 
Many former football players at the professional, collegiate, and even high school levels 
took legal action to encourage SGBs to strengthen their policies and practices to prevent head 
injuries. On the professional level, thousands of former NFL players filed lawsuits against the 
NFL and claimed the league was negligent in its handling of concussion-related brain injuries. 
On the collegiate level, several college athletes filed class-action suits alleging the NCAA was 
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negligent in its management of concussions in collegiate sports (Vecsey, 2011). Even at the 
youth sport level, some former high school football players began to file lawsuits against the 
state-level high school associations for their lack of protection against concussions (Strauss, 
2015).  
 
Regulatory Change: Youth Sport Concussion Legislation 
During the late 2000s, the field around concussion in sports progressed from normative 
changes to a significant regulatory change, which is the focus of Study 1 (Chapter 3) and Study 2 
(Chapter 4) in this dissertation. In 2009, Washington and Oregon passed the first two youth sport 
concussion legislation in the country. Initiatives spread across the country. By 2014, all 50 states 
including the District of Columbia had passed similar youth sport concussion laws (See Figure 4 
and 5). The concussion legislation in general mandated education for athletes, coaches, and 
parents, immediate removal from play for any athlete suspected of a concussion during a game or 
practice, and proper medical clearance before the athlete could return to play (Ellenbogen, 2014). 
For instance, the concussion legislation in Washington included 5 key elements: 1) Requiring 
school districts board of directors to work with state-level athletic association to develop 
concussion guidelines and educational programs; 2) mandatory consent form signed by youth 
athletes and parents on a yearly basis; 3) immediate removal from play during a game or practice 
if a concussion is suspected; 4) written clearance by a licensed healthcare provider for return to 
play; and 5) uniformity of rules for all schools that use public land (Washington Youth Sports 
Head Injury Policies of 2009). The concussion legislation was adopted swiftly and broadly 
across the country. In comparison, it took 16 years for 22 states to enact statewide bicycle helmet 
laws for children; it took 46 years for 48 states to have universal or partial motorcycle helmet 
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laws; it took 12 years for 34 states to have primary seat belt laws for front occupants; it took 8 
years for 17 states to require schools to have automated external defibrillator (AED). In this 
section, I outline youth sport concussion legislation change with a focus on the field conditions 
that may serve as an impetus for the passage of concussion legislation and the key individuals 
and organizations involved in this regulatory change. 
 
 
Figure 4. Passage of Concussion Legislation Across States (Cumulative Adoption Rate) 
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Figure 5. Passage of Concussion Legislation Across States (Map) 
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Field Conditions for Legislation Change 
 In addition to the broader institutional changes around concussion documented above 
(see Figure 2), specific field conditions may have prompted regulatory change around youth 
sport concussions: increasing normative pressure, educational initiatives, and serious youth 
concussion injury events.  
Increasing normative pressure  
Within the history of concussion research and action, Stage 4 witnessed growing 
normative pressure around youth concussions. This pressure manifested amidst evolving 
scientific research and new knowledge on the risks and effects of SRC in youth athletes coupled 
with growing media attention.  
Since the 2000s, more systematic research has been dedicated to understanding the risks 
of concussions among youth players (Buzzini & Guskiewicz, 2006; Moser & Schatz, 2002). The 
number of articles on concussion in youth sport published in scholarly journals rose from 106 in 
the 1990s to 2279 in the 2000s and 2010s. New knowledge about the risks and effects of 
concussions in youth athletes also emerged. First, growing research has indicated that younger 
athletes may sustain more damage from concussions because their brains and bodies are less 
developed than adults’ and are less capable of fully repairing themselves. According to Broglio 
and colleagues (2009), differences in physical maturity (e.g., height, weight), neck strength, and 
endurance may place high school players at greater risk of head injury. Collegiate players, who 
tend to be heavier and taller than high school athletes, may be in better physical condition to 
control head motion after impact (Broglio et al., 2009). As noted by Dr. Cantu in his book 
Concussions and Our Kids (2013), “Children are not adults. Their bodies are still maturing. 
Their vulnerabilities to head trauma are far greater than adults” (Nocera, 2012, p.A23).  
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Second, studies have revealed that youth athletes may take longer to recover than adults 
after suffering a concussion (Covassin, Elbin, Harris, Parker, & Kontos, 2012; McCrory et al., 
2013). Researchers have indicated that relative to adults, children could suffer from “a diffuse 
and more prolonged cerebral swelling” (p.552) after concussions (Field et al., 2003). Such 
swelling could delay the recovery process and hence place youth athletes at greater risk of 
serious or even permanent impairment (Field et al., 2003). For instance, Covassin and colleagues 
(2012) found that after sustaining a concussion, high school athletes showed a greater decline in 
verbal and visual memory compared with college athletes. Cognitive impairments in high school 
athletes also lasted an average of 10 to 21 days, two to three times longer than in college athletes 
(Covassin et al., 2012). According to Dr. Mark Halstead, associate professor of orthopedic 
surgery and pediatrics at Washington University Orthopedics, the unique physiological 
characteristics of the young brain requires children to have complete brain rest after suffering a 
concussion (Reynolds, 2010). 
Meanwhile, media attention around youth sports concussions grew, with more extensive 
media coverage devoted to concussion in youth sports. The media has highlighted new findings 
about the effects of concussions through regular articles in major news outlets such as NYT. For 
instance, compared with 33 articles published in NYT on concussion in youth sports in the 1990s, 
120 relevant articles went to press in the 2000s. Given sobering reports on sports concussions 
and increasing media attention, public awareness of the dangers of SRC in youth has continued 
to grow. Even so, concrete changes to laws or policies have lagged behind science. Such 
normative pressure may prompt state legislators and SGBs to take new steps to respond to the 
findings on concussion in youth sports. 
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Educational initiatives 
This period has also unveiled limitations in concussion educational practices. Since the 
2000s, organizations such as public health advocates, sport organizations, academic institutions, 
and government entities have developed various educational initiatives around concussion in 
youth sports. The CDC, together with 26 partners (including the NFL), launched the Heads Up: 
Concussion in Youth Sports education campaign in 2003 to help parents, coaches, school 
professionals, and healthcare providers improve recognition, prevention, and response to 
concussions (Sarmiento, Hoffman, Dmitrovsky, & Lee, 2014). The rise in the number of tragic 
brain injuries of young athletes also prompted more educational efforts in local states. For 
instance, in 2007, the Brain Injury Association of Washington (BIA-WA) partnered with the 
CDC, Seattle Seahawks, researchers and clinicians at the University of Washington, and local 
media to launch an educational campaign to raise awareness and knowledge around concussion 
prevention and management in youth sports in Washington (Adler & Herring, 2011).  
However, concussion advocates have suggested that education around concussions may 
be insufficient (Adler & Herring, 2011; Laker, Herring, & Adler, 2014), pointing out a lack of 
consistency around organizational practices related to concussions (Adler, 2011; Ellenbogen, 
2014). For instance, a youth sports team may have a coach who is well-informed of the effects of 
concussions and who implements a recommended protocol for removing athletes from play. 
However, if this coach leaves the team, then the “institutional memory” (p.469) of that team is 
also wiped clean; a new coach may have a very different perspective on concussions (Adler & 
Herring, 2011). Such problems have inspired a call for a more uniform approach to concussion 
prevention and management.  
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Key events 
Several serious youth concussion injury events occurred during this perior as well. 
According to the NYT, between 1997 and 2007, at least 50 players in high school or younger 
were killed or suffered severe brain injuries on the football field (Schwarz, 2007). In the 2000s, 
several youth players suffered from SIS. Catastrophic youth sport concussion injury events 
occurred in Washington and Oregon during this time. In 2002, Max Conradt, quarterback of a 
local high school football team, sustained a brutal helmet-to-helmet hit. Despite dizziness and 
headache, Max was allowed to continue to play in a game the following Friday. Over the course 
of 2 weeks, Max suffered multiple concussions and SIS, resulting in lifelong injury. In 2006 in 
Washington, 13-year-old Zackery Lystedt, a former middle school football player, suffered SIS 
during a football game and was permanently disabled. Such tragedies called into question 
existing practices for handling concussions and prompted activism around changes in concussion 
legislation. 
Organizations and Individuals Involved in the Legislation Change 
To meet the pressing need for a more consistent approach to protect youth athletes, 
legislation emerged around concussion management in youth sport (Albano, Senter, Adler, 
Herring, & Asif, 2016). In 2009, Washington and Oregon became pioneers of concussion 
regulatory change and passed the first two such pieces of legislation in the country, the Zackery 
Lystedt Law and the Max Conradt Law, which served as key reference points for subsequent 
states in the adoption of concussion legislation. In Washington and Oregon, passage of 
concussion legislation was led by a local coalition of regional, community-based organizations 
and individuals, including sport organizations, brain injury advocacy groups, brain injury 
attorneys, and scientific experts on sports concussions. This coalition of actors can be considered 
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institutional entrepreneurs (Battilana et al., 2009; Wijen & Ansari, 2007) who mobilize resources 
and skills to lead and promote concussion regulatory change. In the fourth chapter of this 
dissertation, I take Washington and Oregon as my focal cases to delve into the process on how 
institutional entrepreneurs create and promote the passage of new sport policies.  
Since Washington and Oregon, all 50 states and the District of Columbia have passed 
similar legislation to address youth SRC (Lowrey, 2015). Regarding state adoption, local 
community-level institutional factors (e.g., state norms, local advocacy) may play a role in 
determining which state legislature enacts policies sooner (Soule & King, 2006). In the third 
chapter of this dissertation, I investigate the effects of local institutional factors associated with 
states’ rate of adoption of concussion legislation. In this section, I provide background on key 
coalition members and leaders behind the passage of concussion legislation in my sampled cases 
(Washington and Oregon) along with state legislatures, the legislative branch in each state that 
oversaw passage of concussion legislation.  
Coalition members 
Although state-level coalition membership in Washington and Oregon varied in size, 
their compositions displayed similar pattern. The state-level coalitions were composed of a 
diverse group of organizations and individuals, including the following: 1) victim and victims’ 
families; 2) expert attorneys on brain injury; 3) scientific experts on SRC; 4) sport organizations 
(e.g., youth SGBs, professional sport teams, athletic trainer associations); 5) brain injury 
advocacy organizations; 6) government entities (e.g., state representatives, government affaire 
consultants); 7) academic institutions; and/or 8) healthcare organizations and 9) insurance 
groups. Table 2 lists coalition members in sampled states. 
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Table 2. Coalition Members in Sampled States 
Types Sub-types Washington Oregon 
Victims’ family N/A Zackery and his family Max and his family 
Attorneys Expert attorney on 
brain injury 
Mr. Brown (pseudonym) Mr. Williams 
(pseudonym) 
Scientists Scientific expert on 
SRC 
e.g., Dr. Ross 
(pseudonym) 
e.g., Dr. Wilson 
(pseudonym) 
Advocacy 
organizations 
Brain injury 
advocacy 
organizations 
One brain injury advocacy 
organization in 
Washington 
One brain injury 
advocacy organization in 
Oregon 
Sport 
organizations 
SGB e.g., Washington 
Interscholastic Athletic 
Association (WIAA), 
Washington State Youth 
Soccer Association 
(WSYSA) 
e.g., Oregon Sports 
Organization A (OSOA) 
(pseudonym)  
 Professional sport 
organizations 
Seattle Seahawks N/A 
 Athletic trainer 
associations 
Washington State Athletic 
Trainers’ Association 
(WSATA) 
N/A 
Academic 
institutions 
Universities Public university in 
Washington 
Public university in 
Oregon 
Government 
entities 
N/A State representatives, 
senators, government 
affaire consultants 
State representatives, 
senators 
Healthcare orgs Hospitals e.g., Seattle Children’s 
Hospital, Harborview 
Medical Center 
N/A 
Insurance orgs N/A Canfield & Associates N/A 
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Coalition leaders  
In Washington, Mr. Brown (pseudonym) and Dr. Ross (pseudonym) assumed leadership 
roles in the passage of Zackery Lystedt Law. Mr. Brown is a recognized expert attorney on brain 
injury and is a representative of a brain injury advocacy organization in Washington. Dr. Ross is 
a well-respected scientific expert in sports concussion clinical care at a public university in 
Washington. Dr. Ross also serves as the co-founder and medical director for multiple concussion 
institutes and programs in Washington. After learning the tragic story of Zackery and his family, 
they became actively involved in the passage of concussion legislation in Washington.  
In Oregon, Mr. Williams (pseudonym) and Dr. Wilson (pseudonym) assumed leadership 
roles in the passage of the Max Conradt Law. Mr. Williams is an expert attorney on personal 
injury and a representative of a brain injury advocacy organization in Oregon. Dr. Wilson is a 
leading expert on sports concussion management at a public university in Oregon. Dr. Wilson is 
also the medical director for several concussion programs in Oregon. To ensure that what 
happened to Max would not happen to any other kid, Mr. Williams and Dr. Wilson spearheaded 
the effort to create and promote the passage of concussion legislation in Oregon.  
State legislature  
In the U.S., states are important geographic boundaries for policy change: each state has a 
legislature responsible for passing state-level laws. A state legislature refers to the legislative 
body of the 50 states in the U.S. (Jewell, 1969). The primary responsibility of a state legislature 
is to design, draft, and vote on bills and laws. The formal name of state legislature may vary 
from state to state. In some states, the legislature is called the State Legislature; it is termed the 
General Assembly in others. State legislators are usually made up of citizen-elected politicians 
and are responsible for making decisions on diverse issues ranging from public health, education, 
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transportation, and environment. Laws, such as concussion legislation, created in one state may 
spread to other states; hence, a policy passed by one state legislature may affect decision making 
across others (Berry & Berry, 1990). Some intra-state factors may also influence the speed of 
new policy adoption, such as important triggering events (Hoffman, 1999), aspects of state 
norms or culture (Walker, 1969), and local advocacy (Schneiberg & Soule, 2005). In the next 
chapter, I focus on examining the effects of local institutional factors, within and between states, 
on the rate of concussion legislation adoption. 
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CHAPTER III 
Sport Policy Institutionalization: Examining the Adoption of Concussion Legislation 
Across States  
 
Institutional factors can play a key role in the adoption of new approaches among sport 
organizations (Slack & Hinings, 1992; 1994; Washington & Ventresca, 2004). Studies of 
institutional change in sport examine the professionalization and formalization in amateur sport 
organizations (Amis, Slack, & Hinings, 2002; Stevens & Slack, 1998), the trend of socially-
responsible activities in professional sport organizations (Babiak & Trendafilova, 2011; 
Trendafilova et al., 2013), and the rise of diversity-related practices in university athletic 
departments (Cunningham, 2008). This scholarship often focuses on isomorphism in the 
adoption of new practices or structures (Washington & Patterson, 2011, p.7), or how institutional 
pressures lead to conformity and homogeneity among sport organizations (Kikulis, 2000; Slack 
& Hining, 1994). For example, Slack and Hinings (1994) discovered coercive pressure from a 
federal mandate compelled National Sport Organizations (NSO) in Canada to adopt a more 
bureaucratic structure; and Trendafilova and colleagues (2013) found evidence of mimetic 
forces, or imitation of peers, in the trend of environmental sustainability.  
Less is known about the adoption of new sport policies across geographic boundaries, 
including local community-level institutional factors (Marquis et al., 2007; Marquis & 
Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis et al., 2011) associated with heterogeneity in adoption speed. 
Institutional change includes not only practice or structural change at the organizational level, 
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but also policy change at the state, regional, or national level (Béland, 2007; Schneiberg & 
Soule, 2005; Sine & David, 2003). This form of institutional change likely involves antecedents 
beyond broader coercive or mimetic forces. In particular, compared with the implementation of 
new organizational practices, sport policy adoption is apt to involve more political factors, such 
as advocacy efforts in the local region (Mintrom & Vergari, 1996). Further, sport policy adoption 
and speed of enactment may be shaped by both factors within and across geographic boundaries 
(Vogus & Davis, 2005). In the U.S., states are important geographic boundaries for policy 
change: each state has a legislature that is responsible for passing state-level laws. Intra-state 
factors that may affect the speed of sport policy adoption include important triggering events 
(Hoffman, 1999) and aspects of state norms or culture (Walker, 1969). At the inter-state level, 
states may be influenced by peer or neighboring states in their geographical region (Berry & 
Berry, 1990). Although organizational research points to several potential factors prompting 
institutional change, we do not know which of these affect sport policy diffusion. Thus, I 
investigate the following question in this study: What institutional factors influence the adoption 
of sport policies across geographic boundaries? 
To examine the institutionalization of sport policy, I look at the case of concussion 
legislation. Concussion in young people attributable to sport is an important public health issue 
(Buzzini & Guskiewicz, 2006). New knowledge, policies, increased media attention, and 
government involvement around concussion in youth sports, together, indicate institutional 
change is occurring in the U.S. One of the most significant aspects of this trend is the enactment 
of state policies to protect young athletes (Adler & Herring, 2011). In 2009, Washington passed 
the first concussion legislation in the country. By 2014, all 50 states and the District of Columbia 
passed similar youth sport concussion laws, designed to improve recognition and prevention of, 
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and education around concussions in sports. The enactment of concussion legislation is one of 
the most important and widespread sport policy initiatives (Laker et al., 2014). I used event 
history analysis (EHA), a quantitative data procedure, to identify the effect of institutional 
factors, within and between states, on the speed of policy adoption. Further, I drew on supporting 
qualitative data to provide additional insight around the role of the factors identified in the EHA. 
This research advances sport management scholarship in several ways. First, this study 
contributes to the literature on institutional change in sport, focused on broader field-level 
institutional pressures on organizational practice and structural change (Berrett & Slack, 1999; 
Kikulis, 2000; Slack & Hinings, 1994; Trendafilova et al., 2013), by demonstrating the role of 
particular local, community-level institutional factors in sport policy adoption. Second, I identify 
the influence of important triggers, cultural, and political factors in institutional change in sport 
that remain underexplored in previous sport management literature (Amis et al., 2002; Bradish & 
Cronin, 2009; O’Brien & Slack, 1999). Thirdly, this study goes beyond the isomorphism 
hypothesis (Cunningham & Ashley, 2001; O’Brien & Slack, 2004; Skille, 2011) to shed light on 
heterogeneity within the broader process of institutional change in sport by exploring variation in 
the speed of sport policy adoption. In doing so, this work offers an approach for examining 
variation in future research on sport policy or practice adoption. Further, my multi-level focus, 
on intra- and inter-state factors in the adoption of sport policies, addresses the appeal to “deeply 
examine a sport field landscape” (Washington & Patterson, 2011, p.10). Finally, this research 
contributes to an important broader conversation and understanding around organizational and 
policy dimensions of youth concussion and sport safety, and the findings reveal practical insights 
relevant to other sport policy adoption contexts.  
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Theory and Hypotheses 
Organizations, including state legislatures, seeking to establish or maintain legitimacy, 
adopt new practices and policies in response to different institutional factors. Historically, 
institutional research, including within sport management, focused on homogeneity and the role 
of broader field-level coercive forces (i.e. from dependence on other organizations), mimetic 
forces (i.e. from imitating other organizations), and normative forces (i.e. from professions and 
socialization) in promoting organizational isomorphism (Kikulis, 2000; Slack & Hinings, 1994; 
Stevens & Slack, 1998). Over time, institutional research has expanded to consider institutional 
change and heterogeneity in organizational responses (Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002; 
Washington & Patterson, 2011). This work indicates that as new practices and policies emerge, 
organizations adopt in different ways and at varying speeds (Pache & Santos, 2010; Schneiberg 
& Soule, 2005).   
In examining state variation in sport policy adoption, several local institutional factors 
emerge as relevant. First, studies suggest that organizational responses are shaped by the local 
institutional context (Husted, Jamali, & Saffar, 2016; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007; Pe’Er & 
Gottschalg, 2011), including cultural pressure stemming from local norms and values (Davis & 
Greve, 1997; Lee & Hennings, 2002), and social influence between organizations in the same 
regional network (Marquis & Battilana, 2009; Marquis et al., 2007). For instance, Pe’Er and 
Gottschalg (2011) found that the social and economic norms in red states2 supported buyout 
activity, while local norms in blues states impeded it. Additionally, in unpacking institutional 
change, scholars have identified the role of institutional triggers, such as disruptive events 
                                               
2 Since the presidential election of 2000, red states and blue states are used to refer to states of 
the United States whose voters primarily choose either the Republican Party (red) or Democratic 
Party (blue) presidential candidates. 
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(Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010), and political factors, such as advocacy (Perkmann & Spicer, 2008) 
that can be state-based (Schneiberg & Soule, 2005). Overall, the literature suggests that 
differences in cultural, political, and social pressures across states may lead to variation in sport 
policy adoption, within broader institutional change. Correspondingly, I develop hypotheses 
below around the influence disruptive events, state norms, local advocacy, and inter-state 
networks on the speed of concussion legislation adoption (See Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 6. Local Institutional Factors on the Passage of Concussion Legislation 
 
Institutional Triggers: Disruptive Events 
Institutional scholarship identifies the role of disruptive or significant events in triggering 
institutional change and leading to the adoption of new practices and policies in a given field 
(Greenwood et al., 2002; Hoffman, 1999; Munir, 2005). Disruptive events, also referred to 
environmental jolts or exogenous shocks (Meyer, 1982), are defined as the initiating events that 
can “sharply end what has become locked in by institutional inertia” (Hoffman, 1999, p.353). 
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Following Hannigan (1995) and Greenwood et al. (2002), disruptive events may take multiple 
forms, such as disasters or crises, threats, regulatory changes, and technological disruptions.  
Previous institutional studies show that such events can disrupt existing practices, spur 
greater attention to problems, and thereby present opportunities for the development of new 
practices and policies (Hoffman, 1999; Meyer, 1982). For example, Hoffman (1999) found that 
the book Silent Spring (Carson, 1962), which exposed the hazards of using pesticides, received 
considerable media and public attention, enhanced awareness of human impact on the 
environment, and hence, brought about significant institutional change in environmental 
practices and policies for the chemical industry.  
Less is known about the role of disruptive events in prompting sport policy change.  
However, several studies have relevance. Mason and colleagues (2006) suggested that 
allegations of corruptive behavior of the Salt Lake City’s bid team led to attempts at wholesale 
reform within and outside the International Olympic Committee. In a more recent study, Heinze 
and Lu (2017) discovered that a series of traumatic brain injury-related death events of high-
profile professional football players compelled the NFL to change its response to the issue of 
player concussions. Although these studies do not conceptualize or measure the effect of 
disruptive events across organizations, the findings indicate that medical disasters and corruption 
crises can help spur institutional change in sport.  
Given the role of disruptive events in increasing media and public attention around 
issues, bringing interested actors to the field, and prompting the search for solutions (Hoffman, 
1999; Zietsman & Lawrence, 2010), I argue that significant events can lead to sport policy 
adoption. In the context of concussion legislation, I suggest that disruptive events in the form of 
serious concussion incidents in youth sport (e.g., the catastrophic injuries of Zackery Lystedt in 
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Washington) provided the impetus for some local state legislatures to adopt youth sport 
concussion law sooner. Therefore, I propose: 
H1: States with high-profile youth sport concussion incidents will adopt youth sport concussion 
legislation sooner. 
Cultural Pressure: State Norms 
Institutional scholars have long recognized that organizations are embedded in cultural 
environments that can shape or constrain their behavior (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Scott, 
2001). Cultural pressure stems from norms, conventions, values, beliefs, or scripts that guide 
decision-making in a field (Scott, 2001). These cultural elements can form a basis of legitimacy 
and rationality in new practice adoption (Lounsbury, 2007; Scott, 2001). More specifically, 
studies suggest that the adoption process can be enhanced if new practices align with existing 
culture, and thwarted if they violate existing cultural norms (Davis & Greve, 1997; Kezar & 
Eckel, 2002; Suddaby, Elsbach, Greenwood, Meyer, & Zilber, 2010).  
Culture, however, emerges at different levels or within different social systems, such as 
industries and communities (Dacin et al., 2002). At the broader field level, institutional logics - 
concatenations and patterns of cultural elements, such as norms and values (Thornton & Ocasio, 
1999, 2008) - can shift and prompt organizational change (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Heinze & 
Weber, 2015; Rao & Giorgi, 2006). Yet, norms in the more immediate institutional environment, 
such as the city or state, may lead to variation in how organizations respond, within broader 
institutional change (Marquis & Battilana, 2009). For example, Lounsbury (2007) found that 
different financial cultures in Boston and New York provided distinct forms of justification that 
shaped the adoption of active money management practice in the mutual fund industry.  
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Within the sport management literature, several studies acknowledge or theorize on the 
influence of culture in the production of sporting events (Silk et al., 2000) and in shaping 
differences in environmental sustainability practices across sport venues (Heinze & Soderstrom, 
2017). However, there is a dearth of empirical work examining the effect of culture on sport 
policy adoption. Based on insights from the broader management and organizations discipline, I 
argue that variation in sport policy adoption can be explained, in part, by local culture; in my 
case, state values and norms.  
One relevant aspect of state culture for the adoption of sport policies in the U.S. is state 
policy innovativeness. Innovativeness is defined as openness to “the generation, acceptance, and 
implementation of new ideas, processes, products or services” (Thompson, 1965, p.36). Walker 
(1969) developed an index of state policy innovativeness by analyzing a variety of policies 
passed by states prior to 1965. This model demonstrates the cultural patterns of innovation across 
states. Following scholars generated an updated policy innovativeness index (e.g., Boehmke & 
Skinner, 2012). Using this index, I suggest that states with a history and culture of policy 
innovation are likely to pass concussion legislation faster than states without an innovative 
history of policymaking.  
In addition to overall policy innovativeness, state values around the issue, in particular, 
may influence the adoption of new policies. Cultural values are reflected in patterns of behavior 
(Hofstede, 1998). In the case of concussions, states that have more laws intended to keep youth 
safe demonstrate values around youth safety. Past behavior and values, in turn, predict future 
behavior (Aarts, Verplanken, & Knippenberg, 1998). Thus, I expect that states with stronger 
youth safety cultures will adopt concussion legislation faster. The hypotheses around the role of 
state norms are specified below:  
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H2a: The greater the policy innovativeness within a state, the sooner a state will adopt youth 
sport concussion legislation. 
H2b: The greater the number of youth safety policies adopted within a state, the sooner a state 
will adopt youth sport concussion legislation. 
Political Pressure: Local Advocacy 
Another aspect of the local institutional environment that can shape organizational 
change is advocacy (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Perkmann & Spicer, 2008; Sine & Lee, 2009). 
Advocacy refers to “the mobilization of political support through social persuasion” (Lawrence 
& Suddaby, 2006, p.221) and includes seeking resources, arguing for new causes, and lobbying 
for or against new legislation. Actors who engage in advocacy to create new institutions or 
transform existing ones are often called institutional entrepreneurs (Maguire et al., 2004). In 
order to gather social and political support, activists and entrepreneurs may recruit groups of 
actors and organizations into coalitions and networks to pursue a collective goal (Battilana et al., 
2009; Garud et al., 2002; Perkmann & Spicer, 2008). In some cases, this collective action 
involves attempts to influence governing bodies, such as state legislatures (Mintrom & Vergari, 
1996; Schneiberg & Soule, 2005). These advocacy efforts can also affect the “speed at which the 
political system addresses problems” (Reid, 2006, p.345). The success of the advocacy often 
depends on the availability and amount of resources (McNutt & Boland, 1999). 
A growing number of institutional studies demonstrate how advocacy and activism 
generate support for new practices (Lounsbury, 2005; Perkmann & Spicer, 2008; Sine & Lee, 
2009). For instance, using an institutional approach, Sine and Lee (2009) showed how 
environmental activists and movement organizations advocated for the development of wind 
power sectors and other renewable energy sources in the U.S, leading to a significant change in 
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the norms around electricity generation. Several qualitative studies within sport management also 
acknowledge the role of advocacy in the adoption of new practices or policies. For example, 
Sage (1999) found that coalition advocacy groups that protested against the labor practices of 
Nike’s sport shoe factories, successfully influenced governmental policies with respect to 
minimum wages, working condition standards, and limitations on hours of work. In another 
study, Comeau and Church (2010) showed how women’s sport advocacy organizations in 
Canada and the U.S. used different strategies, such as lobbying for resources and attending 
legislative consultation processes, to promote gender equity practices for women. Notably, these 
studies do not examine variation in advocacy and the effect on sport policy adoption.  
According to personal accounts of those involved in the passage of concussion 
legislation, local advocates were an important part of the policy-making process (Adler & 
Herring, 2011). Regional and community-based concussion advocacy organizations - sustained 
through public contributions - provided information concerning public opinion, and applied 
pressure, strategically, for policy change (Adler & Herring, 2011; Ellenbogen, 2014). Based on 
the prior research on advocacy, I propose:  
H3: The greater the concussion advocacy resources, the sooner a state will adopt youth sport 
concussion legislation. 
Social Pressure: Inter-State Networks 
 In addition to intra-state characteristics, the spread of a new policy or practice may be 
shaped by the social context. Social pressure can operate through contacts and networks among 
organizations, including state legislatures (Lee & Pennings, 2002; Vogus & Davis, 2005). 
Institutional scholars often use network perspectives to examine the influence of social structures 
on practice or policy adoption (Lee & Pennings, 2002; Marquis & Battilana, 2009; Marquis et 
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al., 2007). In this tradition, networks are viewed as vehicles by which new knowledge, forms, 
and information are diffused and transmitted across organizations, resulting in convergence 
around common practices (Marquis et al., 2007).   
Institutional studies show that the adoption of new practices can be facilitated by 
different types of networks, including geographic proximity (Marquis & Battilana, 2009; 
Marquis et al., 2007). Organizations often categorize their peers in terms of geographical 
distance (Burt, 1987; Davis & Greve, 1997). In the wake of practice or policy changes, 
organizational decision makers can be more susceptible to social influence from peers who are 
geographically closer (Lee & Pennings, 2002). For instance, Davis and Greve (1997) found that 
golden parachutes (a governance practice against hostile takeover) were spread among 
organizations within a closer geographical area. In another study, Lee and Pennings (2002) found 
that the diffusion of a new partner-associate structure among Dutch accounting firms was 
conditional upon a propinquity network. Despite their popularity in organization research, 
network theories and approaches are under-utilized in sport management (Quatman & 
Chelladurai, 2008). A few qualitative studies acknowledge the role of networks in sport practice 
adoption, such as the diffusion of environmental practices among professional sport teams 
(Babiak & Trendafilova, 2011). However, more work is needed to systematically test the 
influence of social networks on sport practice and policy adoption.  
Aligned with the broader research on networks and geographic proximity, I expect that 
states will be more cognizant of the actions of neighboring states as it pertains to new sport 
policies. State officials are more likely to communicate with states in the regional network that 
share the same border (Berry & Berry, 1990). Neighboring states, as regional peers, thus, may be 
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imitated and used as a reference to determine what is legitimate and appropriate. Therefore, I 
propose:  
H4: The greater the proportion of neighboring states’ adoption, the sooner a state will adopt 
youth sport concussion legislation. 
 
Methods 
In this study, I conducted an event history analysis (EHA) to investigate the effects of 
cultural (state norms), social (inter-state networks), and political factors (local advocacy), as well 
as triggering events, on state adoption of concussion legislation. EHA enables researchers to 
model fixed and time-varying factors that may increase or decrease the amount of time until the 
occurrence of an event (Mills, 2011); and this approach has been used extensively to examine the 
adoption of practices and policies by organizations and states (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 
2004). Thus, through EHA, I was able to model the causes, the timing, and the sequence of state 
policy adoption (Vogus & Davis, 2005). Further, I drew on background interview data to offer 
insight around how some of the factors identified in the quantitative findings influenced the 
passage of concussion legislation. 
Data Collection  
Sample 
 With an EHA design, I followed three decision rules. First, the time period for this study 
was 2009 to 2014, starting with the year the first state (Washington) adopted the concussion 
legislation and ending with the year the last state (Mississippi) adopted. Second, as is common in 
previous research (e.g., Boehmke & Skinner, 2012; Rosenson, 2006), I focused on the 48 
contiguous U.S. states, and excluded Alaska and Hawaii from the analyses because of their 
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isolated geographical location and some missing observations. Under this rule, the sample size 
was 154 observations (state-years). More specifically, each of the 48 contiguous states provided 
an observation for each year in which the state had a non-zero probability of adopting the new 
concussion legislation, between the period of 2009 to 2014. Once a state adopted the concussion 
legislation, its probability of adoption dropped to zero. For instance, if a state passed the 
legislation in 2012, the state contributed four observations and was coded as 0 in 2009, 0 in 
2010, 0 in 2011, and 1 in 2012. Because all 50 states adopted some form of concussion law by 
2014, there was no right censoring issue3 in this data set. Right censoring here refers to the 
situation whereby a state did not adopt a concussion law before the study observation time 
ended. Third, aligned with previous research (Berry & Berry, 1990; Soule & Zylan, 1997), I 
lagged the characteristics of time-varying covariates (e.g., local advocacy, inter-state networks) 
by 1 year, assuming that the previous year’s characteristics affected current-year decisions.  
Dependent variables 
The cases in this data set were composed of state-years. The dependent variable in this 
analysis refers to the probability that a state adopted the concussion legislation during calendar 
years. Following prior studies (Berry & Berry, 1990; Vogus & Davis, 2005), I measured the 
dependent variable by a dichotomous indicator: for each state in a given year, I coded the 
dependent variable as a 0 if the state did not pass the legislation in that year; and a 1 if it did. 
Once the state adopted the legislation in a given year, I excluded that state from the risk set. I 
obtained data on the timing of youth sport concussion legislation adoption from the National 
Conference of State Legislature (NCSL) database (http://www.ncsl.org/). To corroborate my 
findings, following Vogus and Davis (2005), I performed another series of EHA by using exact 
                                               
3 Right censoring occurs when we partially observe a duration: a subject leaves the study or the 
study ends before an event has occurred. (Hays, 2013)  
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dates for the adoption of concussion legislation in each state (Table 7-9). Further, I consulted 
several other sources (e.g., state legislative records, media accounts of legislation adoption, 
MomsTeam.com) to confirm the timing of the initial passage of concussion law.  
Independent variables 
Disruptive events. To test the influence of disruptive events in policy adoption, I utilized 
a dummy measure of the presence or the absence of high-profile youth sport concussion 
incidents that occurred between 2001 and 2013 in each state. I chose to code the disruptive 
events that happened prior to 2009 because the first concussion legislation was adopted in 2009. 
I started the search period a few years ahead because the first two states to adopt (Washington 
and Oregon) had disruptive events in 2006 and 2001. Previous research also identified this time 
frame (2001-2013) as a key stage of incremental institutional change around concussion (Heinze 
& Lu, 2017). I focused on the incidents that received prominent coverage in leading national 
news outlets. I monitored two leading national news sources (e.g., The New York Times and 
Sports Illustrated) for items dealing with salient concussion incidents in youth sport. The NYT 
and the SI were selected because of their prominence and systematic coverage of the evolution of 
the concussion issue over time. Examples of disruptive events in include the notable injuries of 
Zackery Lystedt in Washington, Max Conradt in Oregon, and Kort Breckenridge in Idaho. This 
variable was also lagged one year, assuming that the previous year’s characteristic affected the 
current year’s decisions. 
State norms. I used two variables as indicators of state norms: a state’s policy 
innovativeness and a state’s culture for youth safety. Both variables are fixed values for each 
state across years. To measure policy innovativeness, I utilized Boehmke and Skinner’s (2012) 
updated innovation score, based on Walker’s (1969) original state policy innovation index. After 
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analyzing 180 policies passed by states between 1913 and 2008, Boehmke and Skinner (2012) 
came up with a standardized innovation score ranging from .61 (indicating the highest level of 
innovation) and -.38 (indicating the lowest level of innovation) for each state. I accessed the data 
were from the Harvard dataverse (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/).  
A state’s culture for youth safety variable was based on a state’s previous adoption of 
important youth safety legislation. I operationalized this variable using the number of key youth 
safety policies passed before 2009. Youth safety policy data was provided by the Safe Kids 
Worldwide, a global organization dedicated to protecting kids from unintentional injuries. Safe 
Kids developed a matrix listing key legislation that impacts youth safety. Examples of legislation 
include the seatbelt law (under 16), the bike helmet law (under 16), the life jacket law, and the 
motorcycle helmet law.  
Local advocacy. I measured local advocacy using the public support data for state 
chapters of Brain Injury Association (BIA). The BIA was identified in previous reflection papers 
(Adler & Herring, 2011; Ellenbogen, 2014) and my first-hand interviews as the leading 
concussion advocacy organization in promoting the passage of concussion legislation in each 
state. Public support includes ‘gifts, grants, contributions, and membership fees’ to the BIA in 
each state. I gathered the data from the IRS Form 990 (Return of Organization Exempt from 
Income Tax), filed by each state-level BIA, using Guidestar 
(http://www.guidestar.org/Home.aspx). All dollar values were transformed in millions. This 
variable was updated annually for each state-year.  
Inter-state networks. To examine inter-state networks, I looked at the influence of 
neighboring states’ adoption. Neighboring states refer to two states that “share a land-based 
border” (Doyle, 2006, p.269). This variable was updated annually for each state-year. I 
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calculated neighboring states’ adoption by using a percentage of previously-adopting 
neighboring states for each state-year.  
Controls  
I included several controls that capture state economic and political, and football, soccer 
and hockey popularity within each state. First, to control for the effect of state economic 
conditions, I created a variable for fiscal health. Prior studies suggest that states with a strong 
fiscal health tend to have more room in their budgets to support new legislation (Volden, 2006). 
Following previous research (Berry & Berry, 1990; Soule & Zylan, 1997), I measured fiscal 
health by subtracting total state expenditures from total state revenues and dividing by total state 
revenues. State expenditure and revenue data were collected from the Statistical Abstracts of the 
U.S. published by the U.S. Census Bureau (https://www.census.gov/).  
Previous research shows that the composition of state government may influence policy 
adoption (McLendon, Heller, & Young, 2005). More specifically, when a single political party 
controls the governorship and both houses of the legislature, the probability that the state will 
adopt a new policy is greater than when the government is under divided party control (Berry & 
Berry, 1990). Thus, I utilized a dummy variable for unified government (1=the two legislative 
houses and the governor are controlled by the same party; 0=otherwise) to account for the 
political condition of state legislatures (Berry & Berry, 1990). I gathered the data from the NCSL 
database.  
Further, prior research shows that football, soccer, and hockey are the sports that tend to 
have higher concussion rates (Comstock, Currie, Pierpoint, Grubenhoff, & Fields, 2015; Marar, 
McIlvain, Fields, & Comstock, 2012). Therefore, I included two additional variables to capture 
football, soccer, and hockey popularity in each state. In particular, I controlled for the presence 
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of an NFL team in the state (dummy measure), and the high school football, soccer and hockey 
participation rate. Data on high school football, soccer, and hockey participation rate were 
gathered from the National Federation of State High School Associations (NFHS) official 
website (https://www.nfhs.org/). I applied a per capita transformation to standardize differences 
in population size, thus ensuring comparability across states. 
I updated state economic and political conditions, and state high school football, soccer, 
and hockey participation rates, annually; while NFL teams was a fixed value across years. Table 
3 contains the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for all the variables used in the 
statistical analyses.     
 
  
61 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Legislation 
adoption 
.31 .46         
Disruptive 
events 
.10 .30 .16        
Policy 
innovativeness 
.04 .19 .10 .10       
Culture for 
youth safety 
3.78 1.24 .01 .07 .29*      
Local 
advocacy 
.32 .43 .08 -.02 .22* .04     
Neighboring 
state adoption 
.13 .24 .43* -.01 -.14 .03 -.12    
Unified 
government 
.60 .49 .07 .23* .02 .15 -.15 .06   
Fiscal health -.09 .19 .25* -.03 -.23* -.04 -.11 .37* .15  
Football, 
soccer, 
hockey rate 
.00 .00 -.02 .20* -.20* -.16* -.23* .06 -.01 .08 
Note: *p<.05 
 
Data Analysis 
I used an event history framework to examine the effects of independent variables that 
may influence the amount of time before concussion legislation is adopted in a given state. In 
terms of model selection, I used the Cox proportional hazard model, a commonly used event 
history model in policy adoption studies (Berry & Berry, 1999; Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 
2004). The Cox model examines the hazard rate for event occurrence, which denotes the rate of 
change at a particular time interval (Doyle, 2006; Milles, 2011). The hazard rate refers to the 
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probability, or risk, of adopting concussion legislation during the period of analysis. One major 
strength of the Cox model is that it offers flexibility to fit an event history model without having 
to assume a specific distribution (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004). I used the Efron method to 
handle tied events, i.e. events with the same survival time (Borucka, 2014). Survival time is the 
time between entry to a risk set and the occurrence of an event (policy adoption). Survival time 
here refers to the time (years or days) that it took for a state to adopt concussion legislation. For 
each model, I applied the proportional-hazards test, based on Schoenfeld residuals, to test the 
proportionality assumption. For an individual state i, with a vector of characteristics, x, the 
proportional hazards model is written as follows: 
 
ℎ𝑖(𝑡) = ℎ0(𝑡)exp⁡(𝛽𝑘
′𝑥𝑖) 
 where ℎ𝑖(𝑡) is the hazard function of state i; ℎ0(𝑡) is the unspecified baseline hazard 
function; 𝛽𝑘
′  denotes a k*1 vector of coefficients of independent variables; and 𝑥𝑖 refers to a k*1 
vector of independent variables for state i. 
 
I adopted a methodological technique recommended by previous scholars (e.g. Mintz & 
Palmer, 2000; Vogus & Davis, 2005) to handle the smaller sample size. In particular, I followed 
a four-step procedure to maximally test all relevant variables, while reducing “the demands on 
the small sample size in the final model” (Vogus & Davis, 2005, p.114). As shown in Table 4 
and 5, in the first step, I estimated five separate "single-factor" models, including independent 
variables measuring disruptive events (Model 1), state norms (Model 2), local advocacy (Model 
3), inter-state networks (Model 4), and controls (Model 5). In the second step, I entered all 
statistically significant variables from step one into a first-stage multifactor model (Model 6). In 
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the third step, all the significant variables from step two, and each variable dropped in step one, 
were re-entered into a set of second-stage multifactor models (Model 7-12). In the fourth step, 
the significant variables from steps two and three were entered into a final multifactor model 
(Model 13). I used the Stata 15 program to perform the data analysis.  
Supporting Interview Data  
In conjunction with the above data collection and analyses, I conducted interviews with 
key actors in the passage of concussion legislation to add nuance to my findings. In particular, I 
collected 11 first-hand interviews with local advocacy actors who participated in the enactment 
of concussion legislation in the three early-adopter states, Washington, Oregon, and Idaho. I 
focused on these states to shed light on how the factors I identified in the EHA prompted faster 
adoption. Interviewees included leaders of state-level concussion associations and youth sport 
governing bodies, concussion researchers from academic institutions, and lobbyist. The 
interviews were semi-structured with open-ended questions. I started with questions about 
interviewees’ personal experiences in the legislation campaigns. These were followed by probes 
to understand the characteristics of local advocacy in more depth. I also included questions that 
focused on the potential interaction between states (e.g., “Have you reached out to any states for 
assistance in getting the law passed?”). Most interviews lasted about 40 to 60 minutes, and each 
was audiotaped following the respondent’s permission. The interviews were conducted between 
January 2017 and June 2017. 
I used qualitative, content analysis to unpack the influence of the four key conditions on 
the adoption of youth sport concussion legislation. I used a two-step process. In the first step, I 
deductively coded for the presence of the four factors (state norms, disruptive events, local 
advocacy, and inter-state networks) as factors in the adoption of concussion legislation. In the 
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second step, I focused on understanding how the factors may have contributed to the passage of 
the legislation.  
 
Results 
The results of the Cox proportional hazard regression, using 48 contiguous states, are 
presented in Table 4 and Table 5 (Models 1 through 13). In Step 1, as shown in Models 1 
through 5, five groups of theoretically-related variables—disruptive events, state norms, local 
advocacy, inter-state networks, and controls—were entered individually (Mintz & Palmer, 2000; 
Vogus & Davis, 2005). These models indicate that the effects of three of my explanatory 
variables—disruptive events, policy innovativeness, and local advocacy (H1, H2a, and H3)—are 
well supported. Models 1 through 3 were also statistically significant. In Model 5, none of the 
four control variables were significant. In Step 2, I ran a first-stage multifactor model with the 
three significant factors received in Step 1: disruptive events, policy innovativeness, and local 
advocacy. The results in Model 6 show that disruptive events, policy innovativeness, and local 
advocacy are statistically significant. In Step 3, I ran 6 Cox models (Model 7 through 12) with 
the three significant variables— disruptive events, policy innovativeness, local advocacy—
received from Step 2, and individually re-entered each variable—culture for youth safety, 
neighboring state adoption, unified government, fiscal health, NFL teams, and football, soccer, 
and hockey participation rate—dropped after Step 1. Among these models, one control 
variable—NFL teams—became significant at .05 level (Model 11), and another control—
football, soccer, and hockey participation rate—was moderately significant at .10 level (Model 
12). These two controls were re-entered in Step 4. Therefore, in the final Model 13, I included 5 
variables—disruptive events, policy innovativeness, local advocacy, NFL teams, and football, 
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soccer, and hockey participation rate. The global tests showed that Model 13 did not violate the 
proportional hazard assumption (chi2=3.35, p>.05). Table 6 and 7 present the Cox regression 
results, using days to measure time to adoption. Results in Model 12 in Table 7 (using days to 
measure time to adoption) align with results in Model 13 in Table 5 (using years to measure time 
to adoption). In the following section, I report the final output in Model 13 in Table 5. In 
addition, given Washington and Oregon are two salient cases, I repeated the four steps and 
performed another series of EHA by excluding Washington and Oregon. The results, displayed 
in Table 8 and 9, are consistent with final output in Table 5 and 7. Final output in Table 8 and 9 
also showed significant effects of disruptive events, policy innovativeness, and public advocacy 
on concussion legislation adoption. The background qualitative data also added additional insight 
on the role of disruptive events and local advocacy on policy adoption.  
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Table 4. Cox Regression of Concussion Legislation Adoption (years) I 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Disruptive 
events 
.99** 
(.37) 
    .93* 
(.38) 
.90* 
(.38) 
Policy 
innovativeness 
 2.70*** 
(.77) 
   2.17** 
(.68) 
2.35** 
(.74) 
Culture for 
youth safety  
 -.13 
(.10) 
    -.08 
(.09) 
Local 
advocacy 
  .74** 
(.24) 
  .60* 
(.25) 
.60* 
(.25) 
Neighboring 
state adoption 
   .12 
(.79) 
   
Controls        
Unified 
government 
    -.21 
(.27) 
  
Fiscal health     -1.05 
(1.09) 
  
NFL teams     .13 
(.28) 
  
Football, 
soccer, hockey 
rate 
    -27.78 
(88.96) 
  
Likelihood 
ratio 
-138.15 -135.67 -138.62 -139.77 -140.06 -132.55 -132.35 
Wald x 7.00** 12.28** 9.73** 2.36 2.69 30.03*** 29.54*** 
N 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 
Note: Significance tests are two-tail for controls and one-tail for hypothesized effects.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
+p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Table 5. Cox Regression of Concussion Legislation Adoption (years) II 
 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 
Disruptive 
events 
.91* 
(36) 
1.01** 
(.39) 
1.02** 
(.35) 
1.02*** 
(.32) 
.97* 
(.40) 
1.10*** 
(.34) 
Policy 
innovativeness 
2.04** 
(.70) 
2.21** 
(.70) 
2.13** 
(.68) 
3.67*** 
(.97) 
2.03** 
(.72) 
3.52*** 
(.97) 
Culture for 
youth safety  
      
Local advocacy .64* 
(.25) 
.52+ 
(.29) 
.59* 
(.25) 
.69** 
(.25) 
.64** 
(.24) 
.75** 
(.24) 
Neighboring 
state adoption 
.89 
(.71) 
     
Controls       
Unified 
government 
 -.28 
(.26) 
    
Fiscal health   -1.35 
(1.27) 
   
NFL teams    -.89** 
(.34) 
 -.95** 
(.36) 
Football, 
soccer, hockey 
rate 
    -36.27+ 
(100.48) 
-76.45 
(101.34) 
Likelihood 
ratio 
-132.05 -132.29 -132.24 -130.12 -132.49 -129.83 
Wald x 35.00*** 31.19*** 29.54*** 41.77*** 31.46*** 45.29*** 
N 154 154 154 154 154 154 
Note: Significance tests are two-tail for controls and one-tail for hypothesized effects.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
+p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Table 6. Cox Regression of Concussion Legislation Adoption (days) I 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Disruptive 
events 
1.14* 
(.38) 
    1.02** 
(.39) 
Policy 
innovativeness 
 2.17* 
(.89) 
   1.92* 
(.72) 
Culture for 
youth safety  
 -.19+ 
(.11) 
   -.15 
(.11) 
Local 
advocacy 
  .63** 
(.22) 
  .46+ 
(.26) 
Neighboring 
state adoption 
   .90 
(.76) 
  
Controls       
Unified 
government 
    -.26 
(.31) 
 
Fiscal health     -.90 
(1.19) 
 
NFL teams     .03 
(.31) 
 
Football, 
soccer, hockey 
rate 
    -24.40 
(140.46) 
 
Likelihood 
ratio 
-137.50 -136.95 -139.14 -140.12 -140.19 -133.47 
Wald x 8.99* 6.89* 7.80** 1.40 1.48 22.02*** 
N 154 154 154 154 154 154 
Note: Significance tests are two-tail for controls and one-tail for hypothesized effects.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
+p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Table 7. Cox Regression of Concussion Legislation Adoption (days) II 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Disruptive 
events 
1.06** 
(.37) 
1.20** 
(.41) 
1.19*** 
(.37) 
1.17*** 
(.33) 
1.12** 
(.42) 
1.17*** 
(.33) 
Policy 
innovativeness 
1.47+ 
(.80) 
1.68* 
(.82) 
1.57* 
(.78) 
2.82** 
(1.02) 
1.44+ 
(.82) 
2.82** 
(1.02) 
Culture for 
youth safety  
      
Local advocacy .49+ 
(.27) 
.33 
(.32) 
.43+ 
(.26) 
.53* 
(.26) 
.49+ 
(.26) 
.53* 
(.26) 
Neighboring 
state adoption 
.67 
(.74) 
     
Controls       
Unified 
government 
 -.43 
(.32) 
    
Fiscal health   -1.54 
(1.38) 
   
NFL teams    -.84* 
(.35) 
 -.84* 
(.35) 
Football, 
soccer, hockey 
rate 
    -36.70 
(119.81) 
 
Likelihood 
ratio 
-133.85 -133.41 -133.75 -132.02 -134.10 -132.02 
Wald x 22.89*** 19.88*** 20.78*** 31.54*** 20.20*** 31.54*** 
N 154 154 154 154 154 154 
Note: Significance tests are two-tail for controls and one-tail for hypothesized effects.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
+p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Table 8. Cox Regression Excluding Washington and Oregon (years) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Disruptive 
events 
.72* 
(.35) 
    .69* 
(.35) 
.77** 
(.30) 
Policy 
innovativeness 
 2.52*** 
(.77) 
   1.97** 
(.68) 
3.39*** 
(.96) 
Culture for 
youth safety  
 -.15 
(.10) 
     
Local 
advocacy 
  .85** 
(.26) 
  .76** 
(.24) 
.83*** 
(.24) 
Neighboring 
state adoption 
   1.21 
(.79) 
   
Controls        
Unified 
government 
    -.32 
(.26) 
  
Fiscal health     -.61 
(1.11) 
  
NFL teams     .17 
(.28) 
 -.82* 
(.35) 
Football, 
soccer, hockey 
rate 
    -22.64 
(93.11) 
  
Likelihood 
ratio 
-131.85 -128.71 -130.43 -132.05 -132.25 -126.46 -124.55 
Wald x 4.09* 10.94** 10.45** 2.36 2.60 24.84*** 38.20*** 
N 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 
Note: Significance tests are two-tail for controls and one-tail for hypothesized effects.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
+p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Table 9. Cox Regression Excluding Washington and Oregon (days) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Disruptive 
events 
.87* 
(.36) 
    752* 
(.35) 
.90** 
(.31) 
Policy 
innovativeness 
 1.98* 
(.90) 
   1.71* 
(.84) 
2.53* 
(1.02) 
Culture for 
youth safety  
 -.21+ 
(.12) 
   -.17 
(.11) 
 
Local 
advocacy 
  .72** 
(.24) 
  .59* 
(.26) 
.67** 
(.24) 
Neighboring 
state adoption 
   .90 
(.76) 
   
Controls        
Unified 
government 
    -.37 
(.32) 
  
Fiscal health     -.45 
(1.25) 
  
NFL teams     .05 
(.31) 
 -.77* 
(.36) 
Football, 
soccer, hockey 
rate 
    -19.41 
(110.21) 
  
Likelihood 
ratio 
-131.44 -129.64 -131.04 -132.40 -132.30 -127.28 -126.55 
Wald x 5.80* 6.29* 8.72** 1.40 1.61 18.58*** 29.25*** 
N 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 
Note: Significance tests are two-tail for controls and one-tail for hypothesized effects.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
+p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Disruptive Events  
Based on the output in Table 5, I found evidence supporting the influence of disruptive 
events. Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive effect of the presence of high profile youth sport 
concussion incidents on state concussion legislation adoption. Consistent with H1, the estimated 
coefficient for disruptive concussion events is positive and statistically significant in Model 13 
(𝛽 = 1.10, 𝑝 < .05). For interpretability, following Zylan and Soule (1997), I computed a 
hazard ratio by exponentiating the estimated coefficient 1.10. More specifically, for states with 
prominent concussion incidents, 𝑒𝑥𝑝(1.10 ∗ 1) = 3.00. For states without salient concussion 
events, 𝑒𝑥𝑝(1.10 ∗ 0) = 1. That is to say, the expected hazard rate of adoption is 3 times higher 
in states with disruptive concussion incidents as compared to states without such incidents, while 
holding other variables constant. Thus, the presence of salient concussion events in youth sport 
likely contributed to faster adoption of legislation. 
The interview data further supported the EHA findings about the effect of disruptive 
events. I found that salient concussion incidents in early adopter states functioned as an 
important trigger in the policy adoption process, through generating significant attention around 
the issue of concussion in youth sports and mobilizing advocates. After learning of the high-
profile events, a group of concussion advocates (including organizations and individuals) worked 
to promote the passage of concussion legislation. For instance, in Oregon State, following Max 
Conradt’s tragic injury event, the issue of how to better protect youth athletes from the danger of 
concussions was raised among a group of advocates. This group later formed a state-level 
advocacy coalition to promote the passage of concussion legislation. The role of disruptive 
events is illustrated by the following quote from a legislation advocate in Oregon. 
“This is where the story of Max’s law really starts. Ralph Conradt (Max Conradt’s dad) 
73 
approached us and told Max’s story. Ralph Conradt came at us and he said something 
has to be done, we have to do something legislatively. So that’s how that all started...We 
had this incredible emotional story with Max. ... We realized how serious any concussion 
can be, so that’s where activists, doctors and researchers all came in. These are all 
groups that were part of that coalition.”  
State Norms 
Hypothesis 2a and 2b predict the impact of state norms on concussion legislation 
adoption. The results provide strong support for H2a regarding state policy innovativeness on 
concussion legislation adoption. As shown in Model 13 in Table 5, the estimated coefficient for 
policy innovativeness is positive and statistically significant (𝛽 = 3.52, 𝑝 < .05). For states with 
the highest policy innovation score, 𝑒𝑥𝑝(3.52 ∗ 0.61) = 8.56. For states with the lowest policy 
innovation score, 𝑒𝑥𝑝(3.52 ∗ −0.38) = 0.26. In other words, states with the highest policy 
innovativeness adopted a concussion legislation at a hazard rate 32 times higher than states with 
the lowest, holding other variables constant. Thus, the greater the state’s policy innovativeness, 
the faster the state is to adopt youth sport concussion legislation. However, contrary to the 
prediction in H2b, a state’s culture for youth safety is not significant in Model 7. Taken together, 
the results suggest that certain state norms are more relevant than others in terms of conditioning 
willingness and ability to adopt concussion legislation. 
State Advocacy 
Regarding intra-state characteristics, the results are consistent with my expectations. The 
coefficient for state advocacy is positive and statistically significant in Model 13 in Table 5 (𝛽 =
.75, 𝑝 < .05). For each one unit increase in public support for the brain injury advocacy 
organization in local state, 𝑒𝑥𝑝(0.75 ∗ 1) = 2.12. That is to say, the expected hazard is 2.12 
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times higher in a state relative to a one unit increase in public support, holding other variables 
constant. As predicted, the greater the advocacy resources for brain injury in the state, the faster 
the adoption of youth sport concussion legislation. 
The interview data offered additional support for the broader role of state advocacy in 
policy adoption. As noted by a prominent state-level legislation advocate in Oregon, “The 
success of the passage of this legislation is really about advocacy.” More specifically, I 
identified three key characteristics of state advocacy in early adopter states. One feature was the 
diversity in advocacy membership. For instance, in Washington, the state-level advocacy group 
was composed of a variety of organizations and actors, including brain injury advocacy 
organizations, youth sport governing bodies, professional sports teams, healthcare organizations, 
and academic institutions. Different stakeholders brought different skills, perspectives, and 
resources to the table that were leveraged in the passage of concussion legislation. As noted by a 
key legislation advocate in Washington,  
“I think it was very important that legislators in our state heard the same message from a 
variety of different advocacy groups. And that interest would be from the athlete, 
medical, academic, and legal perspectives. Each had unique context that would be 
interesting in this type of work. This is a perfect example of pulling resources.” 
In addition, I found that local advocacy groups developed shared visions around the 
notion that concussion law was more than a concussion issue, a football issue, or a sports issue. It 
was an issue of children’s safety and health. These shared visions helped diverse groups of 
advocates find common ground in building inter-organizational collaboration. As stated by a key 
advocate in Washington, “I think the one thing that we have in common is that we cared about 
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the safety of our youth and the safety of sports. When you look at it from that perspective, there is 
no territory.”  
Further, the analysis of the interview data suggests that state-level advocacy involved co-
optation. Co-optation is a form of manipulation whereby the organization recruits the threatening 
constituent to “neutralize opposition and enhance legitimacy” (Oliver, 1991, p.157). In building 
the coalition, state-level advocates tried to identify organizations that were critics of concussion 
laws, and involve them in the process. This helped minimize potential opposition in the 
legislation process. As mentioned by a lobbyist, 
“We started early on with the discussion about who may be interested in this [concussion 
legislation], who we want to make sure that doesn’t oppose us. It was important to 
identify anybody who may be opposed to this and bring them in. And they could actually 
become one of the strongest supporters.” 
Inter-State Networks  
I did not find significant effects of inter-state networks on adoption. Note that when inter-
state factor is included in Model 8, the intra-state effects do not change dramatically. However, 
the measure of the inter-state networks does not yield the expected results. As shown in Model 4 
and Model 8 in Table 5, the coefficient for neighboring states adoption implies a positive 
relationship (which is consistent with the hypothesis), but the variable is not statistically 
significant. Thus, H4 is not well supported. Similarly, I did not find evidence, through the 
analysis of interview data, of the role of neighboring states. Instead, qualitative findings suggest 
that some states were heavily influenced by the leading or innovator states, such as Washington 
and Oregon. For instance, one advocate in Idaho said the following when asked about whether 
other states shaped the process.  
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“Absolutely, Washington in particular, I think the thing that we got to remember was that 
Washington passed the law, really on the leading edge. At that time, there wasn’t a lot of 
discussion. They were the first to do it. The people were unprepared, the legislators were 
unprepared. They reacted with emotion. Washington really set up a good example for 
following states to follow.” 
In Model 13, one control variable, NFL teams, was significant(𝛽 = −.95, 𝑝 < .05), and 
yet it was in the opposite direction as I predicted. The result shows that a state without an NFL 
team tends to adopt the legislation at a faster rate. I did not find significant effects of the other 
controls-unified government, fiscal health, and football, soccer, and hockey participation rate-on 
concussion policy adoption. 
Together, the findings indicate that 1) the presence of significant concussion injury 
events in the state, 2) greater state policy innovativeness, and 3) more advocacy resources for 
brain injury in the state, led to faster youth sport concussion legislation adoption.  
 
Discussion 
Prior work on institutional change in sport management neglects policy adoption and 
diffusion across geographic boundaries. Further, this literature often focuses on explaining 
homogeneity in organizational responses (O’Brien & Slack, 2004; Slack & Hining, 1994; 
Trendafilova et al., 2013). In examining youth concussion legislation, this study sheds light on 
the institutionalization of sport policy and variation in the speed of adoption across states. 
Results of EHA indicate institutional factors relevant for sport policy adoption. Specifically, I 
identified the influence of the local institutional environment with respect to important triggers, 
cultural elements, and political activity in sport policy adoption. These findings expand 
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understanding of institutional factors in sport management, beyond the oft-cited coercive and 
mimetic forces (Amis et al., 2002; Slack & Hining, 1994; Trendafilova et al., 2013). In this 
section, I discuss the contributions to the literature on institutional change in sport management. I 
address limitation, future research directions, and practical implications in Chapter 5. 
The findings on intra-state factors connect sport management with a growing body of 
organizational research on the influence of the local institutional context (Husted et al., 2016; 
Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007). The first way my results speak to this area is through identifying 
the role of important local triggering events in sport policy adoption. Concussion legislation was 
adopted sooner in states where there were salient concussion injuries in youth sport. This result 
can be understood in light of significant media coverage and public awareness around these 
concussion incidents that appeared to spark new initiatives around youth concussion safety. 
These disruptive events may have created social pressure in states and directed activists’ 
attention (Nigam & Ocasio, 2010) to the issue of concussions. In demonstrating the effect of 
triggering events, this study extends the sport management literature. Several prior case studies 
suggested the role of events in shaping organizational structure or strategy (Heinze & Lu, 2017; 
Mason et al., 2006). This study builds on this work by systematically identifying the influence of 
events on sport policy adoption.  
The second intrastate factor supported by my findings is cultural pressure. Although 
institutional research suggests that we can understand organizational change through a cultural 
perspective (Rao & Giorgi, 2006; Scott, 2001; Suddaby et al., 2010), few empirical studies in 
sport management test the influence of cultural pressure on sport policy or practice adoption. In 
this research, I used two indicators for state norms. I found that a state norm of policy 
innovativeness significantly affected the speed of concussion legislation adoption. It is perhaps 
78 
the case that states with an innovative culture and history of policy-making are more open to new 
opportunities and have a higher propensity for risk taking, leading to a faster adoption. I did not 
find support for the influence of a more specific state norm for youth safety. One possible 
explanation is that concussion in sport is a relatively new and emerging issue in state policies 
around youth safety. According to my interviewees in the early adopter states, some state 
legislators lacked knowledge about the importance and seriousness of this issue within the 
category of youth safety. Taken together, the results around cultural pressure suggest that 
narrower or more context-specific norms may not be relevant to particular sport policies and 
practices, whereas broader state norms can shape receptivity and readiness to adopt more 
consistently. Thus, this study extends the literature on institutional change in sport management 
by demonstrating that certain cultural norms are important mechanisms in shaping variation in 
adoption within broader institutional change in sport.  
 The last intrastate factor I identified is a type of political pressure—local advocacy. In 
recent years, institutional scholars have shed light on the role of political factors, including local 
advocacy, in institutional change (Briscoe & Safford, 2008; Sine & Lee, 2009). Building on 
these insights, I found that advocacy can influence the timing of sport policy adoption. In my 
context, groups of community organizations and actors formed state-level advocacy coalitions as 
a way to promote the passage of concussion legislation. My results show that states with more 
advocacy resources and support around concussion adopted legislation faster. This finding 
extends institutional research in sport management that has focused on the influence of insiders 
in organizational responses, such as the role of Canadian intercollegiate athletic directors on the 
delegation of managerial activities (Danylchuk & Chelladurai, 1999). This study suggests that 
actors outside the organization or decision-making entity can significantly shape new sport 
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policy adoption. Future research could expand on this finding by analyzing the specific strategies 
and tactics state advocates—including sport organizations, advocacy organizations, and local 
leaders—employ in the sport policy-making process.  
My qualitative findings add more nuance to my quantitative results. In particular, 
analyses suggest an important connection between local advocacy and disruptive events in sport 
policy adoption. More specifically, my findings indicate that institutional actors, such as 
advocacy organizations and activists, leveraged events to mobilize support for the passage of 
concussion legislation. I found that high-profile concussion incidents in youth sport, such as the 
tragic injury events of Zackery Lystedt, heightened public awareness of the severity of 
concussion and motivated a group of concussion advocates to create policies to address this 
youth safety challenge. These events later became even more significant once key advocates 
publicized them, and brought them to the attention of the field. Thus, my quantitative and 
qualitative results together imply that disruptive events can not only function as a trigger for 
change, but can be exploited and leveraged by strategic organizations and actors to propel the 
passage of new sport policies. The relationship between these two main factors aligns with recent 
institutional research on the value of sponsors and agents in determining the significance of 
disruptive events (Munir, 2005), and expands knowledge of the strategic use of events in sport 
by change agents. These findings also reveals that significant events in sport should not be 
understood as isolated occurrences, but as a “sequence of activities” (Nigam & Ocasio, 2010, 
p.824) that can mobilize collective action and lead to the emergence of a new sport policy or 
practice.  
My results are mixed around the role of inter-state networks on concussion legislation 
adoption. One type of network I looked at was geographic proximity. Previous institutional 
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studies on practice or policy adoption suggest that the level of influence of one organization over 
another is proportional to the distance between the two (Davis & Greve, 1997; Lee & Pennings, 
2002). Thus, I argued that a state’s adoption of a sport policy - concussion legislation in my case 
- would be influenced by bordering states. In contrast to my expectation, I found that 
neighboring states’ actions did not significantly affect the focal state’s legislation adoption. One 
possible explanation for this result is that the Internet and electronic devices have increased 
communication and limited the influence of geographical distance. When a state adopts a new 
policy, other states can easily acquire relevant information. Although geographic proximity was 
not significant, my qualitative findings suggest the role of other inter-state network factors. In 
particular, my interview data indicate that some states were heavily influenced by leading or 
pioneer states’ (e.g., Washington and Oregon) adoption behavior. States emulated these leaders 
to enact concussion legislation. Future sport management scholars can study the pattern of new 
sport policy adoption by specifying a leader-follower type of network. My multilevel design 
provides an initial framework to prompt additional consideration of the conjoint influence of 
intra- and inter-state factors on sport policy or practice adoption.  
To sum, concussion from sport participation poses significant health problems for youth. 
This study contributes to a better understanding of institutional dynamics around concussion. By 
shedding light on the adoption of concussion legislation, this work offers insight into institutional 
factors relevant to the spread of sport policies, more broadly. 
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CHAPTER IV 
The Passage of Youth Sport Concussion Legislation: Activities and Tactics in Institutional 
Entrepreneurship 
 
In recent years, institutional scholars have expressed increasing interest in the influence 
of agency on institutional processes (Battilana et al., 2009; Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Garud et al., 
2007). This interest has spawned a growing body of work on institutional entrepreneurship, 
whereby individual and/or collective actors mobilize resources and skills to create new 
institutions or transform existing ones (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Maguire et al., 2004). The 
theory of institutional entrepreneurship helps explain how and why certain novel organizing 
solutions, such as new practices or structures, come into existence (Leca et al., 2008; Perkmann, 
2002). Studies of institutional entrepreneurship have addressed diverse institutional types 
(Pacheco et al., 2010), which can be broadly categorized as new fields (Dorado, 2013; Hwang & 
Powell, 2005; Lawrence & Phillips, 2004), practices (Brown, De Jong, & Lessidrenska, 2009; 
Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007), technologies (Garud et al., 2002; 
Munir & Phillips, 2005; Wang & Swanson, 2007), and forms/structures (Perkmann, 2002; 
Perkmann & Spicer, 2007; Tracey et al., 2011). Relevant research has also explored the 
characteristics of, and conditions for, creating or altering institutions (Buhr, 2012; Dorado & 
Ventresca, 2013; Hardy & Maguire, 2008).  
Less is known about institutional entrepreneurship in terms of the emergence of new 
government policies or legislation, particularly in sport (Pacheco et al., 2010). Passage of new 
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policies or legislation represents a major type of regulatory change (Scott, 2001) that can drive 
organizations to adjust their practices or procedures and shape institutional environments 
(Haveman, Russo, & Meyer, 2001; Hoffman 1999; Slack & Hinings, 1994), acting as important 
carriers of institutional change (Schneiberg & Soule, 2005; Wijen & Ansari, 2007). Scholarly 
understanding of the activities and tactics surrounding the creation and passage of new sport 
policies is lacking.  
To learn how institutional entrepreneurs create and promote adoption of new sport 
policies, I conducted qualitative multi-case study to examine the passage of youth sport 
concussion legislation in Washington and Oregon. Over the past decade, a substantial regulatory 
change to enhance concussion management in youth athletics involves the passage of youth sport 
concussion legislation across states. In 2009, Washington and Oregon began to lead concussion 
regulatory change by passing the first two pieces of youth sport concussion legislation in the 
country. The passage of concussion legislation in these states was led by coalitions of regional, 
community-based organizations and individuals, including sport organizations, concussion 
advocacy groups, and attorneys and scientific experts on brain injuries (Adler & Herring, 2011; 
Ellenbogen, 2014). In this context, a coalition refers to a temporary alliance of actors engaging in 
joint activity to create and promote the passage of concussion legislation. These actors leveraged 
resources and skills to advance concussion regulatory change, behaving as institutional 
entrepreneurs (Leca et al., 2008; Wijen & Ansari, 2007). This study uses this context to explore 
how institutional entrepreneurs create and promote the passage of new sport policies. More 
specifically, I focus on unpacking the activities and tactics with which these entrepreneurs 
engage throughout this process.  
This study contributes to institutional studies in sport management. First, this work adds 
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to growing efforts in recent institutional analysis in sport management to address the importance 
of agency in institutional processes (Heinze & Lu, 2017; Patterson et al., 2016; Reid, 
Washington, Mason, Glaser, 2018) by examining how institutional entrepreneurs promote sport 
regulatory change. Second, this study sheds light on the micro-dynamics of institutional 
entrepreneurship (Maguire et al., 2004) by offering a contextualized understanding of the 
specific actions through which institutional entrepreneurs form coalitions, build policy templates, 
and frame and justify the adoption of new sport policy. Further, by illuminating that institutional 
entrepreneurs engaged in various activities and tactics in a temporal order, this dissertation sheds 
light on the multifaceted nature and temporal dynamics (e.g. Perkmann & Spicer, 2007, 2008) 
associated with the process of promoting institutional change in sport. Empirically speaking, this 
research provides actionable strategies on how to leverage various expertise, aggregate divergent 
interests, and make the new policy or legislation appealing to wider audiences. Practitioners and 
policy makers can use these approaches to fulfill their political or legislative agendas, and initiate 
broader social change. This work also generates insight into how sport organizations interface 
with policy issues in addressing a public health challenge (Santo & Mildner, 2010).  
In the next sections, I begin by reviewing institutional studies in sport management and 
the literature on institutional entrepreneurship. I then describe my data collection and analysis. 
Next, I present my findings around specific activities and tactics of institutional entrepreneurship 
in the passage of new concussion legislation. I conclude by discussing the implication of my 
findings.  
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Literature Review 
Role of Agency in Institutional Studies in Sport Management 
Recent decades have witnessed growing interest in institutional dynamics in sport 
management (Babiak & Trendafilova, 2011; Cousens & Slack, 2005; Edwards, Mason, & 
Washington, 2009; Heinze & Lu, 2017; Slack & Hinings, 1992, 1994). This line of research 
traditionally focused on isomorphism, emphasizing organizational conforming behavior to 
institutional pressures (Cunningham et al., 2001; Slack & Hinings, 1992, 1994; Silk & Amis, 
2000). For instance, Slack and Hinings (1992, 1994) and colleagues (Amis, Slack, & Hinings, 
2004; Danisman et al., 2006) published a series of studies exploring how different institutional 
pressures (i.e., coercive, mimetic, and normative) influenced the Canadian National Sport 
Organizations’ decision to implement a more bureaucratic structure, resulting in increased 
homogeneity among them. A major limitation of these studies involved the lack of a critical 
examination of the role of agency on organizational behavior (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Beckert, 
1999; Dacin et al., 2002).  
Subsequent institutional research in sport management began to consider agency in 
institutional analysis (Amis et al., 2002; Heinze & Lu, 2017; Stevens & Slack, 1998). For 
instance, Stevens and Slack (1998) examined a women’s ice hockey organization subjected to 
institutional pressure to merge with a dominant men’s association. Results revealed that although 
normative and coercive forces influenced organizational change, key actors’ decisions were 
instrumental in leading the organization through the change process (Stevens & Slack, 1998). 
More recently, Heinze and Lu (2017) acknowledged the role of internal stakeholders (e.g., 
players, coaches, and team physicians) and field-level actors (e.g., the scientific community, 
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government, and media) in shaping the NFL’s shifting responses to institutional change around 
player concussions. 
Although sport management research has started to identify the role of agency in 
organizational change (Heinze & Lu, 2017; Patterson et al., 2016; Ratten, 2011), less is known 
about how individual and/or collective actors influence organizational processes in sport. In 
particular, what are the specific activities and tactics of those actors around sport policy change? 
This line of inquiry calls for a more holistic investigation of institutional action that extends 
beyond acknowledging that actors’ influences on organizational behavior to examine more 
closely the process and specific actions by which these actors respond locally, creatively, and 
reflexively. 
Institutional Entrepreneurship 
In investigating the role of agency on institutional processes, institutional scholars have 
emphasized the role of institutional entrepreneurship (Battilana et al., 2009; Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006; Maguire et al., 2004). Research on institutional entrepreneurship has focused on 
understanding how purposeful actors design new organizing solutions (e.g., new practices or 
policies), mobilize different resources, and exercise various skills or tactics to implement 
institutional change (DiMaggio, 1988; Dacin et al., 2002; Fligstein, 1997; Garud et al. 2002). 
Institutional entrepreneurs can be individuals (Kraatz & Moore, 2002; Lawrence & Phillips, 
2004; Maguire et al., 2004), such as individual leaders in the European Commission 
spearheading the production of European Union’s Single Market Program (Fligstein, 2001); 
groups (Colomy, 1998; King & Soule, 2007), such as family business groups seeking to promote 
the institutionalization of business models and investment practices in China (Carney & 
Gedajlovic, 2002); or organizations (Dejean, Gond, & Leca, 2004; Demil & Bensedrine, 2005; 
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Hensman, 2003), such as Sun Microsystems’ sponsorship of Java as a common technological 
standard (Garud et al., 2002). Despite its prominence and broad empirical foci in the 
management discipline (Garud et al., 2007; Hardy & Maguire, 2008), sport management scholars 
have paid less attention to insights from institutional entrepreneurship.  
Institutional entrepreneurs often engage in diverse activities and tactics to engender 
change. Research has suggested that activities in institutional entrepreneurship can be broadly 
categorized as political, technical, and cultural (Battilana et al., 2009; David, Sine, & Haveman, 
2013; Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Perkmann & Spicer, 2007, 2008). Political activities involve 
generating social support for new practices or structures by bringing relevant actors on board 
(Perkmann & Spicer, 2008). For instance, Botzem and Quack (2005) found that the emergence 
and development of a transnational field of governance for accounting and financial reporting 
involved political activities, including building a central organization and enrolling influential 
actors. Technical activities center on the research, education, and development of detailed plans 
(Djelic, 1998) or theorizing new organizational practices or structures (David & Strang, 2006; 
Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, & King, 1991; Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007). For instance, Tracey 
and colleagues (2011) found that the creation of a new organizational form requires institutional 
entrepreneurs to theorize an explanation for why this template provides a solution to the 
problem. Cultural activities focus on framing new practices or structures that appeal to wider 
audiences (Creed et al., 2002; Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003; Rao, 1998). For example, 
institutional entrepreneurs justified the adoption of multidisciplinary practices in accounting 
firms by stressing how these changes aligned with the profession’s prevailing norms and values 
(Greenwood et al., 2002; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Fulfillment of each type of activity also 
depends on effective use of entrepreneurial tactics or skills. Fligstein (1997) identified a list of 
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social skills available to strategic actors, such as direct authority, agenda setting, brokering, 
maintaining ambiguity, aggregating interests, and networking to outliers. 
The maturity and stability of organizational fields also carry implications for institutional 
entrepreneurship (David et al., 2013; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Leca et al., 2008; Maguire et 
al., 2004). Studies have suggested that emerging fields are particularly conducive to institutional 
entrepreneurship because these fields are often associated with high levels of uncertainty, lack of 
accepted institutionalized practices and values, and less defined and more fluid relationships, 
which institutional entrepreneurs can harness to mobilize change (Child et al., 2007; Hardy & 
Maguire, 2008; Maguire et al., 2004). For example, David and colleagues (2013) examined how 
institutional entrepreneurs took advantage of the emergent nature of the early management 
consulting field and legitimized the new professional form of management consulting 
organizations. By contrast, a mature or highly institutionalized field is often characterized by a 
more stable set of rules, policies and norms that define accepted ways of operation and thus may 
offer fewer opportunities for innovation than emerging fields (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; 
Perkmann & Spicer, 2007). In addition, research has revealed that when fields are in crisis, the 
opportunity for social change is greater because a crisis can expose contradictions, 
incompatibilities, and tensions within fields that promote heightened awareness of problems 
(Battilana et al., 2009; Fligstein & Mara-Drita, 1996; Hardy & Maguire, 2008). For instance, 
Zietsma and Lawrence (2010) found that escalating conflict between environmental groups and 
forestry companies in the 1990s prompted a reversal in logging practices and inspired the 
creation and institutionalization of ecosystem-based management system in British Columbia.  
Beyond responding to field change, institutional entrepreneurs can effect field change by 
developing or transforming institutional arrangements and organizing solutions (Battilana et al., 
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2009; Leca et al., 2008). Studies of institutional entrepreneurship have addressed many 
institutional types, framed as fields (Child et al., 2007; Dorado, 2013; Hwang & Powell, 2005; 
Lawrence & Phillips, 2004), practices (Beckert, 1999; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Lounsbury 
& Crumley, 2007; Maguire et al, 2004), forms or structures (Perkmann, 2002; Perkmann & 
Spicer, 2007; Tracey et al., 2011), and technologies (Garud et al., 2002; Munir & Phillips, 2005; 
Wang & Swanson, 2007). In the creation of new fields, for instance, Lawrence and Phillips 
(2004) examined how the interaction between macro-cultural discourses and local actors 
influenced the emergence of commercial whale-watching in Canada. Regarding practices, 
Maguire and colleagues (2004) explored how representatives of pharmaceutical companies and 
community organizations produced new practices of consultation and information exchange in 
HIV/AIDS treatment. In the area of forms or structures, Perkmann and Spicer (2007) unpacked 
projects and skills involved in the creation and diffusion of Euroregion, a new organizational 
form local authorities leveraged to coordinate policies across borders in Europe. In terms of the 
creation of new technology, Munir and Phillips (2005) demonstrated that entrepreneurs of 
Kodak, via strategic use of appropriate discourses, successfully introduced and institutionalized 
new technology of the roll-film camera.  
The least examined institutional type is government policy (Pacheco et al., 2010). 
Passage of new policy or legislation is a type of regulatory change that can drive organizations to 
adjust corresponding practices and procedures (Scott, 2008; Haveman et al., 2001). Macro-level 
regulatory changes can alter both technical and institutional features of organizational 
environments (Haveman et al., 2001; Hoffman, 1999; Hoffman & Ventresca, 2002). On one 
hand, new policy can shape technical environments by influencing “barriers to entry” (Dobbin & 
Dowd, 1997; Haveman et al., 2001, p.254). For instance, the youth sport concussion legislation 
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sets specific guidelines allowing only licensed healthcare providers trained in the education and 
management of concussions to clear athletes with suspected concussions to return to play (Adler 
& Herring, 2011). On the other hand, policy changes can affect institutional environments by 
altering accepted norms and behavior (Haveman et al., 2001; Hoffman, 1999; Kelly & 
Amburgey, 1991). For instance, the inception of Title IX has transformed the culture of gender 
inequality and opened doors for more women to participate in collegiate sports (Anderson, 
Cheslock, & Ehrenberg, 2006). Further, when major regulatory changes occur, coercive 
pressures can cause organizations to modify their structures, processes, and strategies (Hums, 
Moorman, & Wolff, 2003; Maguire & Hardy, 2006; Slack & Hinings, 1992, 1994). For example, 
the passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity law entailed a series of practice changes to 
promote equity and reduce discrimination in the workplace (Dobbin, Sutton, Meyer, & Scott, 
1993). 
Many regulatory changes are “complex social processes” that involve diverse interests 
and perspectives (Bennett & Howlett, 1992; Sabatier, 1988; Wijen & Ansari, 2007, p.1079). This 
type of change may require collective action from a group of individuals and organizations who 
may join forces despite divergent interests (Buhr, 2012; Schlager, 1995; Wijen & Ansari, 2007) 
to create shared stories (Zilber, 2007). Institutional change in such domains thus entails 
numerous actors to collaborate to create or alter institutions (Jolly & Raven, 2015; Leca et al., 
2008; Möllering, 2007; Wijen & Ansari, 2007). In this study, I focus on analyzing activities and 
tactics of institutional entrepreneurs, a coalition of individuals and organizations, in creating and 
promoting sport regulatory change around concussion in sports.   
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Methods 
In this study, I adopted a qualitative multi-case study approach to examine the activities 
and tactics a coalition of organizations and individuals employed to create and promote the 
passage of youth sport concussion legislation. A qualitative case study contributes to providing 
rich, in-depth description of a phenomenon, event, or process occurring in a particular context 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles, Huberman, & Saldana 1994; Yin, 2009). A qualitative procedure is 
well suited for this study because understanding entrepreneurial activities and tactics demands 
detailed analysis that considers the nature of the context in which such entrepreneurship occurs. I 
chose Washington and Oregon as my focal cases because these two states served as pilot states 
and reference points for subsequent states in the adoption of youth sport concussion legislation. 
Qualitative case study requires diverse data sources that provide rich data for researchers to 
generate new theories (Charmaz, 2004); therefore, I gathered qualitative data across multiple 
source types (i.e., firsthand and secondary interviews, archival documents, and news articles) to 
provide a comprehensive understanding of specific activities and tactics and the context 
associated with regulatory change pertaining to youth sport concussions. To strengthen the 
credibility of analysis and corroborate my findings, I also triangulated different data sources 
(Yin, 2009). For instance, I compared interviews with archival documents regarding the 
importance of the passage of concussion legislation (Yin, 2015). 
Data Collection  
Data in this study were collected from three sources. One dataset included first-hand and 
secondary interviews with key coalition actors who participated in the enactment of concussion 
legislation in Washington and Oregon. Other data came from archival documents such as the 
following: legislation histories (including the content of the law, bill analysis, state Senate and 
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House proceedings and hearings, and coalition members’ oral and written testimonies); coalition 
leaders’ published columns; review articles, and PowerPoint slides documenting the passage of 
concussion laws in the Washington and Oregon. News articles on youth sport concussions from 
top national news outlets were also included as data sources. 
Interviews  
My primary data source was interviews. Interviewees included key coalition members 
who participated in the passage of concussion legislation in my chosen cases along with 
individuals involved in the concussion-related research and practices to inform knowledge of the 
field. To identify key coalition members, I first referred to several review articles (e.g., Laker et 
al., 2014; Ellenbogen, 2014), legislation history (e.g., State senate and House hearings), and local 
news to search for organizations and individuals involved in the passage of concussion 
legislation. Then, I confirmed my initial list with key advocates by asking them to identify any 
individuals or organizations absent from the list. To secure access, I searched for interviewees’ 
public contact information via their affiliated organizations’ websites and emailed each potential 
participant an invitation to take part in the study. During interviews with these key individuals, I 
asked them to recommend additional actors who could offer valuable insights into the legislation 
process. In total, 15 semi-structured interviews were collected between January and June 2017. 
Key respondents included representatives of state-level youth sports governing bodies, brain 
injury advocacy organizations, athletic trainer associations, concussion researchers from 
academic institutions/public universities, brain injury doctors affiliated with local hospitals, 
government affair consultants, and high school football coaches (See Table 10 for interview 
participant data). Interviews were audiotaped and transcribed with respondents’ permission. For 
interviews that were not recorded, I summarized my notes shortly after each interview. 
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Transcripts and summaries amounted to more than 75,000 words. Certain details have been 
anonymized to maintain respondents’ confidentiality.  
Interviews opened with questions regarding the formation and characteristics of state-
level coalitions. For example, when interviewing coalition members, I asked, “How did you get 
involved in this legislation campaign? What motivated you to do so? What specific role did your 
organization play in the process of passing the concussion legislation?” When interviewing key 
coalition leaders, I posed questions such as “How did you get this group of organizations on 
board? Was the approach different among these partners?” These were followed by probes to 
explore the policy creation process in greater depth, including questions related to legislation 
writing and editing, such as “Please describe the process by which coalition actors facilitated the 
passage of new concussion legislation? How was the decision around which word to use in the 
law made?” Lastly, I elicited informants’ perspectives on the evolution of the field around 
concussion and their evaluation on the outcome of concussion legislative campaign; see 
Appendix A for the detailed interview protocol. Most interviews lasted from approximately 40 to 
60 minutes, with some lasting 1.5 hours.  
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Table 10. Summary of First-Hand Interviewees 
Actors (ID) Titles Organizations 
A1  Concussion expert/researcher Academic institution 1 
A2 Concussion expert/researcher Academic institution 2 
A3 Concussion expert/researcher Academic institution 3 
A4 Concussion expert/researcher Academic institution 4 
A5 Representative  One brain injury advocacy organization in 
Washington 
A6 Representative  One brain injury advocacy organization in 
Oregon  
A7 Representative Washington State Athletic Trainer 
Association (WSATA) 
A8 Representative Washington State Athletic Trainer 
Association (WSATA) 
A9 Representative Washington Interscholastic Athletic 
Association (WIAA) 
A10 Representative Oregon Sports Organization A (OSOA) 
(pseudonym)  
A11 Representative Washington State Youth Soccer Association 
(WSYSA) 
A12 Representative Washington State Youth Soccer Association 
(WSYSA) 
A13 Government affair consultant Washington 
A14 Football coach High school 
A15 Football coach High school 
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In addition to first-hand interviews, I collected secondary interview data. Data sources 
included the 2010 NFL Concussion Summit on the Zackery Lystedt Youth Sports Concussion 
Law and several interviews conducted with key coalition actors in Oregon and Washington (See 
Table 11 for a complete list of sources). These secondary interview data contained details on the 
passage of concussion legislation in Washington and Oregon; background information on the 
evolution of the field around concussion; and scientific knowledge on concussion diagnosis, 
treatment, and management. These materials allowed me to further verify information collected 
during first-hand interviews and obtain more knowledge on the process by which concussion 
legislation is passed. These interviews were transcribed and generated more than 60,000 words. 
All sources, including videos or audio recordings, are publicly available online. Integrating 
secondary interview data helped me achieve triangulation. 
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Table 11. Summary of Secondary Interviews 
Source Actor(s) Content 
2010 Conference 
on the Zackery 
Lystedt Youth 
Sports 
Concussion Law  
Washington coalition members Contain details on 
background of youth sport 
concussion legislation issue, 
how to pass a youth sport 
concussion legislation, and 
remarks from concussion 
victim Zackery Lystedt.   
Brainreels 
podcast  
Mr. Williams (pseudonym) Contain details on the 
passage of youth sport 
concussion legislation in the 
State of Oregon.  
G4 Athlete Dr. Ross (pseudonym) Contain information on the 
management and treatment of 
concussion, the meaning of 
the Lystedt Law, and 
educational resources on 
concussion. 
Webinar Mr. Williams (pseudonym) Contain details on the 
passage of concussion 
legislation in the State of 
Oregon.   
Think Out Loud Mr. Williams and Dr. Wilson 
(pseudonyms) 
Contain information on the 
scientific knowledge of 
concussion and details on the 
passage of concussion 
legislation in the State of 
Oregon.   
Brain Injury 
Radio  
Mr. Williams (pseudonym) Contain details on the 
passage of concussion 
legislation in the State of 
Oregon.   
Dan Rather 
Reports 
Richard Ellenbogen, Co-Medical 
Director of the NFL’s Head, Neck, and 
Spine 
Contain details on the 
background of the Lystedt 
Law and the evolution of the 
field. 
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Archival documents  
To address the potential problem of inaccurate recall during interviews, I collected 
archival documents including legislation histories, related publications, articles, and PowerPoint 
slides documenting the passage of concussion laws. In particular, I collected six videos of Senate 
and House hearings regarding concussion legislation in Washington and Oregon. The videos 
lasted more than 200 minutes. These hearings can be accessed from the Washington State 
Legislature (http://leg.wa.gov/) and Oregon State Legislature 
(https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/). Hearings included coalition members’ testimonies to state 
legislators, their rationale regarding importance of adopting concussion legislation, and 
legislators’ comments and feedback. These data further clarified how coalition actors framed and 
justified passage of concussion legislation and their interaction with legislators. In addition to 
legislation histories, I also collected columns written by Mr. Williams (pseudonym), coalition 
leader in the passage of concussion law in Oregon. These pieces had appeared in the official 
newsletter of one brain injury advocacy organization in Oregon since summer 2005 and 
amounted to 37 articles that generated over 48 pages of data for further coding. Within these 
columns, I focused on information related to the passage of concussion legislation in Oregon and 
coalition actors’ framing of the importance of this legislation. Archival documents revealed 
additional details about the regulatory change process that had not emerged in interviews and 
provided textual accounts of discussions. 
News articles  
I collected mainstream news articles and expert analysis on youth sport concussion from 
the NYT and SI to gain a better understanding of the field context around the passage of 
concussion legislation. I selected NYT and SI because of their prominence, large circulations, and 
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systematic coverage of concussion-related topics over time. I selected all articles manually after 
searching the NYT and SI databases using the keywords “concussion” and “youth sport” to 
identify articles published between January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2008. This time frame 
was chosen because this period has been identified in the literature as a key time of institutional 
change around SRC (Heinze & Lu, 2017). 
Data Analysis 
I used qualitative content analysis to unpack activities and tactics in the passage of 
concussion legislation. Qualitative analysis is inherently dynamic and ongoing; transcripts, 
summaries, and archival documents were reviewed several times to identify data that either 
confirmed or called for modification of the analysis. I conducted multiple rounds of coding, 
iterating between first-hand and secondary interviews and archival documents (Yin, 2009). Thus, 
my analysis involved the triangulation of multiple data sources to increase confidence in my 
interpretations (Patton, 2002). I also consulted with organizational experts on coding schemes in 
the coding process; the qualitative analysis software NVivo was used to facilitate this process.  
Data analysis was composed of three stages. In the first stage, I examined the field 
conditions that may have prompted regulatory change around youth sport concussion. Important 
field conditions included the following: mounting normative pressure associated with new 
knowledge on the long-term effects of concussions, youth susceptibility to concussions, and 
growing media attention; realization of the limitations of concussion-related educational 
practices; and youth concussion injury events. Detailed descriptions of these field conditions 
appear in Chapter 2. This analysis contributed to preliminary knowledge of the field regarding 
the passage of concussion legislation. Relevant data sources for this step included news articles, 
review papers, and review articles on concussions in youth sport. 
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In the second step, I focused on identifying a series of activities that contributed to the 
creation and promotion of concussion legislation. I relied on broader activity categories derived 
from the literature (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Perkmann & Spicer, 2007, 2008), namely 
political, technical, and cultural. I synthesized these results by grouping qualitative data 
according to activity type. Further, I generated inductive codes on activity subcategories (e.g., 
constructing a broad coalition, building a legislation template, and legislation framing). I also 
paid attention to the temporal dimension in connections between these activities. Main data 
sources for this step included first-hand and secondary interviews, coalition members’ written 
columns and review papers, and state Senate and House hearings.  
In the third stage, I sought to understand the tactics institutional entrepreneurs employed 
to conduct each type of activity. Codes were developed deductively and inductively. Sampled 
deductive codes included brokering and networking based on Fligstein’s (1997) typology of 
social skills and episodic framing (Iyengar, 1996; Iyengar & Simon, 1993). Examples of 
inductive codes included prioritizing recruitment for knowledge and legitimacy, diversifying 
membership, and leveraging expertise. For each tactic, I sought to understand the following: 1) 
how it was defined; 2) how it was used by institutional entrepreneurs, and 3) how it facilitated 
the passage of concussion legislation. In addition, I considered each tactic initiator’s explanation 
of usage along with targeted members’ feedback. For instance, in coalition building, one 
inductive code was prioritizing recruitment for knowledge and legitimacy; I verified usage of 
this tactic by examining the targeted actor’s response. In the cultural framing of concussion 
legislation, I attended to coalition members’ framing tactics and legislators’ reactions or 
feedback to such framing. In this way, I aimed to construct connections and generate support for 
mechanisms between tactics and observed outcomes. I constantly compared these recurring 
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themes across all data sources. Relevant data sources for this step included first-hand and 
secondary interviews, coalition members’ written columns and review papers, and state Senate 
and House hearings. 
 
Findings 
Based on my findings, I developed a model of how institutional entrepreneurs, create and 
promote the passage of new sport policy (Figure 7). My analysis shows that in Washington and 
Oregon, entrepreneurs primarily engaged in three activities. First, they participated in coalition 
building, a political activity, using tactics including prioritizing recruitment for knowledge and 
legitimacy, diversifying membership, involving skeptics, and developing a shared vision. My 
results suggest this set of tactics enabled them to form a broad-based coalition and added various 
expertise and resources, enhanced the credibility of new policy, softened opposition, and 
facilitated collaboration in the passage of concussion legislation. Second, coalition actors shifted 
to technical activity aimed at assembling a concussion legislation template. Important tactics 
involved leveraging expertise, strategic compromise, and using neutral and inclusive language. 
These strategies enabled entrepreneurs to incorporate updated knowledge into legislation writing, 
increase the likelihood of successful passage, and reduce potential conflict in the passage of 
concussion legislation. Further, institutional entrepreneurs engaged in cultural activity focused 
on framing and justifying the adoption of concussion legislation. Relevant tactics included 
episodic framing, namely highlighting an individual’s story and embedding the issue in a broader 
value context. My analysis suggests that these tactics helped to elicit sympathy, enhance the 
salience of the concussion issue for wider audiences, and develop a shared understanding of the 
importance of the passage of concussion legislation among state legislators.  
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Figure 7. Activities and Tactics in the Passage of New Sport Policy 
 
Political Activity: Constructing a Coalition 
My findings indicate that institutional entrepreneurs (here referring to the leaders of the 
concussion legislation initiative) in Washington and Oregon first engaged in the political activity 
of coalition building. In both states, coalition construction started around 2007. Major coalition-
building tactics included prioritizing recruitment for knowledge and legitimacy, diversifying 
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membership, involving skeptics, and developing a shared vision, all of which enabled actors to 
form a broad-based coalition of organizations and individuals across diverse fields (e.g., brain 
injury advocacy, professional and youth sports, athletic training, and the scientific community). 
My analysis suggests that building a broad coalition facilitated the passage of concussion 
legislation due to the availability of broader expertise and resources, improved credibility of new 
legislation, and fewer potential barriers in the adoption process. As noted by a Washington state 
representative at the 2010 Conference on the Zackery Lystedt Youth Sports Concussion Law, 
“It’s very important to really build that broad coalition, prior to introducing any specific 
legislations.” 
Prioritizing recruitment for knowledge and legitimacy 
My analysis shows that institutional entrepreneurs prioritized recruitment for knowledge 
and legitimacy to build a coalition, whereby leaders were selective and strategic in inviting 
others to join the coalition. As stated by Mr. Brown (pseudonym), representative of one brain 
injury advocacy organization in Washington, “Before a change can happen in a meaningful way, 
it is important to identify key stakeholders around the issue and have dialogue with them. 
Dialogue with stakeholders leads to shaping the idea proposed and then it has greater clarity, 
momentum, and more folks pushing it along. There needs to be a buy-in from the key leaders and 
stakeholders on the change you are seeking (personal communication, February 6, 2017).” 
In both states, concussion legislation initiators began by soliciting input from individuals 
with scientific, technical knowledge on brain injury and SRC. In Washington, Mr. Brown first 
invited Dr. Ross (pseudonym) to join the coalition. Dr. Ross is a well-respected scientific expert 
in sports concussion clinical care at a public university in Washington and has assumed a 
leadership role in several concussion institutes and programs in the state. Similarly, in Oregon, 
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Mr. Williams (pseudonym), representative of one brain injury advocacy organization in Oregon, 
invited Dr. Wilson (pseudonym) on board first. Dr. Wilson is a leading expert on sports 
concussion at a public university in Oregon and serves as the co-director and/or medical advisor 
for several concussion management programs in Oregon.  
My analysis suggests that targeted recruitment of scientific experts with extensive 
knowledge of brain injury strengthened the coalition and technically facilitated the passage of 
concussion legislation. As pointed out by respective coalition members in Washington and 
Oregon, whenever actors had questions related to the science of concussions (e.g., effects, 
diagnosis, prevention, and management), they turned to Dr. Ross and Dr. Wilson for advice:  
“Dr. Ross led the medical community about how important concussion was. I mean we 
started this, and nobody really understood that whole concept of concussion that you 
didn’t have to lose consciousness to experience a concussion. So having him and his 
expertise on the medical side was really important.” (A13, personal communication, 
April 18, 2017) 
 
“The big focus that we realized that would be the big driver was the medical side of 
things. Dr. Wilson assisted us in the understanding of brain science, the understanding of 
how serious second impact syndrome is, how serious multiple concussions can be, and 
how serious any concussion can be and is. … So we really focused heavily on the science 
of it, on why we need to do this.” (Mr. Williams, personal communication, May 3, 2017) 
 
An analysis of the field also shows that scientists specializing in SRC have played an 
important role in advancing normative changes around concussion in sports (See Chapter 2 for 
detailed description). Recruiting these scientific experts may confer the new concussion policy 
more legitimacy.  
In addition, concussion legislation leaders in Washington brought high-status and 
resource-rich sport organizations on board early. They targeted the NFL’s Seattle Seahawks in 
particular; the team is the only NFL franchise in the Pacific Northwest region of the U.S. and 
enjoys support from a wide geographical region, including Washington, Oregon, Montana, 
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Idaho, and Alaska. In 2008, the franchise value of the Seahawks totaled approximately $921 
million. My analysis suggests that bringing prominent, highly visible sport organizations such as 
the Seahawks into the coalition appeared to encourage the passage of concussion legislation in 
several ways. First, professional teams’ participation promoted awareness of the new concussion 
legislation initiative among a broader audience. For instance, the Seahawks leveraged its 
resources and the influence of its alumni to disseminate the message of the concussion policy to 
a wider group of listeners. As described by a Seahawks representative:  
“As relates to a professional team, it’s very important to find a team like us who are 
really [a] great communicator and really good connector. So we are able to through 
many meetings with Mr. Brown and Dr. Ross to sit down and say who do we know that 
we can connect and bring to the table to have a constructive conversation to move the 
ball forward in this case, and then utilizing the assets that we have within our own 
building, such as reaching out to our meeting using the power of our meeting network, 
and utilizing our in game stadium during our broadcast. Getting the message out to our 
alumni and asking them to step up and serve as an ambassador to get the word out and 
reaching their network.” (Conference on the Zackery Lystedt Youth Sports Concussion 
Law, 2010)  
 
Second, high-status sport organizations, with their own power and network contacts, 
cultivated connections with other sport organizations and associated resources in the field. For 
instance, the Seahawks harnessed its network connections and recruited the Washington 
Interscholastic Activities Association (WIAA), Washington’s youth sports governing body, 
which has rich connections with statewide public and non-public middle and high schools. Dr. 
Ross (personal communication, February 21, 2017) reviewed how the WIAA was brought on 
board, “The Seahawks first suggested to us that it will be very smart to involve the WIAA. … He 
[Seahawks representative] suggested to us that the WIAA would be an essential partner, because 
they were the ones that actually wrote the policy for high school and middle school athletics. … 
So [the] Seahawks helped us reach out to them. They were very interested. They were a very 
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important partner.” This recruitment process was also confirmed by the target of the recruitment. 
According to a representative of the WIAA (personal communication, April 21, 2017): “We 
found out that there was a group that wanted to do something with concussion legislation…They 
made contact with us through the Seattle Seahawks.”  
Further, my analysis suggests that prioritizing recruitment of high-status sport 
organizations may render the new concussion legislation (creation process) more credible and 
legitimate. Once concussion legislation received sponsorship and support from such elite sport 
organizations, others became more attuned to this policy change. As commented by a 
Washington coalition member,  
“Having the Seahawks on board and its community outreach really lent credibility to the 
cause and to the population at large. Because [oftentimes] people see Seahawks as [a] 
trusted source and the value of the Seahawks name really helps propel this issue forward 
and get more people [to] buy in without having to ask [questions] like ‘What you are 
trying to do?’ Well, automatically this issue is credible.” (Conference on the Zackery 
Lystedt Youth Sports Concussion Law, 2010) 
 
Diversifying membership  
My findings indicate that institutional entrepreneurs also diversified membership in 
coalition building. In both states, concussion legislation leaders recruited appropriate partners 
with complementarities in terms of skills, resources, experience, and spheres of influence. 
Entrepreneurs approached potential partners with a clear idea of how they could collaborate 
toward the advocacy goal. As noted by Dr. Ross (personal communication, February 21, 2017): 
“We looked at people who would have an interest in this legislation. And that interest would be 
from the athlete perspective, from organization that took care of young athletes, from the 
medical perspective, and my perspective, and legal perspective. … We began to look at partners 
who would have an interest in the same topic perhaps from a different perspective.” 
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Although state-level coalitions in both states varied in membership size, their 
compositions displayed similar patterns. The state-level coalition was composed of a diverse 
group of actors, including: 1) victim and victims’ family (e.g., Washington: Zackery Lystedt and 
his family; Oregon: Max Conradt and his family); 2) attorneys handling traumatic brain trauma 
cases and litigation; 3) brain injury advocacy groups; 4) scientists in SRC and academic 
institutions; 5) sport organizations (e.g., professional sports teams, youth sports governing 
bodies, athletic trainer associations); 6) doctors and/or medical organizations; 7) government 
representatives (e.g., state representatives, senators, government affair consultants); and/or 8) 
insurance and risk groups.   
My analysis shows that diversifying membership in coalition building contributed to 
gathering various expertise and skill sets, perspectives, and resources to facilitate the passage of 
concussion legislation. As illustrated by my findings, victims and families enhanced public 
awareness of the seriousness of SRC; brain injury attorneys provided legal counseling related to 
legislation; scientific experts and doctors in SRC offered advices on technical and medical issues 
surrounding concussions; brain injury advocacy groups provided resources and skills regarding 
concussion management and prevention; sport organizations brought in youth athletic resources 
and contacts; government representatives and consultants provided information on navigating the 
legislation process; and insurance groups provided guidance on handling relevant risk and 
claims. This demonstrated the importance of having multiple stakeholders engaged in the 
coalition as they can provide various expertise. According to respective coalition members in 
Washington and Oregon: 
"I think the coalition was strongest because we had all of these diverse elements…I think 
having Mr. Brown, Dr. Ross and their expertise and then bringing all the elements 
together such as the Washington State Youth Soccer, which represents 200,000 kids 
playing youth soccer each week in private leagues. We brought in the Washington State 
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Athletic Trainers Association. We brought in Canfield & Associates, now known as Clear 
risk, an insurance risk management business that represents self-insured school districts, 
and the WIAA. I don’t think you can make legislation work when it comes to youth sports 
unless you are able to look at all of those groups, brands, and committed leaders." (A7, 
personal communication, April 27, 2017) 
 
“We developed a coalition that was wide range.… Down here in Oregon, we have the 
brain injury advocacy organization (pseudonym) with regard to brain injury support and 
prevention. … We have legislators in the Oregon legislature, both in the Senate and on 
the House side, who are extremely knowledgeable about brain injuries. … We also have a 
very vocal group of medical practitioners. We have doctors who [work] with the Oregon 
concussion awareness and management program. We also work with sports governing 
bodies, which brings their incredible medical knowledge and kind of teaching ability to 
the conversation. So yes, in Oregon we’re very lucky to have a large group of individuals 
who are committed to the cause of reducing traumatic brain injury and in helping those 
who have suffered traumatic brain injuries to recover to the fullest extent possible.” (Mr. 
Williams, public interview, October 2, 2015) 
 
A state representative in Washington also acknowledged the importance of building a 
diversified coalition, “I think it was very important that legislators in our state heard the same 
message from a variety of different advocacy groups.” (Conference on the Zackery Lystedt 
Youth Sports Concussion Law, 2010) 
Involving skeptics 
My findings show that institutional entrepreneurs in both states also involved skeptics 
that may possess different opinions about legislation. These actors later became important 
partners and supporters in passing the legislation. This coalition-building tactic appeared to 
reduce or soften potential opposition while expanding support for the passage of concussion 
legislation. As noted by a coalition member (personal communication) in Washington, “It was 
important to identify anybody who may be opposed to this and bring them in. We [needed] to 
identify them and understand their opposition, and bring them in. And they actually became one 
of the strongest supporters.”   
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As a specific example, in Oregon, one sports organization—Oregon Sports Organization 
A (OSOA) (pseudonym) was not involved in the initial draft of concussion legislation. 
Representatives from OSOA attended the first public hearing of youth sport concussion 
legislation and posed questions regarding the feasibility of the bill. The original Oregon 
concussion bill contained a section requiring school districts to replace helmets as needed. As 
summarized in the original bill, “Direct school district to ensure that football helmets be 
annually inspected and to replace all helmets within 10 years. Prohibits use of football helmets 
that do not meet standards adopted by State Board of Education” (Senate Bill 348 Summary, 
April 17, 2009). OSOA representatives raised concerns about this bill and its rather limited focus 
on issues related to helmets in football. They were concerned that the section pertaining to 
helmet replacement may bring a financial burden to the local government and schools. 
According to an OSOA representative at the Oregon concussion legislation hearing, 
“My biggest concern of this helmet bill is the yearly reconditioning. There is gonna be a 
financial cost to the schools for that. If we say we have 275 high schools playing football, 
which brought us a fair estimate. An average of 50 helmets per school. 40 bucks per 
helmet. $550 grand. … Who pays for it? School districts [pay depending] on size, 
insurance, or direct charges on athletes.” (Oregon public hearing on SB348) 
 
After the initial hearing, the OSOA was invited to join the coalition and provided 
valuable feedback to revise the legislation; the organization later became a key sponsor of the 
updated concussion bill. The section that originally required school districts to replace helmets as 
needed was omitted to avoid fiscal costs that might have derailed the bill. Per an OSOA 
representative (personal communication), “Once we became involved and we recommended 
some changes we thought would be beneficial. There was no push back, so it continued as a 
collaborative effort which was good.”   
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Developing a shared vision  
My analysis indicates that institutional entrepreneurs also paid attention to developing a 
shared vision among coalition members. In Washington, different coalition members represented 
different entities or interest groups. For instance, the WIAA focused on public high school 
sports, whereas the Washington State Youth Soccer Association (WSYSA) centered on private 
sport groups. In order to aggregate disparate interests among multiple stakeholders, coalition 
leaders used “the safety of youth and the safety of sports” as coalition magnets (an idea serving 
as a focal point for coalition building) and emphasized that the purpose of passing concussion 
legislation was to improve the safety of all youths and all sports. My analysis suggests that 
developing a shared vision helped coalition members find common ground and thus facilitated 
collaboration among involved parties, as reflected by a coalition member in Washington, “We 
want to get along. We believe we have a connection. … I think the one thing that we have in 
common that we cared about the safety of our youth and the safety of sports. When you look at it 
from that perspective, there is no territory. There is no, oh this is about soccer, this is about 
football, this is about this age group or that age group, it’s about school sports, it’s about non-
school sports. No really it’s about kids. It’s about safety. When you boil it down to about kids 
and safety. It just cuts right to what you are trying to work on. And then you can work together. 
It’s a lot easier” (A9, personal communication, April 21, 2017). 
Technical: Building a Legislation Template 
After the coalition was built, institutional entrepreneurs (here referring to the entire 
coalition of organizations and individuals) shifted to technical activities and focused on building 
a legislation template. An analysis of the context during this stage shows that no sport 
concussion legislation was adopted until 2009. As a coalition member in Washington stated, “We 
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are the first state to pass concussion legislation. There was no template for us to learn” (A12, 
personal communication, April 25, 2017). Similarly, a concussion legislation advocate in Oregon 
indicated, “Well at this time there were no laws in the country whatsoever that dealt with a 
coach’s responsibility or high school’s responsibility with regard to a concussed player” (A6, 
personal communication). Given the absence of a concussion legislation template from which 
coalition members in both states could learn, institutional entrepreneurs were left to draft a new 
sport policy with little guidance. Choosing the right words for the first youth sport concussion 
legislation became an important task; major tactics in this stage included leveraging expertise, 
strategic compromise, and using neutral and inclusive language. My findings suggest these 
tactics enabled entrepreneurs to integrate updated knowledge in legislation writing, increase 
successful passage, and reduce potential conflict in passing concussion legislation. 
Leveraging expertise 
My findings show that in both states, institutional entrepreneurs leveraged knowledge 
from scientific experts and youth SGBs in building a legislation template. My analysis suggests 
that harnessing expertise from these entities contributed to updated knowledge in creating new 
concussion legislation. First, institutional entrepreneurs in both states applied expertise from 
scientific and medical experts in brain injury. These experts assisted in drafting legislation by 
providing counseling on the symptoms, impacts, and management of concussions. In 
Washington, Dr. Ross offered information about concussion symptoms and informed coalition 
members that youth athletes need not pass out or lose consciousness to have a concussion. 
According to a Washington coalition member (A11, personal communication, April 25, 2017), 
“Dr. Ross told us that you didn’t have to lose consciousness to experience a concussion.” The 
Washington concussion legislation acknowledged and stated that concussions may still occur 
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without losing consciousness, “Concussions occur with or without loss of consciousness, but the 
vast majority occurs without loss of consciousness” (Washington Youth Sports Head Injury 
Policies of 2009, p.2). Dr. Ross also offered information about the risks associated with a 
concussion if not treated properly (public interview, April 10, 2013), “Sometimes there can be 
tragic consequences, particularly for young people. Mismanaging a concussion, for young 
people, can have life threatening consequences.” This advice was accepted and reflected in the 
words of the legislation; the statute stated, “Continuing to play with a concussion or symptoms of 
head injury leaves the young athlete especially vulnerable to greater injury and even death” 
(Washington Youth Sports Head Injury Policies of 2009, p.2-3).  
Similarly, in Oregon, concussion experts provided valuable feedback regarding the 
management and prevention of concussions when drafting the legislation. These experts 
recommended including a “no same-day return to play” clause, which mandated that athletes 
suspected of sustaining a concussion would be kept out of play on the day of the injury. 
According to Dr. Wilson (public interview, August 4, 2014), “I would say in Oregon here and 
particularly the Portland Public School and my university, we were lecturing and talking about 
this to doctors and coaches that you’re going to have to keep people out the same day if they 
have a concussion. … And later, with the help of Mr. Williams and the brain injury organization, 
we were able to move that into a state law.” This recommendation for “no same-day return to 
play” policy appeared in the Oregon concussion legislation as follows: “A coach may allow a 
member of a school athletic team who is prohibited from participating in an athletic event or 
training ... to participate in an athletic event or training no sooner than the day after the member 
experienced a blow to the head or body” (Oregon Senate Bill 348 of 2009, p.1). 
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Further, my results revealed that institutional entrepreneurs in both states leveraged the 
expertise of SGBs in designing concussion guidelines and educational materials. In Washington, 
the WIAA developed guidelines and informational forms to educate athletic coaches and athletes 
and their parents about concussions during youth athletic activities. In Oregon, the OSOA 
provided valuable insight into modifying the concussion legislation and recommended using the 
OSOA concussion protocol as a guideline. According to a representative of the OSOA (personal 
communication),  
“As a committee in 2008, we put in a rule at the OSOA level that stated that if an athlete 
shows signs or symptoms of concussion that they should not return to play on the same 
day. They needed to [be] evaluated and cleared by a physician. … After the first public 
hearing, we thought that the ideal bill would be essentially taking the rule that we put in 
from the previous year and then coupling that with coach education.”  
 
Strategic compromise  
Institutional entrepreneurs in both states also made strategic compromise in selecting the 
proper words for the initial concussion legislation. My analysis suggests that compromising 
strategically on sensitive issues improved the likelihood of successful passage of concussion 
legislation. In Washington, institutional entrepreneurs compromised on making the legislation 
revenue neutral, such that the proposed bill would not cause the state government to bear 
additional costs. The concussion legislation was proposed in 2009. In the original bill, 
institutional entrepreneurs included a clause requiring each school district to hire athletic trainers 
to be at every athletic event. An analysis of the context during this stage shows that the US was 
still suffering from the global financial crisis, of which state governments were a prominent 
casualty. With growing unemployment and shrinking revenues, state governments were forced to 
squeeze local budgets. Given these dire financial circumstances, a bill that would place extra 
costs on the state government would be difficult to pass. A state representative in Washington 
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pointed out, “It’s very important to make sure that [the bill is] revenue neutral because of the 
tough economic climate that all states are facing” (Conference on the Zackery Lystedt Youth 
Sports Concussion Law, 2010). To ensure successful passage of the first concussion legislation, 
institutional entrepreneurs came to a strategic compromise on the revenue neutral clause. Per a 
coalition member (personal communication) in Washington, 
 “When we [started] the legislation in Washington State, at the time, Washington was in a 
bunch of [crises]. There was the Great recession in 2008. The state was losing money. 
Attached to the original bill was we [wanted] the states to pay for athletic trainers to be 
at every athletic event at every school statewide. When we started to take it to the state 
legislators, we found out very quickly that ‘If you want to pass it with this bunch of 
numbers attached, it will not get passed.’ So what we did was we pulled that out of the 
bill, and left that issue for another day.”  
 
In Oregon, institutional entrepreneurs also made a strategic compromise on the 
legislation. In the original bill, institutional entrepreneurs hoped the legislation would apply to 
any youth athlete throughout the state. However, for political reasons, the bill was ultimately 
limited to athletic teams to ensure a successful passage of the legislation. As illustrated by a 
coalition member (personal communication) in Oregon, “For political reasons, Max’s law was 
limited to high school sports. Being the first in the country, we really didn’t have the opportunity 
to address the full problem.” 
Using neutral and inclusive language  
In both states, institutional entrepreneurs took another tactic: wordsmithing of language 
by using neutral and inclusive language in building a legislation template. My analysis suggests 
that maintaining neutrality and inclusiveness in language selection helped to reduce conflict and 
tension in passing concussion legislation. For instance, to alleviate inter-group conflict in 
Washington, institutional entrepreneurs used neutral term in defining which actors were eligible 
to return athletes to play. These entrepreneurs were concerned that an overly narrow definition 
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may exclude certain groups, leading to conflict and tension. Rather than providing a list of 
eligible entities, institutional entrepreneurs employed the more general and neutral term 
“licensed healthcare providers trained in the education and evaluation of concussion.” Per a 
coalition member (personal communication) in Washington, “We were told that if we began to 
delineate who and who cannot clear these athletes, there would be politics if groups were 
excluded. … So we learned that if we just said ‘licensed health care providers trained in the 
evaluation of management of concussion’, that was neutral enough and that phrase would be 
later interpreted by our coalition partner, the WIAA, who was the rule-making organization for 
school sports in Washington.” 
The same theme appeared in Oregon, where institutional entrepreneurs strategically 
omitted specific categories of healthcare providers. Oregon’s concussion legislation required that 
athletes “Receive a medical release form from a healthcare professional” (Oregon Senate Bill 
348 of 2009, p.1). Institutional entrepreneurs used a more neutral term to bind a group of eligible 
actors without adhering to particular interpretations, thus minimizing unnecessary conflict. 
Cultural Activity: Framing and Justifying the Adoption of Concussion Legislation 
Institutional entrepreneurs later shifted to cultural activities focusing on framing and 
justifying the adoption of concussion legislation. Major tactics included episodic framing, 
defined as highlighting an individual’s story and embedding the policy issue within a broader 
value context. My analysis suggests these tactics contributed to passing concussion legislation by 
enhancing emotional sympathy, causing the issue to appeal to a wider audience, and building a 
shared understanding of the importance of the new legislation among state legislators.   
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Episodic framing: Highlighting a particular individual’s story  
In both states, institutional entrepreneurs used episodic framing by highlighting a 
particular victim’s story to mobilize supporters and increase the persuasive appeal of their policy 
claim to state legislators. Episodic framing often depicts an issue by using a concrete example, 
event, or story, such as addressing homelessness by presenting a story of the plight of a specific 
homeless person (Gross, 2008; Iyengar & Simon, 1993). My findings show that entrepreneurs 
used strong emotional stories to articulate the potential impacts of policy changes on local 
individuals and families and enhance sympathy among coalition members and state legislators 
involved in passing concussion legislation. 
My analysis indicates that episodic framing was used in two stages. Concussion 
legislation initiators first used the stories of Zackery and Max to mobilize supporters in coalition 
building. Many coalition members indicated that they were emotionally touched by the stories of 
Zackery and Max. The specific emotions elicited by these victims’ stories were associated with 
increased support for joining the coalition to promote the passage of concussion legislation. As 
noted by several coalition members in Washington:  
“When I heard about his story, I became an early and enthusiastic participant in this 
effort.” (A1, personal communication, February 21, 2017) 
 
“So when I was working for the WSYSA, Dr. Ross and Mr. Brown called me up and said 
‘We’d like to talk you about the concussion laws in regards to Zackery Lystedt.’... So I sat 
down. I listened to Dr. Ross and Mr. Brown and understood the whole story of Zackery 
Lystedt. It’s simply an amazing story by the way of what Zack has accomplished. All 
credit should be given to Zack and his family for what they’ve been able to accomplish in 
America in regards to concussion legislations.” (A11, personal communication, April 25, 
2017) 
 
“They had a tremendously compelling story with Zackery Lystedt, the young man that 
was injured. His parents were very motivated to try to do something positive for that 
personal disaster. ... I was intrigued. As a parent, I also had some passion around this 
issue.” (A9, personal communication, April 21, 2017) 
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Later, institutional entrepreneurs in both states used Zackery Lystedt and Max Conradt as 
examples to render the concussion legislation more compelling to state legislators. When 
retelling the stories of Zackery and Max before legislators, entrepreneurs first focused on the 
life-long consequences of the athletes’ injuries on the victim’s personal lives and their suffering 
families. For instance, when sharing Max’s story, entrepreneurs in Oregon stressed that Max, 
formerly a high-performing student who dreamed of becoming a sports journalist, had been 
permanently injured due to repeated concussions. As Max explained at the Oregon hearing, 
“In October 2001, I was a senior. I had a 3.95 GPA. I only had one B. On October 19, I 
was my team’s quarterback on defensive end. When I suffered a few hits, I collapsed at 
halftime during a game. I was rushed to the hospital. They couldn’t air fly me ‘cause I 
was too foggy. I suffered a tremendous brain injury. I was in a coma. I was almost dead 
for two months. I was in a coma for two months. I was in a walking coma for another two 
months. Four months in a coma. I had a dream of being a sport journalist. But it’s been 
on hold for many years.” 
  
Next, institutional entrepreneurs emphasized the preventable nature of these accidents, 
suggesting that these tragedies could have been averted if Zackery and Max had not been asked 
to return to play after suffering an initial concussion. As Zackery’s father shared at the 
Washington concussion legislation hearing, “Zack was hurt and it was a preventable injury. We 
didn’t know that when it happened. We know that now. We know that if Zack [had been] taken 
out of the game, we would not be living the life we are living. And I don’t think people really 
understand what that life is.” 
Further, institutional entrepreneurs stressed that by passing concussion legislation, they 
could change and save people’s lives. As Max testified, “I hope you pass my bill. It will make an 
amazing difference in high school and middle school kids’ lives.” Zack’s father said, “Zack’s 
message from our family needs to be loud and clear [in] that we have the ability to change 
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people’s lives. Zack is exceptional. Zack’s purpose in his life now is to change other people’s 
lives. That takes all of you to make a law, to help other people get through this in their lives. 
They don’t have to [go] through this.” 
My analysis suggests that the stories of Zackery and Max engendered sympathy among 
state legislators, as several stated they were emotionally touched by the victims’ experiences. 
The elicited emotions may have influenced legislators’ acknowledgement of the importance of 
passing concussion legislation. In Washington, a state representative expressed sympathy toward 
Zack and his family: “This is one particular issue that we can join together and really make 
some momentum change in a very profound and positive way. … As a father of a middle school 
boy who played football, I cannot even imagine the emotions and the feelings that Mr. and Mrs. 
Lystedt went through.” Another Washington senator proposed naming the legislation after 
Zackery Lystedt, “I know from time to time we name a legislation after people, in honor of 
people. I’d like to consider [getting] this bill named after Zackery Lystedt.” Similarly, in Oregon, 
state legislators expressed fervent support for Max and his family after hearing their testimony, 
noting that if the bill was passed, it could save lives: 
“Thank you very much. You’ve done an incredible job. You clearly wrap up why this is 
an important bill. I’m sorry that you have to experience this. This is a tremendous loss for 
you. Max, thank you for sharing your story. You are going to help a lot of young people. 
You are going to save some lives. Thank you very much for making this happen.” (Oregon 
concussion legislation hearing) 
 
Embedding the issue in a broader value context  
In both states, institutional entrepreneurs framed and justified the adoption of concussion 
legislation by embedding the issue in a broader value context to underscore the importance of 
concussion legislation for all sports and athletes of all ages as a matter of life and safety. My 
analysis suggests that this framing helped to make the concussion issue accessible to a broader 
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audience and contributed to a shared understanding among state legislators of the importance of 
passing concussion legislation. 
First, institutional entrepreneurs emphasized that concussions are more than a football 
issue; the concussion bill would be relevant to all sports. These entrepreneurs cited data 
demonstrating that all sports and recreational activities in which children and youth engage carry 
a risk of concussions. They stressed that passing concussion legislation would extend concussion 
prevention and management outside of popular contact sports, such as football or hockey, and 
ensure that all young people who sustain a concussion have access to proper protection and care. 
According to a representative of the WIAA (A9, personal communication), “When you look at 
the fact that concussion affects everybody, all youth sports, every sport. When you start looking 
at from that perspective, then it’s much more inclusive, and much more easy to get your arms 
around, and that does take state legislators [getting] involved.” Similarly, a representative of a 
sport organization at the Oregon hearing echoed that the concussion issue pertained to all sports: 
“This is not a football problem, not a football problem at all. This is an all-sport 
problem. This is a huge girl soccer problem. Compared to the number of girl soccer 
[players] to the number of boy soccer [players], it is about 60% higher. Look at girl 
basketball. Girl basketball and boy soccer you think are much different when it comes to 
roughness and [hitting] each other. Those girl injuries are happening a lot. Wrestling is 
right up there with girl basketball. Cheerleaders are up there, not on accident.” 
 
Further, entrepreneurs underscored that concussions comprise an important matter of 
public safety and health affecting youth of all ages, and that the concussion legislation, if passed, 
would maximize health and safety for this group. Accordingly, the concussion issue was placed 
within a broader value context of public safety. 
“My interest, as a physician who spent his life taking care [of] people with brain injuries, 
is that this is an opportunity here to do something which is lifesaving. … I spent my whole 
life in trying to help people from getting hurt and I am remarkably unsuccessful. Here is 
the situation. With the right care, you can stop someone from dying every year and in 
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every state, in every sport. This is so compelling to me. As a healthcare provider, I am so 
thrilled to be part of this group to discuss this with you. Here is the chance to do 
something for public safety, which is unprecedented.” (Dr. Ross, Washington concussion 
legislation hearing) 
 
“Tragedies happen and they are horrible. But also horrible is the kid who missed a 
semester of college, high school, kids who don’t remember. There are a lot of these kids 
who are subtly affected. Yet it affects their lives in big ways. … I would ask you to sit 
back a little bit and think a little bit of the bigger picture of maximizing the health and 
safety for young athletes, not just football players, but also soccer players and lacrosse 
players, minimizing worries and liability issues for coaches and athletic directors.” 
(Representative of sport organization, Oregon concussion legislation hearing) 
 
My analysis suggests that embedding the concussion issue in a broader value context 
brought the issue to a larger audience and facilitated shared understanding among state 
legislators. As several Washington representatives stated at the hearing, 
“One of our common goal for all of us is health and safety for our kids, whether it be a 
coach, a risk manager or as a legislator looking for the wellbeing of all of our kids. 
Thank you for your time and efforts on behalf of our kids, our coaches, our parents, our 
grandparents to make our playing field level for all kids in the field of concussions and 
head injuries.” (Representative of insurance and risk group, Washington concussion 
legislation hearing) 
 
“People think it’s really a football issue. When really it’s a lot bigger issue than that. 
We’ve got to keep reminding people that it’s a soccer issue, it’s a gymnastic issue. It’s a 
basketball issue. It can happen in any sport. We just need to be vigilant about 
concussions, not about football, not just basketball. It’s about concussions….I still think 
what you think about Washington’s law is that it not only impact schools, it impacts youth 
sports. It impacts any group that uses public facility. That’s extremely unique. I think 
that’s the real power of Washington’s legislation.” (Representative of the WIAA, 
Washington concussion legislation hearing) 
  
The influence and power of such framing was well received by state legislators; their 
feedback to and interaction with coalition members indicated they agreed that the concussion 
issue was a crucial public health matter touching all youth in all sports. Additional qualitative 
data can be seen in Appendix B. 
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“This bill can be profound in its positive impact for youth sport throughout the state.… 
Any minimum cost associated with the implementation of the bill is far outweighed by the 
real profound and positive impact we are gonna make for youth sport and kids across the 
state.” (Washington state legislator 1, Washington hearing) 
  
“The most important thing is to really have a sense of purpose that this will save lives. 
This bill, if enacted, will save lives.” (Washington state legislator 2, Washington hearing) 
 
“This bill deals with traumatic brain injuries. It deals with sports, not only football, but 
all sports. ... This is a very serious issue. Our children are very vulnerable.” (Oregon 
senator’s comment at Oregon hearing) 
 
 
Discussion 
While sport management scholars have explored how institutional pressures constrain or 
influence organizational behavior through coercive, cognitive, and normative mechanisms 
(Babiak & Trendafilova, 2009; Danisman et al., 2006; Edwards et al., 2009; Gammelsæter, 2010; 
Slack & Hinings, 1994), less attention has been devoted to how individual and/or collective 
actors influence organizational and institutional processes in sport. In exploring how coalitions 
of individuals and organizations facilitated the passage of youth sport concussion legislation in 
Washington and Oregon, this study provides insight into how institutional entrepreneurs promote 
institutional change around sport policy. In particular, I found that in the process of passing new 
sport policies, institutional entrepreneurs first engaged in political activity focused on 
constructing a broad-based coalition, then technical activity centered on building a policy 
template, and later cultural activity aimed to justify the adoption of new sport policy. Further, I 
identified political, technical, and cultural tactics and associated intermediate outcomes that 
helped pass new sport policies. In this section, I discuss the contributions of this study to the 
institutional literature in sport management; specifically, I note how my findings expand 
understanding of the multifaceted nature and temporal dynamics associated with the process of 
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institutional entrepreneurship around sport policy, extend knowledge of the role of emotions in 
institutional change in sport, and generate insight into how high-status and resource-rich sport 
organizations contribute to sport policy change.  
Multifaceted Nature and Temporal Dynamics  
The institutional literature in sport tends to focus on a macro-analysis of how field-level 
factors influence organizational and institutional processes (Berrett & Slack, 1999; 
Gammelsæter, 2010; Nagel, Schlesinger, Bayle, & Giauque, 2015; Naraine & Parent, 2016; 
Trendafilova et al., 2013); and neglects the role of agents and their associated activities in 
fostering institutional change. By showing that institutional entrepreneurs engaged in a variety of 
activities (e.g., political, technical, and cultural) to advocate for sport regulatory change, this 
study generates insight into the multifaceted nature of entrepreneurial efforts in promoting 
institutional change around sport policy - each type of activity highlights an essential aspect 
thereof (Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007; Maguire et al., 2004; Perkmann & Spicer, 2007). These 
diverse types of activities institutional entrepreneurs carried out, in general, aligned with 
Maguire and colleagues’ (2004) study on the adoption of new HIV consultation practices; 
however, my findings suggest that the specific components of these activities may be different 
depending on the nature of change and characteristics of the field.  For instance, in the case of 
the adoption of HIV practices, institutional entrepreneurs engaged in a type of political activity 
centered on occupying legitimate subject positions (Maguire et al., 2004). This may be 
associated with the emerging field condition of HIV/AIDS treatment advocacy that lacked 
clearly defined leading actors; occupying subject positions with legitimacy, hence, provided 
institutional entrepreneurs access to resources to capitalize change. In my study of the passage of 
concussion legislation, the political activity of institutional entrepreneurship involved 
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constructing a broad-based coalition. This political activity may have been prompted by the field 
context: concussion in sports had already became salient to the interests and objectives of various 
individuals and organizations. Thus, recruiting diverse individuals and organizations was 
important for expanding support for the passage of new sport policy.  
My findings also indicate a temporal dimension to the activities of institutional 
entrepreneurship around sport policy. The institutional entrepreneurs initially focused on 
political activity - building a broad-based coalition to derive diverse skills and resources and 
mobilize support for regulatory change; then, it shifted to technical activity - building a policy 
template, which provided guidance and reference for following states in developing similar 
policies; and later it focused on cultural activity to justify the importance of passing new sport 
policies. This finding builds up Perkmann and Spicer’s (2007) work on the creation and diffusion 
of a new organizational form, by illuminating the temporal dynamics (Langley, Smallman, 
Tsoukas, & Van de Ven, 2013; Lawrence, Winn, & Jennings, 2001; Perkmann & Spicer, 2007) 
associated with the process of promoting institutional change in sport. 
My findings show that in fulfilling each type of activity, institutional entrepreneurs 
employed various skill sets, including political (e.g., prioritizing recruitment for knowledge and 
legitimacy, diversifying membership), technical (e.g., leveraging expertise, using neutral and 
inclusive language), and cultural tactics (e.g., developing a shared vision, episodic framing). In a 
study on the creation and diffusion of a new organizational form, Perkmann and Spicer (2007) 
showed that the types of tactics institutional entrepreneurs employed shifted in a linear order: 
from political, to analytical/technical, and then to cultural skills. However, I found that in the 
creation and promotion of new sport policies, cultural tactics were integrated throughout the 
process. For instance, to build a coalition, institutional entrepreneurs not only used political 
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tactics such as involving skeptics, but also deployed a cultural tactic - developing a shared vision 
among coalition members to facilitate collaboration among them. This finding demonstrates the 
importance of leveraging cultural skills in institutional change around sport policy (Lawrence & 
Phillips, 2004; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Munir & Phillips, 2005; Zilber, 2007). Cultural skills 
can be integrated throughout the change process. As illustrated by these changing actions, I argue 
that understanding the activities and tactics involved in advancing sport regulatory change 
requires a fine-grained understanding of these temporal dynamics. The multifaceted nature and 
temporal dynamics of activities and tactics and their intricate linkage to observed outcomes 
should also be of value in future inquiries in examining the creation or transformation of other 
kinds of institutions in sport. 
Role of Emotions in Institutional Change in Sport 
This study adds knowledge on the role of emotions in institutional change in sport 
(Creed, DeJordy, & Lok, 2010; Creed, Hudson, Okhuysen, & Smith-Crowe, 2014; Welter & 
Smallbone, 2011; Voronov & Vince, 2012). Although the role of emotions in institutional 
processes has been increasingly attended to in the broader management and organization studies 
literature (Brown, Ainsworth, & Grant, 2012; Creed et al., 2010; Creed et al., 2014; Maitlis & 
Sonenshein, 2010; Moisander, Hirsto, & Fahy, 2016), it is less examined in existing sport 
management scholarship. My findings show that institutional entrepreneurs used episodic 
framing via highlighting concussion victims’ stories to mobilize supporters in coalition building. 
My analysis indicates that after hearing victims and their suffering families’ tragic experiences, 
coalition members reacted with an outpouring of emotion and sympathy and expressed growing 
interest in joining the coalition to support the passage of concussion legislation. The emotion of 
sympathy, identified among coalition members, thus serves as a powerful motivator of action 
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and compels them to commit to the passage of new sport policies. This finding contributes to the 
understanding of the role of emotions that may be responsible for entrepreneurial action (Baron, 
2008; Goss, 2008; Miller, Grimes, McMullen, & Vogus, 2012). Specifically, this finding sheds 
light on the role of a positive prosocial emotion—sympathy in encouraging entrepreneurial 
action. Prosocial emotions refer to the emotions aimed to “serve the well-being of a group” 
(Miller et al., 2012, p.617). In addition to these positive prosocial emotions (e.g., sympathy, 
compassion, gratitude), future studies can examine whether and how certain negative emotions 
(e.g., anger, guilt, shame) may be utilized to motivate institutional entrepreneurship? 
Further, my findings show that to elicit support for the passage of new sport policies, 
institutional entrepreneurs used victim’s stories to generate emotional sympathy and compassion 
among state legislators. In particular, when retelling victims’ stories, institutional entrepreneurs 
stressed how these victims had suffered an underserved outcome and that the new concussion 
legislation can mitigate their suffering and prevent similar tragedies from happening again. My 
analysis suggests that state legislators reacted with strong emotions of sympathy for victims’ 
families and showed greater support for the passage of concussion legislation. These prosocial 
emotions may strengthen actors’ commitments and motivate broad and concerted efforts to 
promote the passage of new sport policies. This finding extends understanding of how 
institutional entrepreneurs could simulate certain type of emotions to mobilize support for the 
locus of change (Creed et al., 2010; Creed et al., 2014). This finding also provides a beginning 
for future sport management studies to incorporate emotions into the analyses of institutional 
change. Sport as a context often elicits diverse emotions such as happiness, excitement, or 
disappointment. Future sport management scholars can pay particular attention to theorize how 
emotions may arise and examine how these emotions could be leveraged to promote institutional 
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change, and investigate how institutional forces and emotional dynamics can reciprocally 
influence each other. 
Role of Sport Organizations in Sport Policy Change 
This study expands understanding of how sport policy is created and adopted as a result 
of the collaboration between various sport organizations (e.g., professional sport organizations, 
youth sport governing bodies, athletic trainer associations), advocacy groups, academic 
institutions, and healthcare organizations. In particular, findings in this study advance prior 
literature on policy-making in the field of sport (Enjolras & Waldahl, 2007; Green & Houlihan, 
2004; Hums & MacLean, 2017) by shedding light on the role of high-status, resource-rich sport 
organizations in the passage of new sport policies. Prior research in this field has investigated 
cases in sport policy-making in European countries (e.g., Enjolras & Waldahl, 2007; Skille, 
2008) and Canada (e.g., Green & Houlihan, 2004) and focused on a pattern of cooperation 
between central national sport organizations/federations and the state (political systems, public 
administration). This line of work, however, does not take the role of professional and other non-
profit sport organizations into account. My study shows that a diversified group of sport 
organizations, other than central national sport organizations, can participate collectively and 
collaboratively in sport policy making. In particular, my findings show that prominent sport 
organizations, such as professional sport teams, contributed to spreading information relevant to 
the policy to broader audiences, building connections, and enhancing credibility in the passage of 
a new sport policy. My findings align with work that suggests the celebrity status professional 
sport teams assume in the community allows them to be perceived as a favorable and trustworthy 
communicator of persuasive messages (Alexandar, Eavey, O’Brien, & Buendia, 2011; Diehl, 
2007; Godfrey, 2009). Hence, advocacy activities sponsored by prominent sport organizations 
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could influence other organizations to join efforts. These insights move beyond describing how 
the government or national sport organizations are responsible for the establishment of new sport 
policies (Enjolras & Waldahl, 2007; Green & Houlihan, 2004; Hums & MacLean, 2017), by 
drawing attention to the role of professional sport organizations in using their status, resources 
and connections to promote the passage of new sport policy. 
This study also contributes to prior research on the role of sport organizations in 
delivering socially responsible initiatives (Alexandar et al., 2011; Babiak & Wolfe, 2009; Diehl, 
2007; Godfrey, 2009) by demonstrating the capacity of high-status sport organizations in 
advancing positive sport policy change. Prior research (Heinze & Lu, 2017) also suggests that 
the NFL was involved in youth concussion policy change in order to stave off public and 
governmental pressure in its handling of the concussion crisis within its own organization. Future 
scholars could continue to examine the factors that motivate professional sport organizations to 
become involved in sport policy change. A natural question raised by these findings is whether 
they generalize to other settings. This study focused on the passage of new sport policy in a field 
around an issue (concussion in sport). I expect the process and activities and tactics I identified 
will be similar for the creation of other policies in fields defined by issues. I address the practical 
implications, limitations and future directions in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER V 
Conclusions 
 
 Institutional theory posits that organizations adopt new practices or policies to changing 
institutional environments (Dacin et al., 2002; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Scott, 2001). Previous 
sport management scholars examining institutional change in sport have documented the 
adoption of new organizational practices or structures, such as the enactment of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) practices in professional sports teams (Babiak & Trendafilova, 2011; 
Babiak & Wolfe, 2009; Godfrey, 2009) and the endorsement of professional bureaucratic 
structures across national sport organizations (Kikulis, 2000; Kikulis, Slack, & Hinings, 1995; 
Slack & Hinings, 1994). Much of this work tends to center on the isomorphism hypothesis 
(Cunningham & Ashley, 2001; Phelps & Kent, 2010; Washington & Patterson, 2011) and the 
ways in which broader field-level institutional pressures (e.g., coercive, mimetic, and normative) 
shape or constrain organizational behavior (Augestad, Bergsgard, & Hansen, 2006; Skille, 2009; 
Vos et al., 2011). Less attention is paid to institutional factors affecting variation in sport policy 
adoption across geographic boundaries and the role of agency in the change process.   
This dissertation extends our understanding of institutional change around sport policy, 
corresponding variations in organizational responses, and the role of agency in institutional 
processes by investigating 1) the local community-level institutional factors on the varied rate of 
sport policy adoption across geographic boundaries (Chapter 3), and 2) the activities and tactics 
by which institutional entrepreneurs create and promote the passage of new sport policies
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 (Chapter 4). Empirically, I study these institutional dynamics in the context of the passage of 
youth sport concussion legislation across U.S. states (Chapter 2).  
In Chapter 2, I presented a comprehensive review of background of my empirical 
context. First, I provide an historical overview of the extent of changes that have taken place in 
the organizational field around concussion in sports since the late 19th century. Specifically, I 
depicted how the field evolved along with the involvement of new organizations (e.g., SGBs, 
concussion advocacy groups, corporations, government entities) and individuals (e.g., scientists, 
active and retired athletes, coaches, media reporters), new technology (e.g., new helmets and 
protection gears) and knowledge (e.g., long-term effects of SRC and SIS), key stakeholders’ 
changing responses (e.g., athletes showing greater concerns over the risks of concussions), and 
normative and regulatory changes (e.g., growing media attention and public awareness). I then 
focused on a substantial regulatory change—the nationwide concussion legislation change, on 
which Study 1 and Study 2 of this dissertation center. I identified related field conditions as 
potential precursors to this regulatory change, including increasing normative pressure around 
youth concussions, realization of limitation of concussion educational initiatives, and key youth 
concussion injury events. I further introduced background of key individuals and organizations 
involved in the passage of concussion legislation in Washington and Oregon.   
In Chapter, 3, I conducted a quantitative event history analysis to examine the effects of 
local community-level institutional factors on the rate of sport policy adoption across geographic 
boundaries. In particular, I explored the influences of cultural (state norms), political (local 
advocacy), social (neighboring states), and triggering events (disruptive injury events) on 
concussion legislation adoption across states. These institutional factors were tested with a 
constructed database on the passage of concussion legislation between 2009 and 2014, which 
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includes state-level data such as a state’s history of policy innovativeness (Boehmke & Skinner, 
2012) and high-profile concussion injury events occurred within a state. My findings suggest that 
not all institutional factors indicated by prior work on institutional change are relevant to sport 
policy adoption. In particular, I found that broader cultural norms (e.g. around policy 
innovativeness) influenced concussion adoption timing, but narrower norms (e.g. around youth 
safety) were not significant. Most intra-state factors were significant, but inter-state social 
networks were not. My qualitative findings also add nuance to the results of my event history 
analysis: advocates or change agents leveraged triggering events in sport strategically to push 
change forward. These findings have implications for understanding of sport policy adoption 
within broader institutional change, as well as practical implications for change agents. 
In Chapter 4, I conducted qualitative multi-case study of how institutional entrepreneurs 
advanced sport regulatory change. In particular, I unpacked the activities and tactics by which 
coalitions of individuals and organizations created and promoted the passage of concussion 
legislation in Washington and Oregon. I analyzed and triangulated across multiple data sources 
from my two cases, including firsthand and secondary interviews, archival documents (e.g., 
legislation history, coalition leaders’ written columns, concussion legislation hearings), and news 
articles. My findings show that institutional entrepreneurs primarily engaged in three activities, 
political, technical, and cultural. I also identified a temporal order between these activities. 
Institutional entrepreneurs first engaged in political activity focused on constructing a broad-
based coalition, using tactics including prioritizing recruitment for knowledge and legitimacy, 
diversifying membership, involving skeptics, and developing a shared vision. My findings 
suggest that these tactics contributed to the passage of concussion legislation via eliciting various 
expertise, skills and resources, enhancing credibility of new policy, reducing opposition, and 
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facilitating collaboration. Then, institutional entrepreneurs pursued technical activity centered on 
building a legislation template, using tactics including leveraging expertise, strategic 
compromise, and using neutral and inclusive language. My analysis suggests that these tactics 
facilitated the passage of concussion legislation via integrating updated knowledge, improving 
the chances of a successful passage, and reducing potential conflict. Further, my findings show 
that institutional entrepreneurs shifted to cultural activity and centered on framing and justifying 
the adoption of concussion legislation. Relevant tactics included episodic framing via 
highlighting a particular individual’s story and embedding the issue in a broader value context. 
My analysis suggests that these tactics helped enhance emotional sympathy and expand support 
for the passage of concussion legislation. These findings reveal insight into the multifaceted 
nature and temporal dynamics within the process of institutional change in sport.  
Together, my findings in Study 1 (Chapter 3) and Study 2 (Chapter 4) suggest that an 
organization’s exposure to local institutional effects should be viewed as not only a source of 
pressures, but also a source of opportunities for sponsoring and promoting change. In other 
words, local institutional factors not only constrain or influence organizational behavior but also 
create agency opportunities for organizational actors. For instance, results in Study 1 
demonstrate the effects of triggering injury events on policy adoption. Findings in Study 2 shows 
that institutional entrepreneurs leveraged these tragic events and stories in building coalitions and 
framing and justifying the adoption of new sport policies. Study 1 also shows that state norms 
influence policy adoption. Building on this point, I argue that when prompting change, 
institutional entrepreneurs should also pay attention to whether new policies or practices they 
sponsor align with local norms and culture. Collectively, Study 1 and Study 2 contribute to prior 
sport management studies focused on the constraining effects of institutional forces on 
130 
organizational processes (Berrett & Slack, 1999; Edwards et al., 2009; Silk & Amis, 2000), by 
shedding light on how institutional entrepreneurs can re-evaluate and capitalize on local 
institutional factors (e.g., disruptive events) to initiate institutional change.  
This dissertation advances institutional studies in sport management in several ways. 
First, this dissertation contributes to the literature on institutional change in sport, focused on 
organizational conforming behavior to broader field-level institutional forces (O’Brien & Slack, 
2004; Sotiriadou & Wicker, 2013; Washington & Ventresca, 2004), by illuminating the 
influences of local and immediate institutional factors (Marquis et al., 2007; Marquis et al., 
2011) on variations in sport policy adoption across geographic boundaries. Second, this 
dissertation extends understanding on the role of agency in institutional change in sport (Amis et 
al., 2002; Kikulis et al., 1995; Heinze & Lu, 2017; Stevens & Slack, 1998) by elucidating the 
specific activities and tactics institutional entrepreneurs engaged in to promote sport regulatory 
change. Third, by showing that the various activities and tactics institutional entrepreneurs 
engaged in shifted in a temporal order, this dissertation provides insight into the multifaceted 
nature and temporal dynamics within the process of institutional change in sport. Further, this 
dissertation adds to the growing understanding in organizational institutionalism on constraining 
and enabling institutional effects (Marano & Kostova, 2016; Saka-Helmhout & Geppert, 2011) 
by shedding light on how institutional entrepreneurs can leverage these institutional factors to 
sponsor change in organizational fields. 
 
Practical Implications 
This dissertation offers several practical implications. Given the size of the sport industry, 
and high visibility of and interest around sport, disruptive events abound (e.g. the FIFA 
131 
corruption crisis in 2015, the recent USA Gymnastics sex abuse scandal). Study 1 of this 
dissertation (Chapter 3) suggests that these events can spur greater attention to existing problems, 
bring influential actors into the field, and open windows for policy and practice change. 
Practitioners and policy makers can also leverage these events to fulfill their political or 
legislative agendas, and initiate broader social change. Change agents might generate social 
support and help mobilize activists through collaborating with media outlets and creating special 
interest stories that amplify attention around events. These findings also indicate that when 
promoting the passage of a new sport policy or practice, policy makers and advocates can exploit 
pre-existing cultural norms and conventions within a state. Agents should frame change in terms 
of alignment with existing values, practices, and policies, and invoke state history or precedent, 
to drive adoption.  
Study 2 of this dissertation (Chapter 4) provides actionable strategies and tactics that 
entrepreneurs, policy makers, and practitioners could use to promote the passage of new sport 
policies. For instance, findings in Study 2 suggests that building a broad-based coalition 
composed of individuals and organizations across diverse fields contribute to integrating various 
expertise, resources, and skill sets in the passage of a new sport policy. Inviting high-status and 
resource-rich sports organizations on board also contributes to enhancing credibility and 
legitimacy in the policy-making process. Framing and embedding the new sport policy within a 
broader value context also facilitates to widening support and make the issue appealing to wider 
audiences. I expect the tactics derived from Study 2 could be generalized to the other sports 
safety contexts in developing new sport policies. In recent years, some other important sports 
safety concerns that may entail policy change include issues around sudden cardiac arrest (SCA), 
catastrophic neck injuries, exertional heat stroke (EHS), exertional sickling, and environmental 
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issues such as lighting and access to medical services (Adams, Casa, & Drezner, 2016). For 
instance, interest in injuries suffered by youth athletes due to EHS was heightened in recent years 
as a result of several fatal incidents (Armstrong et al., 2007; Casa, Armstrong, Kenny, O’Connor, 
& Huggins, 2012). Research also suggests that the implementation of effective sport safety 
policies such as heat-acclimatization policies contributes to decreasing risks and dangers for kids 
during sport participation (Casa et al., 2012). From an applied point of view, practitioners and 
policy makers can accomplish relevant sport policy changes to reduce injuries and fatal incidents 
in EHS using tactics I developed from Study 2. Policy makers or managers should also be aware 
of the multifaceted nature and temporal dynamics of promoting the passage of new sport policies 
related to building teams and mobilizing support, developing policy template, and framing the 
legitimacy of its adoption. 
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
This dissertation includes limitations and boundaries that can be addressed with future 
work. In Study 1 (Chapter 3), I operationalize the variable—local advocacy based on financial 
contributions and equate that with resources. While finances are important, human capital 
resources are relevant and are reflected more in my qualitative findings around advocacy in early 
adopter states. I was not able to collect data on individuals and organizations involved in the 
passage of concussion legislation for all 48 contiguous states. Future research should directly test 
the effect of institutional entrepreneurship or human capital resources in state policy adoption. 
Second, regarding the variable—disruptive events, I monitored two leading national news outlets 
(the NYT and the SI) and coded the presence of high-profile, serious youth sport concussion 
incidents in local states. Future scholars may use Factiva’s global news database, which covers 
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more newspapers, magazines and reports in the world, to identify the presence and/or number of 
disruptive events in specified geographic regions. Further, since Study 1 focused on the influence 
of institutional factors in U.S. state policy adoption, it would be important to replicate it with 
non-US states for purpose of generalizability. Future research could explore whether my findings 
extend to other geographic boundaries relevant for sport policy adoption, such as provinces or 
cities.  
One limitation of Study 2 is the ability of the participants to accurately recall the event, 
given that the passage of concussion legislation took place 10 years ago. To address this 
limitation, I triangulated across multiple data sources, including firsthand and secondary 
interviews and archival documents. Study 2 of this dissertation could also be strengthened by 
including firsthand interviews with state legislators. Such data would reveal more insights into 
the effectiveness of tactics institutional entrepreneurs have used. In addition, in Study 2, I 
centered on unpacking the activities and tactics innovators (institutional entrepreneurs in 
Washington and Oregon) have used in the passage of new sport policies. Relevant tactics and 
processes may look different for different types of adopters. I was constrained by data collection 
limitations in tracing the entire concussion legislation diffusion process. Future scholars could 
gather more data in the policy diffusion stage and compare the tactics and processes between 
innovators and laggards (Rogers, 2003).  
Further, in the context around concussion in sports, there is a relatively higher degree of 
urgency and little resistance for sport policy change due to the growing public awareness of the 
long-term health effects of concussions and numerous serious, high-profile injury events. Future 
research could explore whether tactics and processes derived from Study 2 are still applicable to 
other sports contexts (e.g., safe youth football acts) in which there is a lower degree of urgency 
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and more resistance for sport policy change. For instance, in recent years, in response to the 
dangers and growing concerns of repeated brain injuries on younger generation, some state 
legislators (e.g., New York, California, Maryland) introduced Youth Football Protection Acts 
that would ban tackle football for children under 12 years old or before high school. These bills, 
if enacted, would prevent youth sports governing bodies, leagues, and schools from offering 
tackle football for younger kids. However, these bills met with much resistance from athletes, 
parents and coaches, who complained football was “being unfairly singled out” (Woolfolk, 2018, 
para. 2). Future scholars could investigate what the processes and tactics in promoting the 
passage of new sport policies may look like when there is resistance.  
Building on insights developed in this dissertation, I note a few more possible future 
research avenues. Study 1 suggests the effects of local institutional factors on organizational 
adoption of new sport policies. Future research can expand on this finding and continue to 
explore the nature of local, community-level institutional factors supporting or impeding sport 
practice or policy adoption in other contexts, such as the adoption of green management or CSR 
practices in sport organizations and the enactment of diversity practices in collegiate athletic 
departments. Specific community-level institutional factors that could be examined include local 
traditions or culture (Molotch, Freudenburg, & Paulsen, 2000), local policies or regulations 
(Tilcsik, 2011), and community values or ideology (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002).   
Study 2 also sheds light on the emotional aspect of institutional processes in sport. Future 
research should incorporate emotions into the analyses of institutional change in a more 
systematic manner. For instance, future scholars could study the mechanisms that transform 
certain emotions (e.g., sympathy, compassion, anger) into institutional entrepreneurship and the 
role that emotions play in conditioning institutional entrepreneurship. Future studies could also 
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account how certain emotions influence the way institutional entrepreneurs think and commit to 
institutional change.  
Future research is also needed to study the consequences of institutional change around 
sport policy. The new concussion legislation provides latitude for local sport organizations, 
including state-level athletic associations, to develop specific concussion practices (Tomei, Doe, 
Prestigiacomo, & Gandhi, 2012). In the face of field-level pressure from new regulatory changes, 
local organizations need to make corresponding adjustments (Edelman, 1992; Westphal et al., 
1997; Slack & Hinings, 1994). This process may generate variation, as organizations address 
new legislation and other field-level changes differently (Slack & Hinings, 1994; Heinze, 
Soderstrom, & Heinze, 2016). Early evidence shows that some state-level athletic associations 
are more conservative, in that they make few local extensions to field regulations; while others 
are more innovative: they go beyond what is regulated, including introducing new, local 
practices to address concussions (Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014). Future research could examine 
what causes variation in organizational responses to institutional change around sport policy. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A. Interview Guide 
1. Coalition features 
a. How is this idea to work toward policy and legislation been made?  
b. Who are the key organizations and individuals involved in the coalition? 
c. What motivate you and your organization to be on board? 
d. How did you get this diverse group of organizations on board? Was the approach 
different among these partners? 
e. How was the communication between these partners? How often do they meet? 
Where do you meet? Is there any meeting minutes? 
f. What role do they play? What resources do they bring to this process?  
g. Among these partners, is there any organization or person that played an essential 
leadership role? 
2. Process 
a. How is the decision around which word to use in the law been made? 
b. What role do you play in building the legislation template/legislation writing? 
c. Was there any tension that stood out during this process? If so, how do you manage to 
overcome this tension? 
d. When you look back at the passage of the concussion legislation, how do you 
evaluate the outcomes of this legislative campaign? What were the greatest 
successes? Any challenges?  
3. Others 
a. Are there any other issues with respect to this sport policy change that we have not 
discussed and that you think are important? What has been most surprising? 
b. Are you willing to allow me to follow-up with additional clarification questions if 
they arise? 
c. Is there anyone else I should speak with (at your organization or others)? 
d. Are you willing to share any organizational documentation on concussion policies 
and practices that is not available online?
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e. How do you evaluate professional sport team/organization’s involvement in getting 
the legislation passed? 
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Appendix B. Additional Qualitative Data 
Political: Constructing a coalition 
Prioritizing recruitment for knowledge and legitimacy 
“For me, working with Dr. 
Ross is very important 
because he is a very 
important knowledge 
influencer. He is also 
interested in the case as well. 
… At that time, Dr. Ross was 
in primary practice at trauma 
one center. He is also a team 
physician for Seahawks.” 
(Washington coalition 
representative, first-hand 
interview) 
 
“The essential role really 
came from Dr. Ross and Mr. 
Brown’s leadership, and their 
drive to get this passed.” 
(Washington coalition 
representative, first-hand 
interview) 
“It’s like threading the 
needle. You want to thread 
them in an order. It’s like 
before you build a tower, you 
have to build a solid 
structure. Then we just 
continue to add new people.” 
(Washington coalition 
representative, first-hand 
interview) 
 
“Having the Seahawks on 
board and its community 
outreach allowed all of us to 
bring our different pieces 
together, … and is 
instrumental in getting the 
appropriately worded 
educational information out 
for parents, athletes, coaches, 
and schools.” (Washington 
coalition representative, first-
hand interview) 
 
“I would think the leadership 
provided by the WIAA was 
essential, absolutely essential. 
... They are in the business of 
making rules and regulations 
about middle school and high 
school athletics. And without 
their support, leadership and 
the contribution, the law 
would never get off the 
ground.” (Washington 
coalition representative, first-
hand interview) 
 
“There is WIAA contact in 
every town in this state. ... So 
there is a lot of clout, a lot of 
power, and being able to 
reach out. Everybody knew 
who the WIAA is and what 
they do. So bringing the 
association to the table 
brought with it substantial 
support for anything that was 
going to happen.” 
(Washington coalition 
representative, first-hand 
interview) 
  
Diversifying membership 
“In our state, we have a very 
diverse coalition of people 
from state legislators to 
athletic trainers, which by the 
way are key part of this 
process.” (Washington 
coalition representative, first-
hand interview) 
 
"It was a great task force 
because when we didn’t 
know what happened to a 
child after he or she is 
concussed, Dr. Ross would 
come in and help us with that. 
Or unfortunately what would 
happen if that child suffered a 
lifelong injury like Zack did, 
what was the litigation that 
was when Mr. Brown came 
in. Another important org is 
“The reason that it’s 
important for a youth sport 
organization became involved 
is because ultimately if they 
passed legislations, the 
message has to get out to the 
community. The law was a 
little bit useless unless you 
have youth sport 
organizations to drive that 
process. … So our message 
as the youth sport 
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WIAA. We talked to Tom 
(pseudonym, representative 
of WIAA). Tom was very 
instrumental because we can 
get all of this accomplished in 
the club (we called it club 
sports). But how can we get 
this accomplished in public 
high schools. That was the 
next thing that Tom helped 
with that. He was 
instrumental in getting 
education in public 
institutions." (Washington 
coalition representative, first-
hand interview)  
 
organization was because we 
controlled 135,000 kids 
playing sports on public field. 
I thought we had a strong 
method to do that.” 
(Washington coalition 
representative, first-hand 
interview) 
 
“To pass a law like this can’t 
be one person. It can’t be one 
organization. It has to be a 
wide ranging support of many 
organizations.” (Washington 
coalition representative, first-
hand interview) 
“When Dr. Ross and Mr. 
Brown started putting 
together this group, they felt 
that athletic trainers were 
some of the key members 
because we’re on the sideline, 
we’re directly involved, that’s 
one of our direct key injuries 
that we are there to recognize, 
evaluate, and treat and help 
manage and Dr. Ross viewed 
us as one of the experts in 
that process, and we are 
employed in the secondary 
schools so they felt that was 
very important to have the 
athletic trainers involved in 
the legislative process so they 
brought us on early as part of 
the coalition.” (Washington 
coalition representative, first-
hand interview) 
 
“When you go to pass the 
legislation, you can’t just go 
as one organization. You 
have to bring your coalition 
partners in. … One by one 
they started to develop and 
come. ... Many partners went 
into the efforts and 
presentation in Olympia to 
pass the law.” (Washington 
coalition representative, 
public interview) 
“We had an incredibly great team all working in conjunction toward this common goal. … It 
was just a phenomenal team all at the right place at the right time working on this process.” 
(Oregon coalition representative, first-hand interview) 
 
Involving skeptics 
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“They are an independent 
group. … So I think they 
were weary of legislators 
telling them what to do 
around concussion. Again, 
that’s why we want to bring 
them in, and make sure that 
they were comfortable with 
how we were structuring 
legislations that they felt like 
they could be partners.” 
(Washington coalition 
representative, first-hand 
interview) 
 
“Helmets aren’t for the purpose of preventing concussion in 
football. Helmets are for the purpose of preventing skull 
fractures. That’s why it was brought in. People no longer get 
skull fractures. But people die from serious head injuries. We 
have no data that one helmet is better than the other. We 
certainly feel that a new and properly fit helmet is much better 
than an old helmet. We are never gonna have a helmet design 
that is gonna prevent concussions in football. Special helmets, 
mouth guard. … We don’t have any proof to show any 
preventions as far as preventing head injuries.” (Oregon 
coalition representative, Oregon concussion legislation 
hearing) 
  
  
 
Technical: Building the legislation template 
Leveraging expertise 
“Athletic trainers were some of the key members because we’re on the sideline, we’re directly 
involved, that’s one of our direct key injuries that we are there to recognize, evaluate, and treat 
and help manage and Dr. Ross viewed us as one of the experts in that process, ... and then with 
the way the legislation was written, it also allowed for the term “licensed health care provider 
trained in management and evaluation of concussion” to include certified athletic trainers 
because we were licensed health care providers in the state of Washington.” (Washington 
coalition representative, first-hand interview) 
 
Strategic compromise 
“Then reality hit us in the 
face and we said we can only 
bite off so much. So we said 
that basically for political 
purposes we cannot try to get 
this sweeping law that tries to 
cover all young athletes in the 
state, we have to pair it down, 
we have to trim it down, we 
cannot be so ambitious 
because if we tried to be too 
ambitious we would lose, and 
if we lost even though our 
intentions were everything, 
that would set us back 
probably forever. For 
political reasons we said we 
had to narrow it down.” 
“A key question that comes 
up during the legislated 
process is how much is this 
going to cost? We said that 
one dollar directly. It’s 
revenue neutral. … To be 
able to look at the legislator 
in the face and say this will 
not cost anything. This will 
prevent injuries. This will 
make youth sports safer. 
When you talk that way to the 
legislators, they say come on 
in and have some coffee. 
When you say this will gonna 
cost money, they say 
schedule an appointment and 
you will never get into talking 
“We did have to compromise 
a little bit. We wanted 
initially to have every young 
and yet every youth sport or 
whether it was related with 
the school or not covered by 
max's law that was a political 
practicality for something 
throughout the entire country. 
So we compromised this to 
athletic teams.” (Oregon 
coalition representative, 
public interview) 
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(Oregon coalition 
representative, first-hand 
interview) 
 
to anybody about anything.” 
(Washington coalition 
representative, first-hand 
interview) 
 
“It had a section that would 
require school districts to 
replace helmets as needed, 
but that was taken out for fear 
of a fiscal that may derail the 
bill.” (Oregon coalition 
representative, Oregon 
concussion legislation 
hearing) 
 
“As far as implementation 
goes, legislation is a 
negotiated process. Since we 
were the first state, we 
realized early on that if we 
ask too much we wouldn’t get 
anything. That’s how 
legislation works. For 
example, I’d love to have to 
mandate that each school 
district has hired a trainer, but 
not each school has funds for 
that. I’d love to mandate a 
robust requirement for 
education program for kids, 
but there are no resources for 
that. So we learn early in our 
efforts that if the law was not 
revenue-neutral, it didn’t 
have much chance to pass.” 
(Washington coalition 
representative, first-hand 
interview) 
 
   
Using neutral and inclusive language 
“The law avoided specifying 
the physician as the sole 
expert capable of clearing a 
youth athlete to return to 
play. The term ‘licensed 
health care provider trained in 
the evaluation and 
management of concussion’ 
was quite advantageous 
because it broadened the 
expert qualifications in a state 
in which rural constituencies 
are prevalent. It avoided the 
debate that occurs when one 
assigns the duties to a specific 
medical personnel category 
“We didn’t say doctor. We 
didn’t say any particular 
scope of practice. … The 
legislative process is about 
who is in and who is not. 
Besides we’ve got wonderful 
rule making body with the 
WIAA. They are the 
governing body. Let them 
decide who is qualified.” 
(Washington coalition 
representative, first-hand 
interview) 
 
“We wanted to make it broad 
enough on healthcare 
providers. Because we knew 
if we only said physicians.., 
we would alienate other 
groups that was gonna cause 
a fight in Olympias. So we 
made it a broad but then let to 
the WIAA and rule making, 
and a more microscopic level 
to delineate who they would 
consider the appropriate 
providers for check-off 
purposes. So you know part 
of it was also figuring out 
how to navigate the 
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over another.” (Ellenbogen, 
2014, p.5126) 
 
legislative process to make 
sure we didn’t run into. 
That’s where we, you know, 
broaden it to include 
healthcare providers that 
sends a route later in the 
process that we could be 
more specific about who we 
thought would be appropriate 
to clear persons.” 
(Washington coalition 
representative, first-hand 
interview) 
 
Cultural: Framing and Justifying the Adoption of Concussion Legislation 
Episodic framing-Highlighting a particular individual’s story 
“On Oct 12, 2006, a 13-year-
old child played football for 
his school team. This is a kid 
who is a great football player 
on both sides of the ball. But 
he was good not just on the 
field but also off the field. He 
has a 3.5 GPA while he is a 
good player all around. It was 
right in the second half, it was 
very clear that he had hurt 
himself. An important thing 
in terms of the fact in that 
situation is that there is no 
loss of consciousness for 
Zack. He fell to the ground 
after the play. Zack after a 
few minutes was able to get 
up and walk off by himself. 
He was kept off in the next 
couple of plays until the end 
of the first half. It was about 
10, 12, 15 minutes of 
halftime. On the very first 
play of the third quarter, he 
was returned to the game. He 
played the third quarter and 
the fourth quarter. Minutes 
after the game, he collapsed 
on the field. He was airlifted 
“I have a dream. It was 
voices. Yes I can. I will walk. 
Sometime I will do it. I will 
talk. Thank you.” (Zackery, 
Washington concussion 
legislation hearing) 
 
"I think Zack himself at the 
face of this issue, being able 
to come down and testify 
after the hearing in the 
House. You know he actually 
stood up for the first time, 
you know was able to stand 
up from his wheelchair. That 
was a huge milestone. He 
subsequently got on to 
walk...A personal story that 
can be told as very moving." 
(Washington coalition 
representative, first-hand 
interview) 
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to Harborview. They 
performed life-saving 
emergency brain surgery 
twice at a period of ten hours. 
He survived.” (Washington 
coalition representative, 
Washington concussion 
legislation hearing) 
   
“I have been waiting for this 
day for seven years. The story 
is very simply that when the 
rest of the country was 
suffering in 911 attacks, my 
whole world collapsed when 
my son collapsed on the 
sideline of a high school 
football game and slipped 
into a four month comma. 
While he was clinging life, 
we just think this was just a 
freak accident. We really 
didn’t know what. But since 
we spent that four months 
basically living it immanuel, I 
started to go online and do 
some research. …  The most 
shocking thing for us is that 
Max suffered a concussion in 
the week before. He was 
playing with a concussion 
that does not have a chance to 
heal when he suffered a fairly 
light blow to the head. It is 
not a hard hit. But it causes 
second impact syndrome.” 
(Max’s father’s testimony, 
Oregon Senate Hearing) 
“It was the story, it was absolutely the story. And it was the 
fact that Max and Ralph Conrad were willing to be the face of 
change. They were willing to stand up to decades and decades 
of neglect of ignorance of willful ignorance with regard to 
concussions. Max was not the first kid who suffered second 
impact syndrome. Max was not the first person whose life 
story lent itself to the requirement for a Max’s law, but they 
were the first one’s that stood up and did it. And I’ll throw 
into the equation, very coincidentally, Zach’s parents up in 
Washington did the same thing. So I think the most 
compelling, biggest lesson out of that, is that a great societal 
problem was solved, to the extent that it was actually solved, 
because a dad would not let it go. Because Ralph Conrad 
would not just step aside and let the world go by. He said, he 
didn't have any of the skills to do this. He didn't have any 
legislative/legal/medical expertise. He just knew that he had 
to keep shouting from the mountain top, “something must be 
done.” He didn't know what, that was up to us. But he knew 
why it had to happen and that was because his son suffered 
tremendous, horrible, injustice in this injury and he was 
determined that Max’s story would not be in vain. That 
something would change as a result. So I want to throw the 
important lesson out in all of this, I actually use this example 
when I give these talks, especially to school boards and 
educators. One person can make a huge difference.” (Oregon 
coalition representative, Oregon coalition representative) 
 
“We had incredible testimony 
by Max Conrad. …We had a 
great episode that happened 
with Max. This one probably 
won’t be registered anywhere 
except in this conversation. 
On the senate panel was a 
“Max was gracious enough to 
accept. He came there, he told 
his story, and by being there, 
I think he really helped bring 
to the floor, the idea that 
second impact syndrome is 
something we cannot take 
“As many of you know, 
Zackery is an inspiration for 
all of us. He is a student 
athlete. He is full of drive and 
full of determination like 
many of our youth. He 
suffered a very serious 
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senator, and Max was in the 
room and after the hearing, 
Senator said we passed this, I 
believe it was unanimous, out 
of the senate committee and 
we send it to the floor of the 
senate with a due pass 
resolution, which is exactly 
what we wanted. Right after 
she said that, it’s normally a 
very conservative 
environment, which is a 
committee room down in the 
state capitol, Max jumped up 
out of his seat and he yells, 
“Go Gelxer, go Gelxer, go 
Gelxer,” and it was the cutest 
most awesome thing in the 
world, seeing Max just 
overcome with emotion 
overcome with joy, that this 
bill that had his name was 
going to get passed.” (Oregon 
coalition representative, first-
hand interview) 
lightly, it’s extremely serious, 
and I think Max needs to be 
congratulated on his 
willingness to stand out there 
and be kind of the public face 
for concussion prevention in 
the state of Oregon.” (Oregon 
coalition representative, 
Oregon hearing) 
concussion, but no one saw 
the signs just how dramatic 
his injury was. So what 
happened what too often, 
because Zack was really 
determined to get back in. His 
conditions worsened. So later 
in the game, he collapsed, and 
on the field he found himself 
with life-threatening injury. 
We are lucky to have Zack 
alive today. It was that same 
drive, that same 
determination, and that same 
spirit, along with amazing 
care health care, that allowed 
him to succeed after he got 
off the field, and allowed his 
work and his family to turn 
that tragedy into triumph. 
They have worked tirelessly 
to make the awareness of 
what happened to Zack, in 
this state and in this nation.” 
(Washington governor, 
Concussion legislation 
summit, 2010) 
 
Embedding the issue in a broader value context 
“This is not a football 
problem. It’s a sports 
problem. 10% of injuries in 
soccer, for example, are 
concussion injuries. So this is 
not just a football problem.” 
(Washington coalition 
representative, Washington 
concussion legislation 
hearing) 
 
“When in doubt, sit them out. 
If you do that as we all sit 
here, next year and year after, 
we will be saving lives and 
making sport safer. I am a big 
fan of sport. To make sport 
safer and have all the positive 
sides while doing something 
so fundamentally simple that 
can prevent the down sides 
seems to me to be a laudable 
goal.” (Washington coalition 
representative, Washington 
concussion legislation 
hearing) 
 
“What it will do will send a 
clear message to the rest of 
the country that this is an 
issue that we need to work it 
on as a community together, 
not only school sports, but 
youth sports.” (Washington 
coalition representative, 
Washington concussion 
legislation hearing)  
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“Being a large private 
organization, we strongly 
support this legislation. We 
can affect one life, much less 
a hundred lives behind this.” 
(Washington coalition 
representative, Washington 
concussion legislation 
hearing)     
“Zack’s message from our 
family needs to be loud and 
clear is that we have the 
ability to change people’s 
lives. Zack is exceptional. 
(Zack said he is 
monumental.) Zack’s purpose 
in his life now is to change 
other people’s lives. That 
takes all of you to make a 
law, to help other people get 
through this in their lives. 
They don’t have to get 
through this.” (Zack’s 
father’s testimony, 
Washington concussion 
legislation hearing)  
 
"When we started the 
dialogue, basically, I think 
that was the game change for 
the state, because it changed 
the focus from just being 
about school sports to the 
entire spectrum of youth 
sports, club sports as well as 
school sports." (Washington 
coalition representative, first-
hand interview) 
 
"This is not just a football 
problem, but a problem in all 
sports." (Staff summary of 
public testimony from 
Washington House Bill 
Report) 
"It’s clear to us that 
concussion is not a football 
issue, not a boy issue. It’s a 
youth sport issue. We want to 
try to have its broad reach as 
possible." (Washington 
coalition representative, first-
hand interview) 
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